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This is a study of postal service development in the United States
from the 1770s to the present.

It presents a comparative perspective on

the change of the Post Office from a government department to a public

corporation and what this transformation tells us about the American

political system's approach to public service provision.
The history of the Post Office indicates three major tensions in
the approach to postal service.

There have been shifts of emphasis

within these areas, so that new accommodations in the tensions have replaced older ones.
The first tension is between a national Post Office Department which

was closely tied

to

local communities through Congress and the nature of

administration and an increasingly nationally-oriented postal corporation.

The public corporate form frees the Post Office from many of the

constraints of and inputs from local conditions.
The second tension is between a politically responsive part of
Executive and
government with oversight and direct involvement by the

organization
Congress as opposed to an autonomous corporate form of

V

which is purposefully insulated from the operations of those two
branches of government.

The change to a Post Office which is indepen-

dent from Congressional and Executive politics is intended to allow for

concentration on a businesslike approach to postal service rather than
a more political approach.

The third tension is between service demands on the Post Office

from interest groups and individuals and the goal of economic efficiency
Intended to reduce or ameliorate deficits.

Service demands tended to

shape financial conditions for much of Post Office history, while recently the economic stance has become a more decisive factor in service

strategies chosen by the United States Postal Service.
All three represent continuing accommodations within the American

political culture.

The Post Office has always been a national institu-

tion, but the types of ties to localities have changed so that it is

presently removed from significant input from communities.

Its role in

helping to promote commerce has always been important, but recent reforms have moved the Post Office closer to a business form, which change
its abilities or stance as a public service.

Finally, there have always

been financial constraints on the Post Office, but whereas earlier the
extension of service was politically attractive and economically feasible,

the economics of postal service and Post Office deficits have made

finances a significant focus of postal decisionmaking.
The development of postal service in the United States reflects
deals with pubchanges in the political system and the way in which it

vi

lie service demands.

The use of the government corporation form sub-

jects the Post Office to different pressures and influences than use of
the government department form, and so defines public service in a

changed manner.

The Postal Service has become more attentive to demands

consistent with a corporate form, while it has become less responsive to
more traditional types of political pressure placed on government departments.

This has altered the orientation and nature of service, and

the place of the Post Office within the context of a governmental

agency.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the topic of postal service and its changed

character in the context of American politics.

The Post Office began as

an integral operating part of the national government but has been transformed into a public corporation which is tied to the national government

but removed from direct and ongoing Congressional or Executive control.
This change to a public corporation occurred in 1971.

The discussion of the Post Office sets out the differences between
a postal service operated as a government department or agency and one

run as a public corporation.

The new form taken is the result of al-

tered conditions in the society and political process and reflects one

contemporary approach to the provision of public services.

Therefore,

the recent growth in the use of public corporations makes the topic one
of interest and importance in contemporary affairs, for it is indicative
of how the political system is attempting to cope with the demands of

modern American life.

The reasons for the use of the corporate form in

the provision of postal service can be better understood through defin-

ing the term "public corporations," positing the importance of the in-

both
quiry, and explaining the approach taken in discussing the subject,

traditionally and in this study.

1

2

2

The Place of Public Corporations in the Modern State

Public corporations are extra-governmental entities, tied

to

the

state by authorizing legislation, legitimacy, implicit and/or explicit

financial guarantees, and "ownership."

They are part of the government

in the sense of having been created by government and retaining certain
ties to government, but they operate autonomously from the regular de-

partments (and constraints) of government.

They are free from regular

budgetary processes, public administrative techniques, political battles
involving the executive departments, political patronage, and some or
all civil service requirements.

Instead, they are established to oper-

ate on the managerial model of private business in order to take advantage of the flexibility, aggressiveness, and efficiency"^ which the ab-

sence of government constraints is said to allow.

They are intended to

be financially self-sufficient, or at least economically efficient given
their mandate, and able to pursue their goals in a "businesslike" way.

The growth in the use of the public corporate form has been tied

to

reactions to emergencies which occurred because of foreign policy con-

siderations (World Wars and the Cold War), economic distress (the Great
Depression), and the social welfare programs meant to meet these crises
(the New Deal,

the Great Society).

The case of the Post Office, how-

widespread emerever, does not fit into this pattern for there was no
gency at hand.

There was alarm concerning the financial condition and

Chapter
service delivery performance of the Post Office (see

V)

but

crisis.
these were not the result of a greater societal

ownership of the
Earlier, the national government had acquired

^

3

Panama Railroad Company in 1904 (by gaining French interests in it) and
the Alaska Northern Railroad Company in 1915, and founded the Federal

Land Banks in 1916, but these first isolated instances simply.

eroded the basis for opposition in principle to federal public
corporations and by the time of World War I the United States
was prepared to and did employ the public corporation as a
normally available alternative for the carrying out of federal
functions
.

The first spurt of public corporate formations was the result of specific emergencies, however, and was intended to be temporary.^

But emergencies continued to arise, and public corporations were
formed as a consequence.

The Great Depression brought the New Deal

programs, and World War II generated a host of new needs, and public

programs and institutions.

Efforts at administrative reorganization

slowed the growth of public corporations, since the Brownlow report and
the first Hoover Commission "were antagonistic to the existence of auto-

nomous administrative units and markedly biased in favor of a closely

co-ordinated executive branch."^
The post-World War II period, with the growth of the permanent national security and welfare state, brought about renewed interest in

autonomous public corporations.

The willingness and impetus to use pub-

lic corporations has been indicative of the difficulties and obstacles
obstacles
facing legislators involved with growing political demands and

Postal reorganization is instructive on this point.

Congressmen have

political and
seen the removal of the postal service from their direct
demands
administrative purview as a relief from an unending series of

and complaints.

conEven without a role in appointing postmasters or

.

firming the Postmaster General, and without extensive oversight functions,

Congressmen still receive many complaints.

(After all, as a

public corporation with a long history of political activity, the postal
service is still perceived of as a governmental service.)

But Congress-

men view this as the mere tip of an iceberg they would face if they
still involved themselves directly in budgeting and administration of
the postal system.^

Public corporations are often more acceptable than other forms of
public action to those who are uneasy with expansion of the public sector.

In areas where they are considered necessary, often where no pri-

vate enterprise will tread, public corporations act in a manner consistent with private methods of management and operation.

This sits com-

fortably with those who espouse the superior efficiency of private

enterprise

Public corporations take varying organizational and structural
forms to meet different needs.

A public corporation may be local (elec-

tric companies), state (liquor stores), regional (transportation author-

ities),

federally operated but regionally applied (the Tennessee Valley

Authority), and national (the USPS, Amtrack)

.

There are numerous vari-

ations within each of these "geographical" forms.
of our
These "geographical" forms are important within the context

federal system of government.

Some public corporations grow out of and

regional public corparallel units of government, while others (such as

porations) do not.

Some view this development as destructive of the

of a system which
federal system; others point to the adaptive nature
as in water basin management.
can accommodate mul tigovernmental needs,

.

In this sense, public corporations have served as tools of governmental

modernization and relevance, contrasting with the slow-moving process of
altering bureaucratic institutions.

Importance of the Inquiry into the Public Corporation

The public corporation is an important topic for two major reasons.
the relation between the public sector and the private sector has

First,

been and continues to be a main point of contention in American politics.^

Second, as faith in the ability of government to act in the in-

terests of the public good

g

fabric of society increase.

is increasingly eroded, pressures on the

The ability of the government to provide

adequate services to citizens is an important part of constituent evalu-

ation of whether the public good is being approached, and this is a central reason why public corporations play such a crucial role in modern

society
The public corporation holds a potentially large store of information for the political scientist.

To begin with,

the value orientations

of American society which mold public policy are revealed through the

study of public corporations.

This ideological framework is the agenda-

setting function of the American political culture within which the institutions of government operate.

In this sense, constraints upon poli-

tical institutions are as important as powers granted,

for both affect

the performance of public institutions and political actors.

As Alexan-

der Hamilton wrote in Federalist #23:

universal; the
It rests upon axioms as simple as they are
from
means ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons

^

whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought
possess the means by which it is to be attained.

to

In American politics, intense debate has revolved around discovering the

proper location for that actor and power; in the private sector, in
local government, or in the national government.

The resultant public

agencies are significantly shaped by the nature of that discussion in
terms of the atmosphere within which the public sphere operates.

Furthermore,

the way in which government approaches public corpora-

tions sets the boundaries within which legitimation of the public sector
occurs.

The debate will be affected both by the operation and by public

perception of the operation of the public sector.

Judgment of the suc-

cess of public corporations relative to private enterprise relies on

this framing of important definitional criteria.

If private enterprise

is perceived to incorporate such desirable traits as profitability,

growth, and diversification, while the public enterprise model is viewed
as resulting in chronic deficits,

increasing bureaucratization, and de-

teriorating service, then debates over the size of the public sector
relative to the private are already skewed in favor of the latter.

Employment is an example.

An increase in private sector employment

is generally viewed as positive, bringing jobs to the community, mean-

ingful work to individuals, and tax revenues to the various levels of
government, as well as secondary effects which in turn create more jobs,

general economic improvement, and further revenues.

By contrast, in-

creased employment in the public sector generally has negative connotations.

funcIt indicates the inefficiency of government operations and

which had
tioning, a further burden on the taxpayer, a work opportunity

.

to be "created" or is justified as "make-work"

,

and a further demand on

limited tax revenues, having the secondary effect of diminishing individual motivation and stultifying personal initiative, slowing the

growth of the economy, tying up capital, and doing all this without im-

proving general service trends.
flections of the same process

Yet these two pictures are simply re-

— creation

of jobs

— albeit

by the different

sectors
Finally, the terms of legitimation then sanction particular types

of behavior by the constituent elements in the political process.

Dif-

fering expectations for public agencies and private enterprise result in

distinctive ways of operating and evaluating public agencies.

The pre-

vailing stereotype of public sector operation reinforces the norm.

For

example, when problems occur in the Medicaid program the blame is usually
laid on government rather than on the private vendors of service (doctors, hospitals) who profit from public programs.

This "proves" the in-

efficiency of government programs while not raising private operations
as a significant point in the debate.

Traditional Approaches to the Study of Public Corporations

Public corporations as a research topic have received a fairly narrow and limited treatment.

Work in this field has focused on the areas

of public administration, management, organization theory, and eco-

nomics.

These studies have defined politics narrowly, and, in a way,

have dealt with public corporations on their own terms.

This means that

leads to disthe organization and limited goals of public corporations

administration
cussions concerning whether management, organization, or

8

can be improved, or if public corporations are economically efficient or

not.

The analysis of the public corporation as a political instrument

and in light of political processes is not adequately treated, if con-

sidered at all.
The existing literature does raise issues which are related to politics and public corporations.

First, there is the issue of the p ublic-

ness of public corporations.

Public ownership is generally the defining

criteria for these entities.

But public ownership, while a necessary

criterion is not a sufficient one, for as William Shepherd writes, "publicly owned enterprises can be essentially private in behavior and anti-

public in their performance."-'-^

Annmarie Hauck Walsh describes public

corporations as, "corporations without stockholders, land] jurisdictions

without voters or taxpayers

.

"-'-'•

the nature and extent of public

Thus,

control over these public agencies is one significant element in consid-

ering their character.

Since the American political system allows for

a great variety of public corporations,

each with a different relation-

ship to the public and its representatives because of the uniqueness of
its construction, constituency, and mission, public corporations are in

many senses mixed enterprises.
Shepherd cites certain elements which define the publicness of public corporations:

1)

public cost, such as subsidies and the provision

of capital, 2) public control,
5)

3)

management,

scope of geographical coverage. 1^

a formal

4)

degree of monopoly, and

Although these elements allow for

definition, the manner in which public corporations operate and

the implicit ends they pursue may cloud the issue of publicness.

But

than simple
Shepherd's list does incorporate a more comprehensive notion

ownership.

Similarly, Arthur Selwyn Miller says that to identify public

corporations, one must ask:

1)

who owns them?

2)

where do they get

their financing? and 3) how much control is exercised by the government

over them? 13

(Miller is generally concerned with private enterprises

which serve increasingly public functions.)
Since the range of public corporations is great (with no standard
model) publicness is an important consideration in examining each indi-

vidual case.

The nomenclature may indicate "public," leading to expec-

tations of services to fulfill public needs, when the organization,

management, scope of activity, and other criteria may in fact mitigate

against any extensive publicness.

Public corporations, as Shepherd and

Wilcox argue, must be understood within the context of their mandate,
their control mechanisms, the scope of their activities, and their

market orientation.
In addition,

the notion of "public" should include a consideration

of the political dimension of their operations.

Ties to legislators and

the executive branch ground public entities in a public role which, if

ignored, hold the potential for claims of political illegitimacy.

As

Walsh states, "The widely accepted premise that the operation of public
authorities should be protected from politics influences the selection
of politics and programs and precludes certain changes."!'^

The concen-

tration of financial and technical aspects of running a public corporation often allows the political or public dimension to be ignored.
turn,

In

failures of responsiveness to public needs become identified with

the shortcomings of public agencies and government in general.

This

of
undermines the belief in governmental operations and the legitimacy

10

public institutions.

Postal Service as a Topic of Study

The United States Postal Service (USPS) is an example of an Ameri-

can public corporation and offers the opportunity to evaluate prevailing
attitudes toward public corporations in the United States.

modern industrial democracies, the postal service is

As in all

a major component

of the society's infrastructure, and a service covered by a unique type

of monopoly in the United States.

It is one vital component of the over-

all communications network, processing 114,049 billion pieces of mail
in Fiscal Year 1982.-'-^

The postal service is primarily a mail delivery

service, yet it also manifests other important properties.
The literature concerning postal service tends to deal less with
the political results and dimensions of its operations than with more

narrowly conceived understandings of postal service.

operation has been a central concern.

Efficiency of

There has been considerable ef-

fort in minimizing the amounts of public resources used to produce a

given level of public benefits.

This is evident in the criteria by

which the postal service specifically and public corporations in general
are evaluated:
(1)

economic efficiency,

(2)

productivity increases, and

(3)

managerial and administrative efficiency.

A brief description of these will contrast the dominant approaches to

postal service as a public corporation with the tack pursued in this
study.

11

Economic efficiency

.

The application of economic efficiency criteria to the postal

service aims at minimizing deficits or achieving self-sustenance.

Most

recent evaluations of the postal service are explicitly economic in this

While controlling costs is admittedly a worthy endeavor, the con-

way.

cern with economic efficiency of public corporations often neglects

broader issues of political values, purpose, and service.
Recent studies reflect this emphasis on the USPS as an economic

enterprise guided by criteria of economic efficiency.
the Postal System

,

The Economics of

by Alan L. Sorkin, does this explicitly.

He writes:

In spite of the size of the U.S. Postal Service budget and

work force, and the importance of timely mail delivery to
business and consumers, there has been very little economic
analysis of this significant activity. This book focuses on
various economic aspects of the postal industry in an attempt
to provide a guide to policy. 16

Economic analyses offer interesting clues to the values built into the
approach, such as viewing the USPS as the postal industry

.

In any

event, Sorkin 's emphasis on economic considerations is joined by others

studying the postal service, though perhaps not so explicitly.

Perspectives on Postal Service Issues
Sherman,-'-''

is

,

an anthology edited by Roger

divided into the economic, legal, and political for, as

William J. Baroody, Jr., writes in the Foreward, "economic calculations
must be tempered by political prudence just as political enthusiasms
must be restrained by economic realities."''-^
tion,

But even with this recogni-

the book is generally imbued with a certain fascination with eco-

nomic rationality.

In the last chapter

,

"Politics and the Future of

12

Postal Services," James

I.

Campbell, Jr., concludes that:

The most important effect that politics will have on the
future of postal services will be the degree to which the
political game grants the overpriced and increasingly obsolete Postal Service protection from competition. 19

Thus, even in considering the political, Campbell takes a rather narrow

focus as to the effects, concentrating on the issue of postal monopoly
and competition, which is central to the economic assessment of postal

service.

Although nominally a political analysis, Campbell's article

reflects a deemphasis of a political understanding of the place of the

public corporation in a political system, and the effects of actions on
that political system.

Similarly, an earlier volume by John Haldi, Postal Monopoly:

Assessment of the Private Express Statutes

,^

An

argues that, "It is time

to discover whether the postal monopoly is necessary and economical, or

whether it has outlived any usefulness it may have had and is now a barrier to further progress. "^1

Clearly, Haldi is advancing economic con-

siderations to make his case, including arguments concerning economies
of scale and whether the postal service is a natural monopoly.

The pri-

macy of economic rationality is evident, and in discussing the role of

politics in the postal service, Haldi relates that:

Undoubtedly the most constructive step which Congress could
take to eliminate politics and impose economic rationality on
the postal system would be to abolish the monopoly enshrined
in the Private Express Statutes.

Haldi does not include the public service functions of the postal servof
ice in his argument, implicitly recognizing these to be indicative

13

the inappropriate politics involved in the postal monopoly.

Productivity increases

.

Productivity increases are an important topic for much of the business and government worlds, as managers try to raise productivity per

worker to compete with foreign labor, tight budgets, and demands for
profits.

The USPS boasts that:

Productivity increased 3.6 percent this year [1982], with
pieces of mail processed per worker rising from 161,879 in
fiscal 1981 to an all-time high of 167,650 in fiscal 1982.
Since passage of the Postal Reorganization Act, the Postal
Service's productivity has climbed 43.4 percent. In comparison, the productivity of private, non-financial corporations
has gone up just 18.4 percent in that time. Postal productivity gains have exceeded those of the private sector for
nine of the last 13 years. ^-^

Critics raise questions about the methodology of the postal service's

productivity measures,

but regardless, the relationship between the

primacy of economic efficiency and resulting concern with productivity
is clear.

The emphasis on economics and on productivity measures leads

the USPS to consider these narrow perspectives of public service while

downplaying a broader relevance

to

issues such as employment in the

society, the nature of public service in a democratic state, or the re-

lationship between democratic politics and the structure of institutions
designed to carry out public policies.

Managerial and administrative efficiency

.

Another perspective from which the postal service has been ap-

proached is that of management and administration.

But by looking at

political
the postal system as a corporate administrative tool, rich

14

dynamics are ignored, excluded, or implicitly rejected as
undesirable
and illegitimate.

The study of management and administration, while

valuable, limits the conceptual boundaries of an analysis of a public

postal service.

John Tierney recognizes the role of politics in postal

management and the conflicting signals sent to the USPS by the political
process, but the focus of this information is applied to evaluation of

management rather than to the relationship of postal management
stituents of the political process.

Reorganization

to con-

He writes in the Preface of Postal

:

This is a study of the management of the nation's oldest and
largest business the U.S. postal system. The book aims primarily to analyze and explain what difference the 1971 reorganization of the U.S. Post Office Department has made in how
the huge mail delivery organization is managed.
My purpose in offering this analysis is neither to catalogue the perceived weaknesses of postal management nor to
offer prescriptions for improving the system's performance.
Rather, I am trying to identify and explain what features of
the Postal Service's task and environment make it difficult
for the organization's executives to apply "businesslike"
solutions to the postal system's problems. ^5

—

Tierney is not as concerned with the political dimensions and effects of postal service as with the effects of environmental influences

(politics included) on the pursuit of management's agenda.

He finds that

multiple goals keep the reorganized postal service from fulfilling its
mandate, because:

Despite the stated intent of the 1970 Postal Reorganization
Act, members of Congress to date have chosen to place limits
on postal executives' freedom to pursue efficiency and economy,
especially when the savings might come at the price of lessened

public convenience 2^
.

.
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This interferes with economic rationality and
managerial autonomy.

Tiemey indicates that the various political and social
goals are
inconsistent with economy and efficiency, and that

Congress alone can solve this problem, and it can do so only
by making difficult choices among irreconciliable goals.
Members of Congress will have to move beyond their stock harangues
at postal management and decide whether they want a costly
postal service that meets an assortment of conspicuous political needs or whether they want a lean and cost-effective
mail delivery system that will fit more cleanly in a changing
communications environment

His analysis contains evident bias, such as that arguments over postal

service and management are "harangues" to be avoided rather than an as-

pect of the political debate over the public role of the USPS, and that

politicians can simply decide
the society.

to

ignore the assorted political needs of

He also is positing a choice which may not be a "problem"

to be "solved" at all and approaching the issue as a problem of efficient

management and administration, concerned with agenda-setting, goal orientation, organization, and managerial prerogative.

Tierney's approach

results from his view that "the whole postal reform movement was essen-

tially to attempt to secure managerial autonomy."

Similarly, The Evaluation of the United States Postal Service

,

a

Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration com-

missioned by the USPS

,

is an assessment of the USPS's implementation

of the Postal Reorganization Act.
to

the USPS,

"The Academy was chosen," according

"because of its record of unbiased and informed studies in

the field of public administration and its technique of bringing together

panels of distinguished experts to make such reviews. "^0

So the report

16

was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of managerial implementation

of the Postal Reorganization Act, and recommend improvements in areas
of
deficiency.

It was not intended as an evaluation of the political nature

of the postal service, except in terms of how well postal service had

been insulated from Congressional and Executive branch politics.

Both these studies, in different ways, seek to understand the postal

service in a framework of managerial or administrative efficiency.

Al-

though valuable, they are indicative of the lack of attention to the

postal service as a public institution, one tied to government and politics in important ways for the functioning of American democratic government.

The political connection is not tangential but essential, for the

history of the postal system, from its beginnings, has been steeped in
politics.

In many ways,

this has been the postal service's strength.

The Approach of This Study

This study of the postal service has been done through the historical development of the Post Office beginning in the 1770s.

This his-

torical approach allows us to compare the Post Office Department and the

United States Postal Service, and to analyze the differences.

The Post

Office has changed in structural and organizational form during the past
200 years,

from an agency within the Treasury Department to a department

of government to a governmental corporation.

This reflects certain

changes in the understanding of politics within the American political
system, which can then be posited and discussed.

This allows for an un-

derstanding of how public corporations differ as political institutions
from more (historically) traditional forms of government organization.

i
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Three prominent tensions emerge from this historical study of the

postal service.

They include that between 1) the postal service as a

service organization and as an economic enterprise,

2)

the postal service

as a community-oriented national political institution and the postal

service as a corporate national organization, and

the primacy of po-

3)

litics as against that of businesslike operations.

These tensions have

been resolved in different ways during postal history.
The issue of service versus economics has never been a critical is-

sue of postal operations and policy until recently.

The early resolu-

tion of the tension served as a model until the postal deficit reached

alarming proportions in the last several decades.

Congress had been

willing to underwrite the expansion of postal services through the years
despite having to draw money from the treasury to do so.

The benefits

of distributive politics in a nation which was expanding rapidly over-

whelmed the fiscal constraints which were present.
The operations of the Post Office in the middle of the twentieth

century produced deficits which were too large, at
demands on the national treasury were growing.

a

time when competing

Thus, a new accommoda-

tion was styled which made service delivery more dependent upon the eco-

nomic circumstances of the Post Office rather than letting the financial

picture be formed by service demands.
The second tension has been that of a postal service rooted politically in the community versus a post office oriented to national concerns.

The Post Office has been a national government operation since

throughout
its creation, but it has had important ties to communities
its history.

This is evident both in the post offices which were and

.
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are situated in localities and in the conception of how national ad-

ministration relates to the community.

The founding era Post Office was

closely aligned with local needs and politics because of the nature of
the postal mandate of the time, including Congressional prerogatives in

postal policymaking and the roots Executive administrators had in the
community.

The important figures in the society were essentially local

figures, recognized as having the proper attributes to inhabit public

office by the constituents of the community

The rise of party government changed orientations toward administration but retained the ties to community politics.

After all, the parties

maintained their strength at the local level and responded to (varied)
local conceptions of public needs.

This represented a different empha-

sis in how to properly formulate public policy including the nature of
the actors involved, but it still left the prerogatives of that power

accessible to the community.
The Progressive Era signalled a shift to a national government

which would limit local prerogatives in order

to minimize the venal in-

fluences of parties and bosses and the inability of local interests to
conceive of the national "good," while promoting statesmanship and the

pursuit of proper policies.

Proper government policies would be gener-

ated through national administration held responsible to the elected
chief Executive and insulated from particular local jealousies repre-

sented by Congress, bosses, and interest groups.

While this presented

an idea of representative government based on notions of administrative
ties
responsibility and efficiency, it did so by removing the political
to the local political units and representatives.

(The Executive would

19

be held accountable by "public opinion ." -^2)

This culminated in the reorganization of the Post Office, wherein

administration and management was further removed from community control
by taking the Post Office out of the Executive branch of government al-

together and making it a public corporation.

Thus, the Postal Service

became estranged politically from localities; its local policies tend to
take on a homogeneous character, rooted in marketing surveys and other

methods used by corporations to evaluate their operations.

This may be

a legitimate way of providing postal service, but it highlights the

change which has occurred over the last two centuries.
The third tension is that between the political Post Office and the

businesslike USPS.

As the Post Office moved toward a more nationally-

oriented service, it also came to a more bureaucratic and businesslike

understanding of its functions.

Congressional politicking and interest

group pressure on postal affairs led to an attempt to make the Post Of-

fice more professional and less prone to purely political judgments and

machinations.

Earlier ideas about reforming the Post Office Department,

such as the recommendations of the Hoover Commission in 1949 (see Chapter V), were rejected in favor of a more drastic detachment of the Post

Office from the main political channels of Congressional and Executive
politics and budgeting.

The USPS is still subject to Congressional

pressures in extraordinary circumstances and the Presidential appointinfluence
ment powers for the Board of Governors, but the extent of this

contrasts enormously with that of the old Post Office Department.
Office in
This study begins with the founding of the American Post

certain political
the 1770s, with the establishment of an agency having
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bases and ties to the national government and communities, an accommodation between service and economic efficiency, and a formative relationship with the private sector.

The intent is to demonstrate both the

development of the Post Office as a public agency and the changes in the

understanding of politics in the American political system which have
occurred since the founding.

.
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Theory and Develo

CHAPTER

II

POSTAL SERVICE IN THE NEW NATION

Postal service was not an invention of the New World or Europe:
its origins have been traced to Mesopotamia, Assyria and Persia, Egypt,

Greece, Rome, China and Japan.

These older postal "systems" were de-

signed for quite different clientele than those presently operating,

being intended to deliver messages to government officials (and influential private citizens) rather than to provide a broad-based service
for the general population.

The early systems demonstrate, however, the

Importance of a communications network in any developed or extended society.

Governments, whether limited or broad in their structure and

participatory vision, have viewed postal communications of some sort as
vital to their success.

Later versions of postal service have empha-

sized citizen needs for, and even "rights" to, such service, indicative
perhaps of a general proliferation of rights among people throughout
society.

The American colonial post office was established by a grant from

William and Mary to Thomas Neale

,

on February 17, 1692.

2

Neale was em-

powered to run the service as he saw fit, with an obligatory payment of
six shillings and eight pence made to the Crown annually.

3

Neale never visited the American colonies, running the system from

Britain and through a deputy postmaster in the colonies, Andrew Hamilton.
Neale had relieved himself of the patent by 1698, and the Crown bought

24
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it back in 1710.

4

The Crown never realized a profit from the post of-

fice during this early period.
In 1753, Benjamin Franklin became the deputy postmaster in the

colonies; and as early as 1761, the colonial post office registered its
first surplus for the Crown, in the amount of 499 pounds.^

Crown received 3,000 pounds.

In 1774, the

Although the operation of the post office

benefitted from Franklin's financial and organizational skills, he in
fact spent all but five years (between 1753 and 1774) in Britain.

The history of the British-directed post office ended as the war of

independence began, a result of the creation of an indigenous Continental
post office and subsequent atrophy of the British system.

The British

post office in the colonies closed on Christmas Day in 1775.

This chap-

ter analyzes the establishment of that truly American post office, a

product of the increasing tensions between Britain and her colonies.

A Continental Post Office

Events in 1774 led to the creation of an indigenous American postal
service, a product of the Committees of Correspondence and an emerging

sense of nationhood.

The need for and plans to establish a postal sys-

tem, neither supportive of nor administered by the British, heralded the

birth of an American post office.

William Goddard is credited with generating the idea and promoting
it into a practicing postal system, which he did within a relatively

short time.

His trip from Baltimore through New York and New England

(in February, March,

and April, 1774)

time he returned to Baltimore.

led to a functioning entity by the

.
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Goddard proposed a "Constitutional Post office" to the New York
Committee of Correspondence, and then to several New England Committees,
the most important being the Boston Committee.

By August 11,

1774, the

postal system was operating from Casco Bay, Maine, to Williamsburg,
.

.

Virginia

7

There were three main justifications for the establishment of an

independent postal system:

the security of private mail deliveries and

the noninterference with newspaper deliveries,

the denial of revenue to

the British ministry, and the positive motive of providing a unifying

force among the colonies.

The fear of British interference with the mails lay in the nature
of communications being made by the colonists in the atmosphere follow-

ing the multiple troubles with British authority.

John

C.

Miller indi-

cates that Samuel Adams saw the Goddard plan as a chance to take action

towards his goal of ridding America of all Parliamentary authority:

Adams was eager to make a fresh assault upon British authority, for he knew it would be fatal for the revolutionary movement in the colonies to appear to stand still after the Tea
party. Moreover, he foresaw that if matters came to the worst
between the mother country and colonies, America would require
a separate system of postriders to prevent a stoppage of intercolonial correspondence; hence his denunciations of the
constitutional [British] post office as "an usurpation of the
Parliament no longer to be borne. "^

In addition to possible interference with the regular letter mail,

"editors were worried about possible rejection of their newspapers in
the mail."

9

The central role of letters and newspapers in spreading

news about British actions and fostering American resistance made security of the mails of great importance.

.
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In many parts of the colonies men were already, through secret
committees, laying the foundations for the structure of revolt
which soon arose. There was constant danger that their plans
might be discovered through the interception of letters by the
postmasters. But if letters were at the mercy of the post office, the same was much more true of newspapers

Secondly, Goddard presented the British post office service as an

unconstitutional tax upon the colonists, which provided a considerable
revenue to the British crown.

The Committees reasoned that there was

truth in the charge, and the Boston Committee thought "its fees were

just as unconstitutional as the tea duty, though the revenue was
smaller."

The revenues were not inconsiderable, however, and this

coupled with the idea of "no taxation without representation" made swift

action by the Committees fully understandable.
The third factor was that of promoting a union among the states,
the only formal institutional entity in the yet-to-be-United States.

An

important part of the unity of action with regard to the new postal system very likely was the dismissal of Benjamin Franklin as postmaster of
the colonial post office.

This occurred January 30, 1774, and was con-

firmed in the colonies by no later than April 25, 1774,
been circulated as a rumor beforehand.

13

though it had

Thus, what had been a reluctance

to institute a new system out of respect for Franklin was turned into a

motivation for a new system.

By this act the British had foolishly severed an important
link between the old Post Office and the Americans, who were
now less reluctant to erect their "Constitutional Post Office"
on the wreckage of the old one than they might otherwise have

been.l^

Indeed, one commentator viewed the goal of fostering union a prominent
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factor for pursuing the post office, more so than that of limiting

revenue to the British.

Richard D. Brown writes that:

As the Boston Committee of Correspondence envisioned it, the
post office project furnished an ideal example of joint colonial action and an excellent opportunity to develop the
cherished defensive union among the colonies.
Resistance, after all, had already become a generalized colonial
phenomenon by the spring of 1774; the union needed to make it
effective was the vital remaining goal.l^
.

.

,

The new post office extended from Maine to Virginia within four

months of its establishment, and it was the first institution of national stature.

It predated the founding of the nation and was central

to the successful revolution and founding.

It was integral to the opera-

tion of the nation from birth and is as good a representative of ongoing

public enterprise in the United States as can be found.

Its story is

one with excitement almost unparalleled, for it "witnessed" and participated in the much-celebrated revolution while never firing a single
shot.

Its power represented most essentially that of words, to both in-

form and propagandize.

The story of the United States Postal Service

thus began.

The Post Office of the Continental Congress

The Second Continental Congress met on May 10, 1775, and on May 29

appointed "a committee to consider the best means of establishing posts
for conveying letters and intelligence through this Continent."

16

The

committee members were Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Lynch, Richard Henry
Lee, Thomas Willing, Samuel Adams,

and Philip Livingston.

On July 26,

1775, the Congress took over the postal system, and appointed Benjamin

,

.
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Franklin as Postmaster General.

Thus,

the establishment of a postal

service by the Continental Congress reinforced the central
role of communication, free from British surveillence

,

in the emerging "nation."

It created a system intended to extend from Falmouth

(now Portland)

Maine, to Savannah, Georgia, with a weekly post to South Carolina.

Any

profits were to go to the treasury; deficits would be paid by the United
Colonies.

There were modifications of the essential system between 1775 and
1782, such as which routes were to be served and how often, what sal-

aries and payments would be made, the process for dealing with "dead

letters," and other matters.

Two acts indicative of the perceived im-

portance of the post office occurred in 1776:

on July

8,

all postmas-

ters, during term of duty, were excused from any military service, and

on August 8 post riders were likewise excused. 19

During this period a functioning postal service was able to carry
on the nation's business, from that of military officers to Congressmen
to private citizens.

Just as it had been an instrument for nurturing an American
mind and encouraging resistance to the British, so now it was
used to unite Americans in a common cause. At great cost and
at great hazard, postriders carried letters and documents of
one kind or another between a frequently moving government and
its armies in the field as well as between soldiers and their
families

The Post Office under the Articles

In 1781 the Articles of Confederation gained final adoption as the

working order of government for the United States.

The Articles gave

30

the United States in Congress assembled

the sole and exclusive right and power of.
.establishing and
regulating post-offices from one State to another throughout
all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers
passing the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of
the said office. 21
.

As peace neared, the new Congress acted to develop a more elaborate

postal system.

On October 18, 1782, "An Ordinance for Regulating the

Post Office of the United States of America," was passed into law.

It

began by stating that

the communication of intelligence with regularity and despatch, from one part to another of these United States, is
essentially requisite to the safety as well as the commercial
^2
interest thereof.
.

.

.

and was followed by the plan which was to govern the post office's oper-

ation for the following ten years.
In addition to setting up the mechanism by which the post office

would operate, the Ordinance was noteworthy for establishing an operation which was not a revenue-producing service.
the new government,

This orientation, under

indicated that profits from the post office should

be used for improvements in service (i.e., establishment of new post of-

fices and purchase of equipment with which to carry the mail) and not as
a source of revenue.

23

Nearly a century and a half later. Congressman

Clyde Kelly was able to look back at this period and write:

The change from profit seeking to service-giving was one of
those acts which made American Independence more than a mere
separation from England. It was a revolution in the principle
and purpose of government. The Post Office Establishment underwent a change, not of method but of fundamental purpose.

.
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The principle of the public good was substituted for that of
government gain.^^

The distinction was important, for the orientation toward revenue recy-

cling played a significant role in the rapid expansion of post roads and

postal services.

Equally important, perhaps more so, was the establishment of the

postal service as a national institution which was unrivalled at the
time.

Both the Articles of Confederation and the Ordinance of 1782 in-

dicate the national scope of the office.

There was neither great debate

concerning the power of postal service as being too centralizing in influence nor jealousy evident on the part of the states.

The Articles

were adopted, then the Ordinance of 1782, and the post office operated
pretty much within that framework until 1792, when the new government

under the Constitution passed a comprehensive statute governing postal
operations.
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Only two issues apparently challenged the national orien-

tation of the postal service during that period, although one finds

criticism of the service rendered (which seems the fate of delivering
the mail at almost any time and place)

The first question centered around whether to accept paper currency
as payment for postage.

The period of the 1780s was, of course, charac-

terized by the issue of paper currency in the states:
states had issued some form of such currency.
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by 1786 seven

The impetus for paper

money is usually attributed to the needs of debtors and agrarian interests as opposed to the desire for specie by commercial and creditor in-

terests.

The main concern as regards the postal service is that there

was a clamor to pay for postage with paper money; the Postmaster General,

32

Ebenezer Hazard, ordered postal officials to accept only "hard" money.
He was backed by an act of Congress of September 20, 1786, which stated
the postmaster general is "to receive no money in payment other than

specie."

This apparently resolved the issue, and the post office was

able to collect specie for its services. 2 8
The second issue was one which more directly challenged the national

orientation of the General Post Office of the United States.

The chal-

lenge was not to the operation of the post office in interstate communi-

cations or on the main post road; there was a question, though, of in-

trastate postal service.

The main reference to this problem appears in

a letter from Postmaster General Hazard to the Congress.

recorded that Hazard

The Congress

"was

forwarding intelligence from Frederick Green, Postmaster at
Annapolis, informing that the Maryland legislature is considering taking control of the Maryland postoffice [sic] under
the idea that Congress had control in interstate postoffice
[sic] business and not within the state.

More specifically. Hazard reproduced Green's letter, which read:

Our assembly last Fall brought in a Bill to Establish Post
Riders to the different Parts of the State, and the Superintendence thereof was put under my direction as Postmaster general of the State; and I was told by the principal members
that the power given Congress by the Confederation was "establishing and regulating Post Offices from one State to
another throughout all the United States," and not to establish Post Offices within the State, off the Continental Line.
The Business was finally postponed to the next Session (which
will set in a few weeks) when I expect it will be again taken
up. 30

Apparently this issue never surfaced again,

Although postal his-

approval
torian Gerald Cullinan wrote that Hazard "gained Congressional

33

of the principle that all post offices, whether or not they were situ-

ated on the main post road, were under the jurisdiction of the central

government,"

the Congressional records do not indicate such an action.

Other sources refer to the episode of Hazard's letter, more or less

obliquely, but no further mention is made either of Maryland's actions

or the Congressional reaction.

It may be that

the results of the Anna-

polis convention, i.e., a calling for a constitutional convention in May
of 1787, had diffused the issue.

Regardless, even with this "false

alarm," the issue of national supremacy in all postal service was not

seriously challenged during the tenure of the Articles of Confederation,
a time certainly noted for its generation of state sovereignty debates

over many of the crucial political services and functions of the day.
That there was no serious debate concerning a national postal service,
one of the most extensive operations of national sovereignty and viewed
by influential figures representing the full spectrum of political belief as a vital function of the society, is in itself quite remarkable,

either for the disinterestedness assumed or, more likely, in the perceived inherent legitimacy of postal service as properly national in

scope and orientation.
If postal service occupies the same level of national justification

as such operations as the treasury and the military

(indeed, perhaps

greater justification given the early general unanimity on its course of
conduct)

,

then it can be said that the postal service represents the

most fundamental type of commitment by the United States government, and
therefore is as proper a subject of study of public enterprise in the
United States as any.

The post office provides the policy analyst with

—
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the advantage of a public enterprise commitment which:
tire history of the United States,
that history,

3)

2)

1)

spans the en-

plays an important role throughout

demonstrates an example of government commitment to the

successful operation of public enterprise, and

4)

mirrors any changes in

policy attitude toward the operation of public agencies.
As noted before, there were difficulties with postal service which

in no way related to the issue of federalism.

One was interference with

the mail, which did carry fines but was evidently a common occurrence.

George Mason wrote in a letter to Arthur Lee,

in 1783, that:

I have lately received two or three Letters from Europe, Via
Philadelphia, every one of them broken open, and sealed up
again there, or at some intervening Post Offices; as almost
all the Letters I have had these two years past from Europe
have been. 32

Madison and Jefferson sent their most important messages to each other
in cipher to avoid discovery by interference,

a further indication of

the insecurity of the mails in terns of inviolability.

33

A second problem was the irregularity of the mails.

Conditions

were rather primitive in many areas, the roads not yet well-developed,
and conveyance of the mail dependent upon chance.

A typical citation

comes from the pages of the Journals of the Continental Congress, where
it was noted that:

Congress having received information that the mail from the
southward has arrived here but twice for the last seven weeks
and then only from Virginia, and that mail from the eastward
has arrived here but once for the last three weeks, notwithstanding travellers both on horseback and in carriages have
passed on the post roads Resolved That the postmaster general be directed to inquire into and report to Congress the
.-^^
reason for the aforesaid failures.
,

.

.
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The expectations for deliveries in that period were certainly
not great

compared to contemporary standards, and yet even so there was
trouble

with mail delivery.

Though this type of complaint was to continue, it

is framed in a time and societal atmosphere quite different from
that of

today.

The culture of a preindustrial society would differ in its lack

of emphasis on routinlzat ion of postal delivery, as would a commercial

society (which was soon to develop)

.

A Constitutional Post Office

The debate in the Constitutional Convention did not enter into a

consideration of national versus state sovereignty regarding the postal
system.

Although one observer indicated that the vote on the amendment

to add the phrase,

"and Post Roads," to the powers of Congress* can at

most be interpreted as a general fear of national power, no such debate
is recorded,

and any such interpretation is highly speculative, not cor-

roborated by any evidence.

35

Indeed, the evidence appears otherwise,

supporting the conclusion that there was no discussion promulgated about
the postal service as anything but a national power of Congress, and
that no plans emerged to alter the national postal power significantly.

The suggestion that Congress should be able to regulate stages on

post-roads was never reported out of the Committee on Detail, and Benjamin Franklin's plan to add a power for "cutting canals where deemed

necessary" was defeated, but not on grounds pertinent

to

the postal

*The Congressional power in the Constitution reads, "To establish
Post Offices and post Roads."

.
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power.

(Although the Pinckney plan 36 had included a clause that the

post office should raise a revenue, this was never discussed further.)

According to Lindsay Rogers, "In the state conventions there was practically no discussion of the postal power."

T 7

James Madison wrote only

two sentences about the postal service in the Federalist #42:

The power of establishing post-roads must, in every view, be
a harmless power and may, perhaps, by judicious management,
become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which
tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be
deemed unworthy of the public care.-^^

The national sense of the post office was already firmly established;

Madison reinforced this view, and the state conventions and Anti-Federalists were quiet, presumably not greatly agitated and probably in

agreement

Anti-Federalist writings demonstrate the amazing lack of disagreement over the construction of the postal power.

The only discussion of

complaint centers around the partisan use of the postmaster authority in

operating the mails to the detriment of the Anti-Federalist position in
ratification debates over the Constitution.
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Some Anti- Federalists

maintained that newspapers supporting their arguments were not delivered,
in certain cases.

Yet these arguments did not touch the structure or

organization of the postal service, but only the use

of

the established

system (then under the Articles of Confederation) for venal and blatantly
political purposes.

This attests to the crucial role of postal service

in the political culture of the time rather than to any disagreement

over a national postal service.

The Anti-Federalists who did mention the postal system in a context
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of national versus state powers,

i.e., in any structural and philosoph-

ically meaningful sense, assumed the power over post offices and post
roads to be naturally a national power.

The Federal Farmer, in a letter

of October 8, 1787, describes three forms of government, and concludes

that "the third plan, or partial consolidation, is.

.

.the only one that

secure [sic] the freedom and happiness of this people. "^^

In a three-

sentence description of the plan, the power over the post office is
given to the general government. 41

In a letter of October 10,

writes that power over the post offices
"clearly.

.

is

a

1787, he

power which should be

.lodged" in the general government.

In "The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by A Farmer," the author,

in discussing the relation of state to national power, mentions the lack
of state control over post-roads in passing but without discussion, im-

plying an acceptance of that national power as legitimate.
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A third reference in Anti-Federalist writings is that by Samuel
He wrote that:

Chase, in April, 1788.

The greatest happiness of a people is to govern themselves.
Our
Their greatest misery is to be governed by others;
state government is fully competent to all internal state
purposes
For the safety and happiness of the people of this and
other states, external objects, or such for which the state
governments are not competent are to be provided for.
1.
To provide a form to regulate commerce among the states
resort against
and to preserve peace between the states
domestic empires, with Indian tribes, and to coin money and to
fix the standard of weights and of foreign coin and to fix the
to establish post offices
standard of weights and measures
may be called a general internal or con and post roads
tinental object.
I am for the establishment of power in Congress for all the
above or similar purposes. '^^
.

.

.

.
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Therefore, there was little debate concerning the powers or structure of the postal service in the Constitution, and the only references
in this context by Anti-Federalists supported the powers as much as did
the Federalists.

The issue was not simply not raised; there was impli-

cit and at times explicit agreement that the postal service should be a

creature of the national government.

This basic consensus launched a

government enterprise which developed, from the very founding, in the
image of the American political system's approach to a legitimate and

important national public service.
Ultimately, the Constitution included a simple yet broad mandate,
the power of Congress "To establish Post Offices and post Roads. "^^

observer noted that, "To establish post offices and

po.st

One

roads is the

form of the grant; to create and regulate the entire postal system of
this Government is the evident intent."
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The absence of any disagreement over a national postal service, or
change from that already operating (under the Articles of Confederation)

,

was reinforced by the actions of the First Congress.

On Septem-

ber 22, 1789, Congress adopted the following:

Be it enacted, &c., That there shall be appointed a Postmaster
General; his powers and salary; and the compensation to the
assistant or clerk and deputies which he may appoint, and the
regulations of the Post Offices shall be the same as they last
were under the resolutions or ordinances of the late Congress.
The Postmaster General to be subject to the direction of the
President of the United States in performing the duties of his
.^^
office.
.

.

The act was to remain in force "until the end of the next session of

Congress and no longer,"
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but on August 4, 1790, the temporary act was
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extended, and a permanent post office act was not
adopted until May

8,

1794.

The Postal Acts of 1792 and 1794

The postal act of 1792 was the first significant postal legislation
since the Ordinance of 1782.
1789 and 1790,

It was also temporary, like the acts of

to be in force only until June 1,

1794.

The postal sys-

tem "established" in the 1792 act was reinforced and made permanent by
an act of May 8, 1794.

The acts are sufficiently similar, excepting the

permanence of the 1794 act, so that for most purposes they can be
treated as one.
Three main themes arose from the act of 1792:

The first was that the Post Office must be self-supporting;
the second, that the Post Office make no profit, but use its
surpluses to extend its services; and the third, that Congress, not the postmaster general, must establish the nation's
post roads.

The first theme assumed that rates could be set to cover expenses incurred, so that no introduction of treasury funds need be made.

This

changed the orientation from the Ordinance of 1782, which stated that
the excess expenses from establishing new post offices and supplies

would be paid out by the treasury.

But this self-sufficiency intent

was not adhered to in practice, and when the post ran a deficit in its

pursuit of the larger public policy of service provision, Congress ap-

propriated additional monies.
The second theme is that any profits should be plowed back into the

postal system to further the establishment of post offices and post
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roads, not unlike the provision of the 1782 Ordinance.

This was to be

the controlling theme of the first two, since the priority of expansion
of postal services was greater than a self-sustaining post office.

This

was a product, to a significant degree, of public influence on Congress,
and in this vein Congressional control over the establishment of post

roads was illustrative.

The role of post roads in an expanding nation was an extremely im-

portant one, which the House of Representatives was not going to delegate to appointed officials.^"*"

The Senate was willing to delegate this

authority to the Postmaster General, but Senators themselves were then
chosen by the state legislatures.

The direct tie between House members

and their constituents exerted a pressure on Congressmen both to recog-

nize the central role of postal expansion in the late eighteenth century
and to retain control over the process by which it would be achieved.
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Congress did play the central part in the identification of post roads
and so subsequent internal development, whether it intended to promote

commercial development, the spread of political education, communication

with the western frontier, or a representation of the national government throughout the country at a time when the national government was

largely unknown, absent in any physical terms, and distrusted.
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Why did it take so much time for Congress to act in formalizing the

postal service?

President Washington, in his First (January

Second (December

8,

8,

1790),

1790), and Third (October 25, 1791) Annual Messages

to Congress repeated the need to pass a bill concerning the Post Office.

It was evidently one of the central concerns of national scope,

his Second Annual Message, Washington wrote:

for in
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The establishment of the Militia; of a mint; of Standards of
weights and measures; of the Post Office and Post Roads are
subjects which (I presume) you will resume of course, and
which are abundantly urged by their own importance.

In the Third Annual Message, he again asserts the importance of acting

on those items, "some of which
tion.

I

cannot forbear a more particular men-

These are, the Militia; the Post-Office and Post-roads; the Mint;

Weights and Measures.

"^^

As Washington himself acknowledged, other urgent matters kept Con-

gress from acting sooner on these important matters. 56

The post office,

although in need of an official establishment act and also improvement
in service, was not in a terminal condition, whether considered in poli-

tical, service delivery, or financial terms.
tant,

to be sure,

A founding act was impor-

as evidenced by Washington's concern that attention be

paid to this, yet it could also wait.
Congress was, however, working on postal service matters during
this period.

During 1790 and 1791 proposals were offered to give the

Postmaster General and the President the power to establish the nation's
post roads.
a resolution.

On June 16, 1790, for example, Mr. Sedgwick introduced such
The result of the debate was that, "The motion was

negatived^ .by a great majority.
.

.

.
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Attempts to vest the Postmaster General and the President with such
powers were unsuccessful, and the act of 1792 formalized the Congressional prerogative regarding post roads.

The disagreement in drafting

legislation, then, was centered around the issue of power division within
.

.

the national government, with Congress taking an active position,

rather than any discussion of national versus state powers.
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Further, it

42

illustrates the nature of the discussion which preceded passage of
a
bill establishing the postal service.

Another factor appears

to

have been at work, which is that the

nature and structure of the post office was basically settled by the

government under the Articles of Confederation, including its national
"nature," and so the particulars could wait.

Questioning did not arise

about the fundamental nature of the post office under the new Constitution, and this lack of debate is striking considering many of the other

issues which dominated discussion at that time, especially relating to

their national as opposed to state-based operation.

Yet the postal

service passed through this time generally, almost unanimously, accepted
as a legitimate exercise of the national government.

How does estab-

lishment of such an important service and institution fail to engender
great debate?
One answer is quite clear.

At the time, the size of the national

government in general, and the postal service as a particular part of
the government, was extremely small, so whatever the philosophical im-

plications of a national postal service, the physical implications were
not yet great.

This is not neglecting the fact that the number of post

office employees was second only to that of the Treasury,

or that the

philosophic considerations in the early days of the new government were
not well-debated, only that, again, experience (with the operation of
the post office under the Articles, and easy adoption in the Constitution) tended to make statesmen of differing hues view this service with

no great alarm.

The postal service did not evoke fears which a national

militia or centralized taxation power did.

1
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Probably more important was the widespread support
improvement and
extension of the postal system enjoyed as an exercise of
democratic
government.

Not generally perceived of as a threat, the post office

would act in the interests of all segments of the society, a
truly positive functioning part of a rather limited national government
and ex-

periment in liberal democracy.

(The acceptance of this positive power

of government is itself a curiosity, being a statement of
the type of

activity which was seen as legitimate in a positive liberal state.)

There was not, however, complete unanimity.

Madison's work, as a

member of Congress, towards establishing "the best route for the post
roads between Maine and Georgia," 6

as a national exercise brought forth

a strong reaction from Jefferson:

Have you considered all the consequences of your proposition
concerning post roads? I view it as a source of boundless
patronage to the executive, jobbing to the members of Congress
and their friends, and a bottomless abyss of public money.
Does the power to establish post roads, given you by Congress,
mean that you shall make the roads, or only select from those
already made, those on which there shall be a post 7^2
.

.

.

This disagreement did not enter the public sphere, apparently, and pro-

vided no policy debate as the post office limped along on existing
roads, not making them as Jefferson feared.
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This exception notwithstanding, the broad spectrum of statesmen of
the time appeared to envision an active purpose for the post office.

The development of postal service would serve to promote several aspects
of life and vitality in the society:

knowledge, commercial activity,

agriculture, expansion, and communication.

Diverse interests in the na-

tion would be served by a national entity which cut across the prevail-

:

.
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ing political divisions.

George Washington wrote (in his Third Annual

Message) to Congress that

The importance of the Post-Off ice and Post-Roads, on a plan
sufficiently liberal and comprehensive, as they respect the
expedition, safety and facility of communication, is increased by the instrumentality in diffusing a knowledge of the
laws and proceedings of the government; which, while it contributes to the security of the people, serves also to guard
them against the effects of misrepresentation and misconceptions.
The establishment of additional cross-posts, especially in the Western and Northern parts of the Union, cannot fail
to be of material Unity. 64

Washington understood the promotion of knowledge, political and otherwise, as essential to the practice of democratic government.

He pro-

posed a national university as well as postal service expansion, both
being crucial to the diffusion of knowledge in the new nation.

Alexander Hamilton wrote of the value of the postal service as infrastructure necessary to the growth of commerce:

Facility of communication and cheapness of transportation are
matters of primary importance in the business of every country; but under the existing circumstances of the United States
they call for the earliest and most efficient exertions of
government. The good condition of the post roads especially
V7here they happen to connect places of landing on the rivers
and bays, and those which run into the western country will
conduce exceedingly to the cheapness of transporting and the
facility of obtaining raw materials, feed and provisions

The United States at the time was in need of improved transporta-

tion and communication facilities.

The development of these necessary

components of the infrastructure was done "in the belief that individuals and corporations would be eager to build the superstructure upon
ft

it.'

7

The post office was intended to play, and did play, an important

.

45

role in American commercial development.

In looking back, Ross Allan

McReynolds wrote:

The foremost element in post office development between 1789
and 1860 was improved means of transportation, shown in the
highway, canals, the streamboats, and the railroads, which
also enabled settlers to cross the continent more quickly and
the merchant and manufacturer to extend and multiply their
operations

The post office did much to promote the growth of "new" technologies by

both providing the infrastructure pivotal to their operation and by subsidization of their operations.
By the Ordinance of 179 4, Congress was authorized to contract with

private stagecoaches to carry the mail. 69

But apparently because of the

priority accorded passengers over mall'^^ and the resulting unsatisfactory service, the post office established a government-run public enter-

prise experiment, a post office stage between Philadelphia and Baltimore, begun in 1799

.

The system was never extended, however, and ter-

minated within two decades.
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Reflecting the new enthusiasm for private business and free
enterprise in this period, General Meigs [Postmaster -General]
ended the government -owned stagecoach line shortly after the
end of the war [of 1812], and the government ceased to compete
with private businesses in carrying mail and passengers ^-^
.

There was a limit to which the postal service, as a public enterprise, could extend; beyond that lay the proper sphere of private enterprise.

The postal service did test the boundaries of legitimate action

in this early period, as it has throughout its history, and settled upon
a role as a public enterprise which subsidizes private enterprise devel-
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opment through establishment and maintenance of an essential societal

infrastructure but which does not compete with private enterprise.

Congress and Policy

This early period can be generally characterized as one in which

policy determination was held relatively close at hand by the Congress.
The example of establishing post roads is indicative of this, although

even here the postmaster was empowered to make contracts with private

parties for the carrying of mail.

This is not a broad delegation of

power as far as policymaking, but simply a (necessary) discretionary

power determined by the extent of postal operations.

Even so, the let-

ting of contracts had to be done within a set of procedures drawn in detail by the Congress.
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Congressional control over policymaking, without broad delegation
of power to the administrative agencies of the executive, are character-

istic of the United States prior to 1886-1887, according to Lowi.^^

This earlier era was transformed "quickly" by the Supreme Court in 1886
(in Wabash

,

St.L. & P.R. v. Illinois )

76

and Congress in 1887 (by estab-

lishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission, whereby Congress suc-

cessfully nationalized certain regulatory areas and delegated powers to

administrative entities to carry out that regulation)

.

The nature of

legislation changed as the language used gave broader and more accessible interpreted powers as mandates, to be administered not by Congress

but by the appropriate agencies.

During the early period, Leonard White noted that,
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in matters of revenue and in the control of
shipping, closely
allied with the collection of customs.
.large powers and
wide discretion were bestowed upon officials, but
so limited
were federal activities that administrative authority
over
persons or property was otherwise exceptional.'^^
.

And although Congress "gave great discretionary powers to
the President.

.

.," it

"distrusted discretion in the hands of subordinates."^^

Though White noted that discretion is to some degree inevitable, the

discretion he cited was narrowly defined and did not approach a meaningful policy role such as Lowi indicates.
The founding era manifested a distributive pattern of politics with

Congress specifying post roads and the "opening" of new areas, fulfilling constituent demands in a time of suspicion of national power.

The

national government was thus able to make its presence felt in a positive, nonthreatening sense to rural residents and farmers desirous of

coimnunication and better roads, especially as they moved further west,
as well as to the more cosmopolitan interests.

Moreover, even with limited struggles over discretionary powers. 80

Congress was the agent of policymaking during this period.

Goals of

better communication for a more informed society, better roads to facilitate that communication as well as commerce, the provision of both adequate mail service and roads to provide components with which to pursue
and formalize^*^ the expanding frontier, and the carrying of newspapers
all worked as conduits of Congressional policy goals which were dis-

cussed in depth and incorporated into the statutes of the period.

the sense of bringing the frontier into the mainline of American society institutionally and culturally.
''In
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Insofar as the early postal service was concerned, while
discretion was

necessary and delegation of power did occur, the general course
of
policy was one of Congressional prerogative, actively exercised.

The

Congress was active by establishing post roads, noting deficiencies
in

service to be corrected, and making constant corrections in postal

legislation to deal with these and other problems.

In an administrative

sense, discretion was evident in the actions of postal officials; in a

policy sense, it was not.

Congress had not delegated sufficient power

to the postal service.

Conclusion

The founding period was a time during which the development of the
post office in many ways determined its operation for the next two centuries.

Three themes predominate in this early period which need fur-

ther emphasis.

They are the post office as a service-provider rather

than a revenue-producer, a national and interstate rather than a state

and intrastate organization, and a facilitator of commerce, communication,

and expansion.

Service provision

.

The founding era is characterized by an explicit formulation (in
the form of the Ordinance of 1782) and general understanding of the

postal service as principally a provider of service and not a source of
revenue.

Service and the facilitating of commercial activities were its

primary chores, with profits being used towards these purposes, despite
the belief by Hamilton at one time that it could be profitable (as it

.
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was under Franklin in colonial times)

Both Jefferson and Hamilton accepted this orientation.

Jefferson

attempted, in 1792, to convince President Washington to transfer the

post office from the Treasury Department to the State Department, because the law of 179 2 had removed his doubts about the character of the
post office.

He observed that it was not designed as a revenue-producer,

which would properly reside in Treasury, but as a service-provider,
since the law declared that (according to Jefferson) "the whole profits
of the office should be applied to extending the posts and that even
O-l

past profits should be refunded by the treasury for the same purpose."

Washington did not act according to Jefferson's wishes, but Jefferson's
perceptions of the nature of the post office were clear.

Hamilton understood this as well, although he did not act on it un^
til 1795, by which time Jefferson was no longer Secretary of State.

action took the form of proposing a trade:

His

Post Office to State in ex-

change for the Mint to Treasury.

Service provision during this period manifested two main traits:

establishment and extension.

These two qualities were the realization

of the service provision needs of the society.

The establishment of the postal system encompassed its evolution

from the Committees of Correspondence through the Constitution and enabling acts.

The structure, nature, scope, and legitimacy of the postal

service had to be dealt with in fundamental ways.
postal organization had been established.
they would be incremental
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By 1800, a stable

While many changes continued,

and not revolutionary.

The establishment of a service-producing postal service was, how-
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ever, in its own way a radical departure from previous
postal practices.

Although the degree of importance

is arguable,

the concept of a post

office which was not intended primarily to produce revenues or
service
to a

very limited clientele was different.

Postal service as public

service, with the public denoting access to all citizens, was consistent

with and reinforced the idea of American democracy, spreading political
knowledge throughout the citizenry.

By focusing on service, and not

requiring it to make a profit, the policymakers were freeing the system

from a rather narrow, city-oriented tool of the well-educated and welloff.

The postal system as a promoter of egalitarianism, of education,

and of expansion was partly a result of the founding era when the estab-

lishment of postal service allowed for a more expansive understanding of

public service than had heretofore been part of postal systems in Europe.

Establishment was not, then, a statutory pronouncement simply setting up the institutions of postal organization.

Instead,

it

was an

evolutionary process whereby an understanding of public purposes was de-

veloped through a series of events and laws which worked toward shaping
a system with definite goals.

But this occurred through a legislative

and administrative process which formulated ideas responsive to conditions, made adjustments and alterations, and promoted growth or exten-

sion to meet the demands of a vital nation in its early stage of independence.

The establishment of the postal service with a service orientation

encouraged extension of postal service.

The original services were ex-

tended to fulfill the needs and demands of a rapidly growing society.
In 1790,

the United States system had 75 post offices and 1,875 miles of
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post roads, in 1812, 2,610 post offices and 39,378 miles of
post roads,
and by 1829, there were 8,050 post offices and 114,780 miles of
post
roads.

The types of services did not change significantly, although

increasing use was made of private stagecoach contracts,

but the ex-

tension of the existing service was the main goal in terms of service.

Wesley Everett Rich characterized the early period as one in which

The aim was service rather than revenue, and to this end the
receipts were put back into the extension of roads to all
parts of the country. For the period when the country was
young, and rapidly growing, the policy was undoubtedly of immense value to the nation. 87

The character of an extending postal service, building on a narrow
foundation, was evident in the early years, and is reflected in the

records of the Postmasters and secondary sources concerning the postal
service.

Leonard White wrote [of the Federalist period]:

The bulk of current business transacted by the General Post
Office consisted of the designation of post offices, the appointment of deputy postmasters, making contracts for carrying
the mail, receiving periodic reports from the deputies, and
keeping the accounts. 88

The push to provide communication between the northern and southern

stretches of the country, and then to move westward with the settlers,

meant that the existing postal establishment was incessantly being
forced to open up new post offices and servicing post roads.

As stated

earlier, Congress had clearly given itself the exclusive right to estab

lish post roads (bringing with this, the post office's reactive role in

providing service, through post offices, contracting for mail delivery,
etc.), and Congress reacted to constituent and regional demands in iden
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tifying needed postal routes.

(This continued into the 20th century.)

Americans petitioned [Congress] mostly for post roads,
which
meant, of course, mail routes.
This, at least, was true in
the nineteenth century, when from whatever point they
settled on their westward march.
.they demanded post routes to
bring them the mail. And at session after session Congressmen
obligingly entered their petitions in the records of Congress,
passed law after law establishing post roads for their constituents, and blithely handed the postmaster general the task of
installing the postal service on routes they had created. ^9
.

Service provision during this early period was, therefore, identified essentially as establishment and extension of the basic postal

service system which has since served the nation.

Added to the fact

that the orientation was to service rather than revenue-production, the

post office was, through Congressional appetite, an important and extremely fast-growing part of the national government.

It also repre-

sented the national government in many areas of the new nation where

nothing else did, and unlike most officers of government (e.g., customs
officers, revenue collectors)

achievements of government.

,

was a symbol of the positive aims and

Service as an identifiable goal which was

significantly promoted came to define the postal system.

No more im-

portant a component of public policy could touch people in such a personal way.

A national system

.

The establishment of the post office as an unquestionably national

system was integral to the character of postal service, and to the central role of Congress in the development of both a coherent system ad-

ministered by the Postmaster General and the identification of suitable

53

routes within and between the states.

This fit into the visions of the

more nationally-oriented Federalists who held notions of
a social welfare removed from localism (i.e., a more cosmopolitan view
of democracy)n90 and^ a

,,

government by gentlemen.
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At the same time, it ap-

pealed to the state-oriented Anti-Federalist view, which generally
recognized a need for improved communication and roads for rural residents,
farming interests (wealthy or not), and western settlers, and which un-

derstood the House of Representatives as representing the one true democratic feature of the new government, i.e., a representative institution
tied directly to the people's voices and votes. 9 2

The postal service

was, therefore, able to operate as a national public service which ful-

filled the interests of a variety of political advocates and whose Legltimacy was tied to the machinations of a popularly-elected House. 9 3

The national scope of the postal service was crucial in the devel-

opment of an integrated road network and extensive postal system within
a short time.

Whether the demand for postal services within the states

would have led to intrastate systems being quickly developed was rendered moot; however,

the resources of the national government being ap-

plied to these efforts most probably made the task a practical undertaking, especially since the national government was willing to do so on
the back of the United States treasury.

At a time when such large-scale

projects were untenable at the state level, the national government was
the only vehicle by which the postal network could have been extended so

widely over such a short period of time.
With the rapid growth of postal operations came the potential for
an increase in political importance.

Although the post office did play

54

a central role in the development of roads and
communication, it did not

manifest itself as a major outlet of political power for
which the post
office eventually gained a legendary status in later
times.

It can be

speculated that each interest saw in the post office and the development
of its potentials the fulfillment of their vision of the
"good society",

whether this was in terms of national or local goals, or in terms of
commerce or agriculture; at the same time, few saw any threat posed by
a national government operating the postal system,

unlike the threats to

state government autonomy and personal liberties posed by a national

bank or national military.
The national orientation established during this period gave the
postal service an effectively broadened and malleable operational base,
since:

operate;

1)

2)

the nation as a whole was a large physical area in which to
the ability to operate on a national level allowed room for

more integrated and unified action, less burdened by the more restrictive state government perceptions of interests; and

3)

the national

government was still in its infancy and developing an essential character, while the state governments were well-established in nature,

had a continuity which extended back into the colonial period.

and
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The physical size of the new American republic provided unrivaled

opportunities as well as restraints for the postal system.

The re-

straints involved the physical features, of course, but more importantly
the clamor for service to remote and newly settled areas.
a strain on the system itself

and served by poor roads),

While putting

(for new areas were often inaccessible,

this also acted to justify the claims for

additional funds, well understood and continually approved by Congress.
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The size and possibilities for extension of postal
services therefore

allowed the post office fairly wide latitude in expenditures,
in service
provision, and in post office sitings.
The size of the American republic was an object of discussion
be-

tween the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, most pertinently the
ability
for republican institutions to govern in an extended republic.

The ar-

guments of Madison and Hamilton were victorious, but regardless, the new

nation was a large and resource rich country, with a potential wealth
(agricultural and commercial) that would soon overwhelm Europe.

The

postal service, crucial to communications of the era, played a critical
role in the development of this potential.

Washington referred to its

educational and political potential, and Hamilton to its role in facilitating commercial development, while Madison assured in The Federalist
the harmlessness and the worth of a national post office.

The ability to operate as a national institution, free of state
jealousies, gave the post office a broad policy base.

The more "re-

fined" view at the national level would produce a policy and service

conducive to the national interest rather than the varied parochial

state political environments.

The postal service was not totally in-

sulated from state and local influence as demostrated by the Congres-

sional role in postal policy.

This fairly direct representative input

was part of the general processes of Madison's national system, which
was intended to provide for a more qualified, enlightened representative
who could, even while immersed in his district's needs, contemplate some

notion of national interest.

Although influenced by local concerns, the

postal service was nonetheless a national entity with the overriding
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goal of a national postal system where each state and locality would
be

connected with every other, surely an orientation reiioved from localistic visions of postal service geared to the city or, at most, the state.

The national government was a limited government and a "new"^^

government, which meant that the postal service was unhampered by an

"institutional memory" on the part of the national institutions.

This

stood in contrast with the state governments which, even considering

changes and new constitutions, had an organic history which, had they

power over postal operations, would most likely have put greater constraints on the post office.

Facilitator of commercial development

.

By establishing an infrastructure of communication and roads, the

postal system was providing two of the necessary conditions for economic
success and commercial development.

The United States was blessed with

bountiful natural resources, relatively unused in contrast to the wornout European continent.

A spirit of energy had been unbound by the

revolution, and coupled to the Protestant ethic which allowed for and
even bolstered the development of a commercial spirit
again,

— in

contrast,

to the relatively limited conceptions allowed within the European

political, social, and religious world

— the

United States had few im-

pediments to development of a successful commercial tradition.

Among

the most trying was the isolation experienced by many citizens,

"Isolation" in an agricultural society, based in self-sufficiency,
is not terribly vexing,

communication.

at least if there is still some transmission of

But to a budding commercial society, isolation deprived
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the businessman of markets, ideas, capital, and
natural resources.

Of

course, the nation in the late eighteenth century and
early nineteenth

century was grounded in agriculture.

Yet the purposes of early leaders

were tied to the development of a "commercial republic."

And the post

office, from its early days, was not to fail in the promotion of
com-

merce.

Facilitating commerce is but one aspect of a more general area of

what Edward G. Daniel described as "non-postal functions."

Those serv-

ices, by Daniel's description, include, "the Post Office as a benefi-

cient agent for the encouragement of railroads, ocean shipping, westward

migration, and other non-postal aims." 9 7

Common to these 'non-postal'

aims was the promotion of private commercial development.

During the

founding era, this consisted largely of the subsidization of private
carriers and stagecoaches through their employment to carry the mail,

rather than a strict reliance on public carriers. 98

A less direct sub-

sidization was through building of post roads which facilitated westward
movement
As early as 1785, operating under the Articles of Confederation,

the Postmaster General was authorized and directed to enter into contracts with carriers employing stagecoaches.

99

The act of May

8,

1794,

also authorized the use of private stagecoaches to carry the mail."''^^

Wayne Fuller explained that this was authorized

because the mail had already become too heavy for horseback
riders to manage alone and because it was thought that the
letters and newspapers would be better protected from robbery
But it was also done and
and weather in stagecoaches.
this was typical of Congress's double use of the Post Office
to encourage stagecoaches, subsidized by postal money, to go
,

.

.

—
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where they otherwise would not have gone and thus
establish a
transportation system throughout the young Republic. 101
The postmaster evidently used his authority to so use
the stagecoach

lines and, except for a brief flirtation with the government line
from

Baltimore to Philadelphia, relied on and subsidized the private lines.
This underwriting of private commercial development is indicative
of the postal service's role throughout its history, beginning at
this

early point.

Carter Goodrich, in his volume The Government and the Eco

nomy, 1783-1861

,

picks out "one significant element of continuity,"

which transcends American history, which is

the deep-seated preference of the American people to employ
the powers of government to influence the economy at strategic
points needing special attention rather than attempt its operation in detail. 102

The post office was the legitimate national government agency which

could stimulate private business without arousing any great cry of indignation:

a perfect tool for the government influencing the economy

towards a more commercial and private enterprise development.

By 1816,

even Jefferson indicated a more appreciative perspective in his letter
to

Benjamin Austin:

We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist.
He, therefore, who is now against domestic
manufacture, must be for reducing us either to dependence on
that foreign nation, or to be clothed in skins, and to live
I am not one of these;
like wild beasts in dens and caverns.
experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort. 103
.

By that time,

.

.

the United States Post Office was promoting not only

-
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stagecoaches, but steamships as
As early as 1791,

well."'"^'^

in his report to Congress, Hamilton had written

extensively about the need to provide the proper conditions
to help

stimulate the infant manufacturing abilities of the nation. "'^^

His

closing sentences display the recognition of a need to help
provide the
capital necessary for "prompting and improving the efforts of
industry."
He wrote that:

In countries where there is great private wealth, much may be
effected by the voluntary contributions of patriotic individuals; but in a community situated like that of the United
States, the public purse must supply the deficiency of private
resource

In one sense, the postal service was the 'public purse' which 'prompted

and improved'

the conditions under which private commercial interests

operated, for the subsidization of their efforts (through employing
their private services as a means of achieving the public goal of postal
service) was an important,

if not determinant, boon to their development.

Hamilton also understood, "The Facilitating of the Transportation
of Commodities," as being one of the "principal.

growth of manufactures is ordinarily promoted.

.means by which the

.

""'"^^

Hamilton recognized

the national government's power to construct public roads and canals,

and wrote that, "This is one of the improvements, which could be prosecuted with more efficacy by the whole than by any parts of the Union.

""'"'^^

He feared the sacrifice of the "general interest" to local interests,

and argued against any such local "jealousies" as unwarranted.

He then

turned to an extensive quotation from Adam Smith to demonstrate that,

"Good roads, canals and navigable rivers.

.

.are.

.

.the greatest of all
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improvements."

109

Smith had written that even local opposition
had been

shown to be in error, in that when previously
opposed turnpike roads

were put in place, "Their rents however have risen
and their cultivation
has improved

""^'"^
.

This provides a basis for understanding tne utility
of providing

infrastructure, capital, and promotional support for the development
of

more commercial ability in the United States.
for this type of activity,

The Constitution allowed

and Congress supported this process in the

form o^ a benevolent postal service (even if it opposed promoting
com-

merce through a national bank)

.

In the early years the operations of

the postal service were not as wide-ranging as they would later be,
or

even as some proposed they should be at the time, but its role in that

period as a growing public enterprise, a central visible and positive

representative of the national government, and a promoter of private enterprise,

is an indication of the enduring character of the United

States postal service.
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CHAPTER

III

THE POSTAL TELEGRAPH
The history of the early post office is one of
establishment and

extension of the fundamental services expected of

a

postal service.

The

means employed were all toward a purpose of letter
carrying, whether by
horseback, stagecoach, steamship, or the emerging railroads.

The post

office played an important role in subsidizing the steamship
and railroad industries early in their development, which in turn
provided im-

provement in the post office's service, speed, reliability, and extent
of operation.

At the same time that the post office remained a political

tool of Congressional prerogative,

it became increasingly politicized

through Andrew Jackson's appointment of William Barry as Postmaster General

'
.

During the first year of the Jackson administration, an estimated 54 3 postmasters, or about 7 per cent of the more than
8,000 postmasters in the country were removed for political
reasons. This figure may seem comparatively small, but it
represents almost all the postmasterships worth bothering
about. Most of the changes were made in New York and the New
England states, the stronghold of the Eastern establishment
.

Leonard White cited a House Report from 1835 which stated that the Post

Office was not "a political department.

.

.in the partisan sense of the

word," but that, "Since the 4th of March, 1829, the removals of postmasters have not fallen much short of 1,300, and in a great majority of the

cases without the assignment of any cause."
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That Barry represented

71

Jackson's interests in political
appointments seems clear, but his apparently inept administrative activities
and poor relations with Congress eventually caused his removal in
1835.

The greatest innovation in communication lay
ahead and is the subject of this chapter~the introduction of
the electromagnetic telegraph
by Samuel F. B. Morse.

The change of speed from that of horses or
ship

or trains to the almost instantaneous telegraph
wire was a critical advance

.

Communication had from the beginning of history been tied
to
transportation. Messages could travel no faster than the
messengers. The limitation disappeared [with] the invention
of the magnetic telegraph.'^

Morse relied on government funds to prove his system practical in
operation, and operated it under the Treasury Department and the Post
Office
in its initial stages.

An analysis of why this revolution in communica-

tion was allowed to assume completely private ownership rather than pub
lie

(postal) ownership will help clarify the attitudes toward public en-

terprise during the late 1830s and 1840s.

The opportunity missed for

successful government enterprise can be measured by the enormous subsequent success of the Western Union Company.^

The Post Office Department went through years of changing stewardship:

Barry until 1835; Amos Kendall (1835-1840); John Milton Niles

(1840-1841); Francis Granger (1841); Charles A. Wickliffe (1841-1845);

and Cave Johnson (1945-1849).

Barry's inept administration and patron-

age; Kendall's sharp business and administrative acumen; Wickliffe's

"alarming" mismanagement; Granger's differences with President Tyler
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these personalities helped lead to the Act
of 1845, which reformed postage rates (by weight rather than number
of sheets), changed methods for

contracting out mail routes, and established the
star-route system.^
According to Cullinan, Cave Johnson

had little interest in the postal system as such.
He was
principally interested in using the Post Office
Department as
a base for his political manipulations.
He was Polk's closest
friend, personally and politically, and the President's
liaison man with Congress.'

Postal policy concerning the telegraph grew out of this
atmosphere of

politically-minded administration, as well as of the economic
conditions
of the period.

The general political trends toward less government in-

vestment influenced whatever public (and postal) policymakers attempted.
In this sense,

the larger arena of public policy conditions was impor-

tant in assessing why the post office was not granted the logical power

over the telegraph.

The literature on the post office is brief and gen-

eral in this area and calls for futher development.
In any event, despite the requests for a public telegraph urged by

central figures such as Samuel Morse, Postmaster General Johnson, and
the House Committee of Ways and Means, the telegraph came into private

operation.

Leonard White described the prevalent mood of the time:

Laissez-faire trumphed. Congress not only would not buy the
patent rights, it was indifferent to the regulation of the
telegraph system. Both the "safety of the citizen" and the
threat of disastrous competition to the post office by a private monopoly yielded to the predisposition of the time, [during] an age deeply committed to the less government, the better and to primary reliance on the states for what regulation
seemed unavoi dabl e
.
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Robert Luther Thompson wrote that
ultimately, despite Postmaster General

Johnson's repeated appeals for public
control of the telegraph in 1846.
"The government, now busily engaged in
prosecuting the war with Mexico,
could not be bothered with anything so
trivial as the telegraph. "9

Wayne Fuller cited a sudden "lack of interest
in government ownership of
the telegraph"10 in 1846, attributed to
apparent fears about the ineffi-

ciencies possible in government operation of a
telegraph system.

Yet a more complete picture

is

warranted here to help explain the

reasons Congress ultimately failed to create (or sustain)
a postal tele-

graph in the 1840s.

The economic histories about the period do not in-

dicate an unwillingness for government to be involved in
promoting im-

provements, although enthusiasm was dwindling, and the post office
in

particular was the foremost example of a willingness to extend operation
as far and as wide as possible.

What were the special conditions in the

relationship of the telegraph technology

to

public operation, what was

the general relationship of the government to private enterprise during

the period in terms of developing improvements, and how can the decision
to let

private interests develop a telegraph system be understood within

the context of American public policy?

The story of the telegraph in the United States is generally con-

sidered to be "so closely bound up with the life of [Samuel] Morse that
the story of one can scarcely be told without touching upon that of the

other. "11

Thus, most accounts do detail the Morse "connection," leaving

others such as Joseph Henry, whose "discoveries were fundamental," by
the wayside. 12

Alfred Still, in Communication through the Ages

,

con-

74

tends that asking,

silly."

"Who invented the electric telegraph?.

.

.is rather

Each country has its own socialization
process and values,

which lead to

a

result wherein Morse is America's inventor
of the tele-

graph; Cooke and Wheatstone, Britain's; von
Seiranering, Germany's, etc.l^
In America, such questions are addressed to the
child, because
the child is more up to date and consequently
more knowing
than his elders. The American child, who learns at
an early
age that glorification of his country is his first
duty, while
veracity is largely a matter of expediency, promptly
produces
the name of Samuel F. B. Morse. 15

While the contributions of various actors in the international
scientific scene were obviously crucial,

the fact that the most heavily pursued

attempts to put a telegraph to public use in the United States were
those revolving around Samuel Morse makes his contribution to public
policy formation especially relevant.
As early as 1837 Morse advocated a government telegraph, in answering a circular letter sent from Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury
in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of

February

3,

1837.

The circular was intended to procure "from the most

intelligent sources, such information as would enable Congress.

.

.to

decide upon the propriety of establishing a system of telegraphs."!^

Secretary Woodbury, "from these communications, and such other investigations as the pressure of business has enabled me to make," was

satisfied that the establishment of a system of telegraphs for
the United States would be useful to commerce as well as the
Government.
It might most properly be made appurtenant to the
Post Office, and, during war, would prove a most essential aid
to the military operations of the country.!^
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Morse's response, dated September 27,
1837, cited five advantages to the
construction and operation of a postal telegraph
1)

nearly instantaneous communication of the
"fullest and most
precise information" between points

2)

the above at any time and in any weather

3)

the process achieved in a fairly small space

4)

the message recorded in a "permanent manner," and

5)

the message made in secret.

He prefaced the argument for the development of a
telegraph system with

the reasoning that it should be under the auspices of the
Post Office

Department, because

The mail system.
.is founded on the universally admitted
principle, that the greater the speed with which intelligence
can be transmitted from point to point, the greater is the
benefit to the whole community. 18
.

Indeed, the history of the post office had been steeped in attempts to

improve the speed and scope of mail service.

"The only question that remains.

.

.is,

Morse asked rhetorically,

what system is best calculated,

from its completeness and cheapness, to effect this desirable end?"l^

The answer was the telegraph, and he wrote that.

if the perfecting of this new system of telegraphs.
.shall
be thought of as public utility, and worthy the attention of
Government, I shall be ready to make any sacrifice of personal
service and of time to aid in its accomplishment.^^
.

Morse took his telegraph instrument and demonstrated it in Washington in February, 1838, and it

—

so impressed the House Committee on Commerce especially its
that an enthusiastic recomchairman, F.O.J. Smith of Maine
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mendation was made for an appropriation of
$30,000 to
the construction of an experimental
telegraph line to
practicability of Morse's invention.
.but the panic
the skepticism of Congress, and the pressure
of other
intervened, and no money was appropriated 21
.

permit
test the
of 1837
business

.

The Commerce Committee held Morse's demonstration in
its meeting room
and, "On February 21, President Martin Van Buren and
his entire cabinet,

at their own special request, visited the room and saw the
telegraph in

operation."

^

But ultimately Congress did not act.

It appears that

economic conditions and skepticism ran ahead of Morse's enthusiasm,
and
that Congress felt that public monies for a questionable technology were
no better spent than the private ones Morse had been unable to acquire.
It was not until 1843 that Congress finally appropriated Morse the

$30,000 initially proposed in 1838.
The conditions in 1842-1843 had been altered by the enhanced image
of the science of the telegraph.

A report from the House Committee on

Commerce, dated December 30, 1842, cited the international recognition

w hich Morse's invention had received (particularly in France and Britain), and further promoted the American spirit, for

it is a matter of national pride,

that the invention of the
first electro-magnetic telegraph by Professor Morse, as well
as the first conception of using electricity as the means of
transmitting intelligence, by Doctor Franklin, is the offspring of American genius. 23
,

The substance of the report develops the potential for the telegraph in
terms of defense, commerce, and social relations.

7A

Further,

the poten-

tial for revenue from the operation of a telegraph system was apparently
"so inviting" that to pass up the chance for the regulation or operation
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of the system might lead to such development
by a private company, and

"might be used to the serious injury of the
Post Office Department," and

would be beyond interference because of considerations
of "justice or
public opinion ."^5

The Commerce report introduced "A Bill to test
the

practicability of establishing a system of electro magnetic
telegraphs
by the United States. "^6

A later report of Mr. Chappell, from the House Committee
of Ways
and Means, concluded that the constitutional basis and
significance of
the postal power allowed the post office to operate a telegraph.

The

Post Office had always seen its obligation to keep up with the newest
of

technologies, and it would have been

a gross and manifest dereliction to have permitted it to lag
behind the improvements of the age, and to be out-stripped by
the pace of ordinary travel and commercial communication. To
be outstripped by private expresses, or by the ordinary lines
of travel, is deemed.
.a thing.
.not to be permitted.
This great and fundamental principle upon which the departments acts [sic].
.led necessarily to subsidizing the steamengine into the service of the post office; and it must and
will lead, with equal certainty, to a like adoption of any
other newly discovered agency or contrivance possessing decided advantage of celerity over previously used methods. ^7
.

.

.

The report emphasized that the sole question to be considered was whether
the advantages of the telegraph were "of sufficient value to justify the

expense of engraftment on the system. "^8

xhe report also discussed the

arguments for a telegraph, the foremost being the "rapidity of transmission" and its corollary benefits.

Communications would be secret.

They

foresaw that the telegraph would soon be developed by private enterprise
if not by the public, so that
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then a state of things will inunediately
develop itself which
the people will never endure or tolerate
the government in
permitting to exist. The state of things would
be that the
post office, in its transportation of all
correspondence and
news would lag not hours, but days, behind the
transmission
of the same things through another medium; and
that, a medium
belonging to private individuals, and controlled by
private
views and interests. 29

And the corollary of a private development of the telegraph
would make
it "manifest

mercy."

how greatly government and the people would lie at their

The report affirms in detail the power of the post office
to

develop the telegraph, and operate it in the public interest, and further states that the government has the power to establish the telegraph

for its own use:

"the committee deems the constitutionality of the mat-

ter incontrovertible. "^1

This seemed to resolve any constitutional or

jurisdictional questions, although the telegraph was initially put under
the Secretary of the Treasury instead of the Postmaster General.

-^^

The

resolution passed the House February 22, 184 3, and then the Senate in
the last hours of the session.

-^-^

Morse, who had been unable to attract private capital to fund his

experiment to demonstrate the practicality of the telegraph, had finally

convinced the government

to do so,

after five years of effort.

Whether

Congress acted simply out of the failure of private enterprise to risk
the funds necessary to provide for this pilot project or whether it was
a more positive statement of policy,

such as that embodied in the House

report of December 30, 1842, cannot be readily ascertained.
dication,

though,

A broad in-

is that a mere three years later, after the line had

been built, the practicability of the technology proven, and an ongoing
(if somewhat erratic and curious) enterprise in operation. Congress did
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not see fit to _buyj:he patent for the telegraph
from Morse and continue
to operate a public line or system, but
rather allowed the whole tech-

nology to be run privately.

The commitment to a public system, operated

for public rather than private benefit and under
the control of the Post

Office Department rather than its potential competitors,
was lacking.
There were proponents of a public telegraph system,
although they

were ignored or rejected.

These included Morse, Postmaster General

Johnson, and the President of the Magnetic Telegraph Company
and ex-

Postmaster General, Amos Kendall.

Morse was foremost along these.

Hav-

ing achieved success in the establishment of an operating line.

He felt that he had earned repose.
To this end he sought to
carry out his long-cherished idea that the telegraph should
become the property of the Government, and he was willing to
accept a very modest remuneration. 34

His offer of $100,000 to be paid to him and the other proprietors was
rejected.

Congress did not accept the repeated recommendations in 1845 and
1846 of the Postmaster General, Cave Johnson.

Johnson did not envision

an immediate profit in the establishment of the telegraph, but

Its importance to the public does not consist in any probable
income that can ever be derived from it; but as an agent vastly superior to any other ever devised by the genius of man for
the diffusion of intelligence, which may be accomplished with
almost the rapidity of light to any part of the republic, its
value in all commercial transactions, to individuals having
the control of it, or to the government in time of war, could
not be estimated. The use of an instrument so powerful for
good or for evil cannot with safety to the people be left in
the hands of private individuals uncontrolled by law.35

Johnson feared that a partial government operation of the telegraph would

80

lead to skimming by private services, and
that those private interests

might use the telegraph

to

"perhaps become the most potent instrument

the world ever knew to effect sudden and
large speculations

- to

rob the

many of their just advantages, and concentrate
them upon the few. "36

in

1846 Johnson again advocated the purchase of the
telegraph, arguing that
the Post Office

must necessarily be superseded in much of its most
important
business in a few years, if the telegraph be permitted
to remain under the control of individuals. It is the settled conviction of the undersigned that the government should get the
exclusive control of it, by purchase, or that its use should
be subjected to the restraints of law. 37

But Congress neglected Johnson's counsel and Morse's wishes and off ers

The failure of the Government to appreciate the value of what
was offered to them was always a deep source of regret to
Morse.
For, while he himself gained much more by the operation of private companies, the evils which he had foretold
were more than realized. 38

The result was that,

overnight

"Dozens of private telegraph companies were born

"-^^
.

This period in the development of the telegraph illustrates both
the extent to which the government would go in promoting a novel tech-

nology and the limits to which it would hold itself in operating a public
enterprise.

The time from Morse's letter to Secretary of the Treasury

Woodbury (in 1837) to the "explosion" of private companies in the after-

math of Congress' inaction

is an

indication of how the government ap-

proached public service issues in the nineteenth century.
One interesting fact is that state capital was never sought by
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Morse, and state telegraph operation
neglected, despite increasing state

involvement in capital funding and regulation
during the Jacksonian
period. ^0

The regional (and then national) competition
and the rapid

growth of the private telegraph system may have
inhibited the involve-

ment of the states, but this surely contrasts with
state involvement in
canal and railroad construction.

But since the government of the period

was flexible in terms of subsidization, the need for
national funding

may have eclipsed a state role.

Transport ation Revolution

,

George Rogers Taylor wrote, in The

about the limited perceived constitutional

role of federal government during the period,

having to do with defense, the mails, Indian affairs, and interstate and foreign commerce.
With the exception of
transportation, not many new fields existed where the federal
government might easily have entered during this period. But
where a real need for federal ownership of facilities appeared,
practically no opposition to it seemed to have developed. ^1
.

.

.

The period in which Morse was developing the telegraph was one in

which the national government was, in general, restrained in its powers
and its role in promoting internal improvements.

Why this did not

translate into schemes for state and local funding of either Morse's

velopment or the infant telegraphs system is probably due

1)

to the pri-

macy of the national government in postal affairs, or communications
2)

to an implicit

de-

anc

understanding of the nature of communications technol-

ogy, which required a national rather than piecemeal or state focus,

something recognized since the founding period.

The first point is ad-

dressed in Chapter II, where it was shown how there existed a remarkable
lack of conflict between the states and the national government over

tht
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complete monopoly of government postal functions given
the national government. ^2

second point is reinforced by the notion that the
promo-

tion of union, and feelings of national felicity, would be
an important

byproduct of a national postal service. ^3

This was important to a na-

tion which was, at the time of the founding, in danger of separation
into many parts, and later was threatened by the increasing regional
pres-

sures afflicting ante-bellum society.

In both cases, postal service and

efforts for improving communications were important tools for helping to

bring about moderation.

Moderation would help to alleviate the pres-

sures which factions would inevitably put on a democratic nation, and
the flow of information to an increasingly "learned" society would help

induce such moderation.
The most striking element of the development of public policy toward
the telegraph is the relationship between the political tenor of the

times and the approach to public sector activity.

Until the 1830s, na-

tional government involvement had been viewed as legitimate in promoting

enterprises which private capital could not promote. '^^

But with the ad-

vent of the Jacksonian period, national government involvement became

suspect in relation to state government action, and much activity deDebate centered around the propriety of na-

volved to state government.
tional versus state action.

46

This switch to state government activity does not have a relevance
to the issue of the telegraph,

though, for there never was a question of

state action, just as with the development of the postal service.

What

was at issue was national action versus leaving the field to private de-

velopment.

And although private capital was unwilling to fund Morse's
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experiment, it is not at all clear that it
fact,

unable to do so, and in

as soon as the (potential and immed iate)
benefits began to be

realized, investors jumped right in
This falls in line with other examples of national
promotion of

commercial development, especially in the internal
improvement projects
concerning the canals, steamships, and railroads. A7

But,

Direct support to transport was less important after the
1830s.
One reason for diminished public involvement was
the crisis of confidence in internal-improvement subsidies
created by the Panic of 1837. Also, the conquest of the midwestern prairies in the 1840s and 1850s was less risky for
private enterprise than the conquest of the Appalachian barrier, which took place largely before 1837.
Finally, by the
1840s both capital markets and corporate structures had become
better equipped to mobilize and manage the large units of
capital required.
.

.

.

Although national government subsidization was on the decline by the
1840s, in relative terms,
a subsidy.

the telegraph was a new technology in need of

It took five years for Morse to receive a subsidy, and the

success in making the development of the first electric telegraph in the

United States a project under purely public auspices was probably moti-

vated by a number of factors, including:

1)

government as a promoter of new technologies;

the historical role of the
2)

the national govern-

ment's operation of the system of intelligence transfer or communication,

which had up

to

that point included letters and newspapers, but was now

apparently being expanded;
to enter into a project

3)

the unwillingness of private enterprise^^

which was, by all evidence, developing a tech-

nology which would revolutionize communications and society; and 4) the

relatively small investment which would be required to finance Morse's
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experiment, especially considering the potential
benefits, to the public
treasury, to coimnercial development, and to the
prestige of America and
its genius.

So the willingness to fund an internal
improvement was a

national policy outcome given the specific policy area
(communications-

postal/transportation policy), and the type of promotion involved,
i.e.,
"seed" money to insure that a telegraph would be built, not
dissimilar

from the use of stagecoaches, steamships, or railroads used by the
post
office.

That this action was taken despite some hesitancy to use govern-

ment where private enterprise could potentially develop was probably due
to the long-term involvement of the national government in postal policy,

postal subsidization, and so communication, all of which was uncontroversial.

Added to this is the fact that although the effects of the Panic

of 1837 were still being felt.

No other nation in modern history has experienced less difficulty in meeting its financial needs than did the United
States in the years between the second war with England and
the Civil War. 50

Finally, whatever the contrary trends within the period, the time between 1815 and 1860 has been characterized as one in which government

(often at the state level) was active, for

in no other period of American history has the government been
so active in financing and actually promoting, owning, and
controlling banks and public works including turnpikes,

bridges, canals, and railroads

The initial funding for Morse's demonstration project between Washington and Balitmore was undertaken, then, as a logical developmental
step well within the scope of American public policy of the time.

It
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was consistent with what had gone before
and what was still developing.
But despite the logic of this investment
in the telegraph, the Congress,

ignoring pleas of the Postmaster General and
Samuel Morse, refused

to

go

further to operate or expand a public telegraph
system under the direction of the Post Office.

The relinquishing of tnis new and innovative

system to the world of private enterprise provides
several indications
about public and congressional attitudes toward the
role of government

within the environment of the period.
The first is that, despite the government's willingness
to provide
some money where no private capital was available, it was
not so gladly

given within the political atmosphere of the period.

Increasingly,

private development was preferred, and increasingly it was able to be
used.

As W. Elliot BroiMilee indicated, money was much more readily

available in the 1840s and 1850s to be "mobilized and managed" to promote private development.

At that, the telegraph technology was not as

capital intensive as other improvements, while at the same time it offered "the most drastic change" in an era "of revolutionary developments
in transportation and communication "^^
.

outlay, potential receipts were enormous.

Thus, for a relatively small
As soon as this became

evident.

Dozens of private telegraph companies were bom overnight.
Telegraph poles suddenly sprouted along the nation's roads and
railroads as mile after mile of message-bearing wire were
hauled aloft and strung from pole to pole, while down on the
grotjnd such confusion spread that a telegram from New York to
the frontier town of Chicago would have to pass through as
many as four companies. 5

And,
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Wxth the great extension of the lines, the original hesitancy
to use the telegraph disappeared.
The whole method of gathering news was rapidly revolutionized, and business,
financial,
and transportation interests soon began to make use of
the new
device. -'^

Quickly, private development of the telegraph made a public monopoly
on
the patent almost irretrievable, as Morse had feared.

Discussion of

making the telegraph publicly-owned continued, but the topic was pretty

well closed by 1846, until the first World War.
The subsidization of the first Morse telegraph line (with $30,000),
and a later grant of $8,000 to cover expenses and for structural reor-

ganization within the government, 56 was all that the public sector, in
the form of Congress, was willing to provide.

One last appropriation of

$4,000 was made,^^ and "Congress authorized the Postmaster General to

lease the line to any person who would keep it in operation for its

earnings, or sell it under the direction of the President of the United

States."

58

The Postmaster General did first lease it and then ultimate-

ly sell it to the Magnetic Telegraph Company,
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Congress went as far as founding and operating the first significant telegraph line, but no further.

Its role was dominant in postal

policy, and it was able to determine the scope of Post Office activities,
It had time to act

when no private interests would adequately fund fur-

ther development, but this time span was very short, and Congress did
not act.

Samuel Morse, Cave Johnson and Amos Kendall all urged the

government to buy the patent to the telegraph system and run it as
government enterprise.

Yet there was no action on this.

a

Evidently,

Congress could extend the post roads and order improvement in the postal

system without fully appreciating the importance
of the telegraph as a
communications device and its effect on the transfer of
information
through society.

The only protracted discussion in Congress concerning the
merits of
the telegraph in the 1843-1847 period took place in
the Senate on Febru-

ary 28, 1845. 60
tages.

It indicates a reluctance to act, whatever the advan-

Whigs generally favored the telegraph, with some reservations

(of Senator George Evans), while Democrats opposed it.

Senator George McDuffie, Democrat from South Carolina,^"'' asked,
"What [will] this telegraph do?

papers?"

Would it transmit letters and news-

Along with Senator Thomas Hart Benton's^^ question as to

whether "there was a call for it by the merchants of the country?", this
indicated a concern as to the commercial viability of the proposed ex-

tension of the telegraph from Baltimore to New York.
was a Democrat from Missouri.)

from Connecticut,
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(Senator Benton

Senator Jabez William Huntington, a Whig

said that "no petitions had come from the merchants

in favor of that telegraph, because they thought its value and impor-

tance was too evident to require being brought to the notice of Congress

.

Senator George Evans,

64

a

Whig from Maine, wondered, "Why should

the government wish to work the telegraph for the benefit of private in-

dividuals?

If

merchants wished the benefits of the telegraph between

here and Baltimore, let them pay for it."
Whig from Louisiana,
graph
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Senator Alexander Barrow,

had earlier indicated that operation of the tele-
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erected by the government and controlled by
the Post Office
Department, would not only pay its expense, but
be a source of
revenue. He hoped to see the day when it would
be extended to
Boston and New Orleans

However, Senator Evans' suggestion that the powerful
interests would

benefit through a government telegraph was not readily
answered, and he
seemed to reflect the general outlook of the period, as
characterized by

contemporary historians, such as Richard Hofstedter:

The Jacksonian movement grew out of expanding opportunities
and a common desire to enlarge these opportunities still further by removing restrictions and privileges that had their
origins in acts of government; thus, with some qualifications,
it was essentially a movement of laissez-faire, an attempt to
divorce government and business. 66
*t

The maintenance or growth of public enterprise in order that the estab-

lished interests might be served had a disquieting effect on the Congress of the time, so that both Evans and Benton might raise such an issue within an effective political atmosphere acting as a stage.

Con-

tinued maintenance of the telegraph line, and extension of that line,

would be a public subsidy to private business.

The money for Morse's

development of an experimental line from Washington to Baltimore was
enough; if business wanted a telegraph badly enough, they could surely

construct it.
There was no effective argument against that, for Huntington ad-

mitted that its value was evident enough, the implication being that
business was waiting for the government to develop the telegraph.

There

was no indication that capital could not be raised, or that the risk was
too great, so it appears that the line was rejected,

in economic terms.
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to lessen the benefits to private business.

Further government subsi-

dization was understood as simply allowing business
to concentrate on
its ongoing operations.

What Senators Evans and Benton missed was the

business potential of the telegraph itself, which Barrow
understood to
be a "source of revenue" for the Post Office Department.

While the Post

Office has throughout its history been just that, a subsidizer
of com-

mercial (as well as educational and political) expansion, senators now
argued against further expansion through Jacksonian lenses:

to be care-

ful in exploiting the national government so that established interests,

no matter what their fiscal (or moral) 6 7 integrity, would not retain the

advantage.

Senator McDuffie worried that "the telegraph might be made very
mischievous, and secret communication after communicated, to the prejudice of merchants."

68

However, Senator Huntington, "thought no danger

would result from its establishment, owned as it would be by the government, and controlled by the Postmaster General." 69

As early as 1842,

the House Committee on Commerce had voiced concerns as to how the tele-

graph, "if monopolized by a private company, might be used to the serious injury of the Post Office Department "^^
.

And the House Report Num-

ber 187, presented three days after McDuffie's Senate rhetoric, voiced
the same fears of injury to the Post Office.

Furthermore,

if the government shall not speedily embrace the project.
he [Morse] will be necessitated to look elsewhere for his indemnification. And, should the arrangements into which he may
find it necessary to enter with private individuals or associations, stipulate exclusive rights in their favor, it is manifest how greatly government and the people would lie at their
mercy
.

.
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McDuffie also asked, "Under what power in the constitution
did
senators propose to erect this telegraph?

He was not aware of any

"^^
authority except under the clause for the establishment of post
roads.

No one answered directly, although everyone presumed the
power would be

exercised by the Post Office Department, since chis power was being used
by the Post Office Department to operate the Baltimore to Washington

But three days later, the House Committee of

line.

VJays

and Means did

answer McDuffie by detailing an argument of constitutional justification.

The Committee found that the operation of the telegraph was

legitimately a post office power.

As the post office subsidized steam-

ships and railroads, it could equally do so with telegraphs.

In addi-

tion to the postal power, "the government undoubtedly possesses the

authority to establish the telegraph for its own use in the transmission
of official orders and communications."

Together with the postal power,

"the committee deem the constitutionality of the measure incontroverti-

ble."m73

Whether McDuffie was aware of the report which was about to be

released is not known,
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but his line of argument was forcefully re-

butted by the reasoning of the Committee of Ways and Means and by the
practice already ongoing in operating the Baltimore-VJashington line as
part of the Post Office.

Congress took no further action, and the telegraph system was de-

veloped by private individuals.
cepted "some system"

— any

system

Whether Evans and Benton would have ac-

— is

questionable.

But the point is

moot, since government deliberation was running a race with the rapidity

with which private enterprise appreciated the implications of the telegraph as a revolution in communication.

And as Congress failed to act,
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Morse asked Amos Kendall to serve as President of what
came to be the

Magnetic Telegraph Company.
enterprise success.

The story developed from there is a private

Although discussion of the public control of the

telegraph system surfaced at times, significant action was not taken
until 1918, when the exigencies of the first World War led to a government

takeover of the telegraph and telephone systems.
As a public policy question,

the failure of Congress to listen to

those pushing for a telegraph system under the Post Office illustrates
how the postal service as a public enterprise has been instrumentally

operated to achieve certain limited ends.

The subsidization of private

enterprise has been central to postal policy throughout the existence of
the postal service, but the ownership of stagecoaches, steamships, rail-

roads, or the telegraph has been seen as undesirable.

Subsidize busi-

ness, but do not displace business or inhibit its development.

The main characteristic of the telegraph example is borne out in
the nature of public enterprise in the United States as a subsidizer of

commercial development.

The government, specifically Congress, went as

far as necessary to stimulate development.

Whereas the post office had

earlier used the stages, ships, or railroads as a means by which to deliver mail, in the case of the telegraph the post office more straight-

forwardly developed the technology.

When this was done, the telegraph

was set loose by Congress to develop and compete with the Post Office.
The warnings of Cave Johnson in his annual reports as Postmaster

General (reports of December
heeded.

He wrote that.

1,

1845, and December

7,

1846) were not
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It becomes, then, a question of great
importance, how far the
government will allow individuals to divide with it
the business of transmitting intelligence— an important
duty, confided
to It by the constitution, necessarily and
properly exclusive?.
The use of an instrument so powerful for good or
for evil cannot with safety to the people be left in
the hands
of private individuals uncontrolled by law. 75
.

.

Apparently Congress was willing

to

the onslaught of the telegraph.

let the Post Office Department absorb

Although the postal service still

exists, this is an early indication of the way in which Congress would

allow the post office to be inhibited in certain ways, developmentally
(in terms of new technical possibilities) and financially, whereby Con-

gress sets conditions allowing private enterprises to operate successfully against the post office and to skim profits (despite the first
class mail monopoly).

Thus, in the promotion of commercial development

relating to the telegraph, Congress not only allowed but ordered the de-

velopment of a technology which would ultimately compete with the Post
Office, and yet could not be used by the Post Office.

This public en-

terprise was therefore having its potential for qualitative improvement,
profit-making, and public recognition and approval undermined.

So pub-

lic policy in this instance not only limited postal abilities and sub-

sidized private commercial development, it subsidized and established a

competitor to the very post office it operated.
ent endeavor altogether,

This is a very differ-

for in the past the promotion of commercial

development had to do with general economic growth, education, or transportation, while in this case Congress had subsidized and developed an

alternative communication system

American postal policy.

.

This introduced a new dimension into

In this case Congress demonstrated to the

postal service that it favored private enterprise over
public enterprise, and that it would not hesitate to allow
competition in the com

munications field.

The implications were immense for the United Stat

Post Office in particular and for public enterprise in general.

The

"loss" of the telegraph, from the viewpoint of the postal
service as

public enterprise, was significant.
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Taylor wrote about how the period of his study, 1815-1860, "was
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Of course, when statesmen such as Washington promoted such learning, it may be regarded as a call for educating the elite so that they
may "lead" in a wise and prudent manner.
Many elements across the political spectrum attack elitism (without adequately defining it) or, in a
sense more applicable to Washington and the American founding, attack
the existence (and effort to maintain that) of a body of men who could
be cultivated for leadership.
It is reasonable that such a "class"
could be criticized for an unjust and inegalitarian project, but criticism of the result of such an experiment, considering the political
and social conditions of the time, is more problematic
Who can doubt
the skill of Washington in stilling the winds of sectionalism, at least
to the point of enabling the new republic to enjoy a (relatively) peaceful beginning?
It took much pressure over a long period of time for a
dilemma written into the founding document to fester to the point of
civil war; while this is a damning comment on the original compact
agreed to at Philadelphia, it also reflects the skill with which a group
which sought political moderation was able to institutionalize it.
.
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45
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Goodrich, o£. cit
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Ibid., 43-44.

Different sources estimate a different subsidy percentage for
the
various internal improvement projects. The point here is
not necessarily how intensive (25% or 75%) the government
subsidy was, only that it
was not uncommon and that it was important to commercial
development.
The importance of (national and state) government funds for
building
canals and steamships was probably greater than that for railroads,
for
several reasons.
Brownlee, o£. cit., suggests 75% governmental investment for canals, and only 25% for railroads.
(See Chapter 7.)
48

Brownlee,

cit., 233.
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49

The cause of the failure of Morse to receive private funding for
the experimental telegraph line is not completely clear, but several
factors seem to have determined this. First of all, Morse was busy
demonstrating his invention, attempting to attain patents (in several
countries, without success), improving his invention, and, without funds
to adequately promote his telegraph was unable to approach public and
private sponsors. Similarly, his associates (F. 0. J. Smith, Alfred
Vail, and Professor L. D. Gale) were unable to obtain or provide aid.
(See Morse, 0£. cit
150-152.)
And the general business conditions of
the times, following the Panic of 1837, were not terribly good.
(See
Morse, 0£. cit
Chapter XXVIII.)
So Morse was not able to actively
solicit private funds in any meaningful sense which, coupled with general reticence to provide capital and skepticism about an electric telegraph, shut out the private capital market.
Thus, Morse concentrated on
the national government because of private capital's weak condition, its
apparently conservative sense regarding risk of a substantial nature,
and the unclear use and profit which might result from a successful
telegraph.
Private capital was unable to provide, therefore, the funding necessary which led to activity in the public sector, as had and has
been the case in so many other instances. Ultimately, after having in
its possession a proven commodity, the Magnetic Telegraph Company and
others rapidly raised private capital and spread telegraph lines and
systems throughout the United States.
.
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^^Morse (and his associates) founded the Magnetic Telegraph Company
with Amos Kendall, ex-postmaster general, as president. The first com-

98

mercial lines where then constructed from New York (more
accurately
Newark, New Jersey) to Philadelphia, and then to Washington.
Henry'
0 Reilly, leading the building of the telegraph to Baltimore (and then
Washington) from Philadelphia, wrote on Christmas day of 1845
to Amos
Kendall that, "It will be a memorable fact in telegraphic history,
that,
vast as are the advantages it promises, scarcely a merchant
or capitalist in the great cities of New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore,
could
be induced to take a dollar of stock to encourage the whole
enterprise!"
(O'Reilly to Kendall, December 25, 1845, O'Reilly Manuscript Collection
I, cited in Thompson, o£. cit
49.)
By the close of 1846, though, the telegraph was well on its way to
success, so that Kendall could write:
"Our Treasurer thinks our net income now is 5 percent on the stock or 20 percent on the money invested."
(Kendall to Smith, October 6, 1846, Smith Papers, XI, as cited in Thomp.

,

son, o£. cit
56.)
It is interesting that the president of the first successful commercial telegraph company had been a past Postmaster General of the
United States, and a successful one at that. Thompson indicated that,
"Kendall's experience as Postmaster General had given him a thorough
familiarity with the main commercial routes of the country. He proposed,
therefore, to interest private capital in the construction of trunk telegraph lines along these routes, and then to build the numerous side or
feeder lines necessary to serve the entire country." (Thompson, op. ^
cit., 39.)
.

,

56^

Thompson,

^^Ibid.

Ibid

,

o£^.

cit

.

31.

,

33.

.

59

Ibid
56.
During the period of 1845-1846 Kendall, while "working earnestly for the development of the telegraph by private enterprise
.strongly favored the sale of the patent rights to the government."
(Thompson, o£. cit
Others involved disagreed, specifically for40.)
mer congressman F. 0. J. Smith, who "had made up his mind that he would
never again be a party to any application to the government to purchase
the telegraph." ( Ibid )
Kendall ultimately agreed to a time limit until
which the government could buy the patent, a limit which passed.
.

.

,

.

.

,

.
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February 28, 1845, 28th Congress, 2nd SesSketches of the Debates and Proceedings edited by
From:
Blair and Rives (City of Washington:
Globe Office, 1845), Volume XIV.
The following quotes in the text are taken from this debate of February
28, 1845.
Co ngr es s ional Globe

sion, p.

6

366.

,

,

Senator George McDuffie was Senator from South Carolina, a Democrat who was representative of the Jacksonians, although his disagreements over the Bank of the United States and nullification left him displeased with the administration. See: Dictionary of American Biography ,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), and
edited by Dumas Malone (New York:
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Biographical Dictionary of the Ame.ri r an Congress 1774-1971
(Washington
United States Government Printing Office, 1971).

'
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Senator Thomas Hart Benton was Senator from Missouri,
a Democrat
He was more representative of the Jacksonians,
being Jackson's spokesman
the Senate, and Senate leader against the Bank of
the United States
His ties to Jackson were intricate, including
the fact that either he or
his brother left a bullet lodged in Jackson's
chest (in a brawl, of
sorts), an incident they later let rest. Dictionary
of America n Blo~
graphy op cit
Volume II.

m

.

,

63

Whig

.

,

Senator Jabez Williams Huntington was Senator from Connecticut,
a
Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress 1774-19 71 op^.
.

cit.

64„
6^-._„.„_
.....
Senator .George .Evans was .Senator from
Maine, a Whig (or "i'national
Republican")
He is not being stereotyped as a Jacksonian, but only as
reflective of the Jacksonian era which permeated national politics.
Evans was a strong supporter of the protective tariff, of the United
States Bank, and of Internal Improvements. He admitted during the debate that, "He was not hostile to the extension; and he thought it next
to useless unless extended to New York.
[My emphasis.] He thought,
however, that some preliminary arrangements would have to be made before
such an extension was authorized. It would be necessary to acquire the
right to the land, and prevent the government from being overcharged by
the owners.
The telegraph was now on the railways, and no one could say
how long the company might allow it to remain there." See:
Congres sional Globe op cit., 366 for quote; Dictionary of American Biography ,
op
cit
Volume X.
.

.

,

.

.

.

(

,

.

,
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Senator Alexander Barrow was Senator from Louisiana, a I^Jhig.
Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress 1774-1971 op cit
,

.

.

^^Rlchard Hofstedter, The American Political Tradition and the Men
Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 70.
67

Matthew A. Crenson, The Federal Machine: Beginnings of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian America (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1975), p. 24, wrote that:
"Such things as Internal Improvements
and the banking monopoly could be useful conveniences, as Jackson himself conceded, but he thought that the moral impediments of these conveniences outweighed their public utility. Internal Improvements would
Inflame petty, parochial jealousies and might be 'resorted to as artful
expedients to shift upon the Government the losses of unsuccessful private speculation, and thus, by ministering to personal ambition and
self-aggrandizement, tend to sap the foundation of public virtue.'"
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Although a familiarity with the affairs of Congress in general
might be expected, the fact that the Senate was engaged in
an encompassing debate concerning Texas/Mexico evidently was taking attention
away
from other matters. The telegraph question, although "pressing"
because
of the inevitable push for private development in a very
short interval
(and as an indication of public policy sentiments) could not
adequately
compete with proposals concerning the Texas/Mexico situation. Thus,
McDuffie may well have been quite unaware of the Ways and Means Committee report.
However, it should be understood that Congress had put off
this question for a long period, during which adequate attention might
have been focused upon it.
^^Senate Document
p.

861.

1,

29th Congress, 1st Session (December 1, 1845),

CHAPTER

IV

RURAL FREE DELIVERY

The period between the 1840s and the 1880s was one of
improvement
of existing postal services,

extension of their geographic scope and

volume, and expansion of the postal service into new endeavors.

Though

outside the parameters of this work, events of significance occurred

during these decades, beginning with the Act of March

3,

1845.

This

legislation created a new set of postage rates based on the weight of a
letter rather than the number of sheets it contained, restricted the use
of the franking privilege, and made the procedures for the bidding for

transportation contracts more effective."*"

The use of adhesive postage

stamps began in 1847, and compulsory prepayment of postage was mandated
by the Act of March

3,

1855,

for domestic letter mail.

2

which also created a registration system

In 1860, the Pony Express began making its

historic runs, but it was eclipsed (and discontinued) in October, 1861,
by the completion of the transcontinental telegraph line. 3

The Civil War period was one of innovation, as new services were
added.

Free city delivery began operating "in forty-nine of the larger

Northern cities and towns" on July
1863.

4

1,

186 3,

through the Act of March

3,

Domestic money orders were created by the Act of March 17, 1864,

and a Railway Mail Service (by which Railway Post Offices sorted mail
in transit) was established by the Act of March 25,

1864.^

Post cards were introduced in 1873, free franking privileges
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abolished and redefined the same year, and special
delivery begun in
1885, and extended to all classes of mail and all post
offices in 1886.^

This series of reforms represented an improvement in
the technical means
by which postal service was achieved, and expansion of
the actual ser-

vices offered by the postal system.

The growth of the postal service

from the time of the founding was remarkable— by 1890 there were
62,401
post offices, with revenues of over $60 millions—and the role of
the
Post Office was still central in the affairs of the nation.

The return of the Republicans to the White House, in the person of

Benjamin Harrison, in 1889, also brought a new Postmaster General, John
Wanamaker.

Wanamaker was the successful Philadelphia businessman who

headed the nationally famous department store, Wanamaker

&

Company, and

he was an innovative merchant who used novel techniques and technologies
in pursuing his business ends.

He is credited with being the originator

of the "Money-Bank Guarantee", and he successfully used advertising to

promote his business.

He employed electric lights in his store in 1879,

and also installed steam heating, both of which were novel applications
for these technologies.

As a respected businessman, he was able to

raise and coordinate capital for Harrison in the campaign, and was offered the Postmaster General position on the advice of Republican party
leaders and, apparently, Harrison's personal friend (and first choice
for Postmaster General)

,

James Clarkson of Iowa.

g

During his term of office, Wanamaker made four proposals which relate significantly to the role of the postal service as
prise.

They include rural free delivery (RFD)

,

a

public enter-

parcel post delivery

service, establishment of a postal savings bank, and the public owner-
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ship of the telegraph and telephone systems (as a part of the Post Office Department).

Only the first of these, RFD, was a new suggestion

by a Postmaster General, and only RFD became any sort of reality during

Wanamaker's tenure.

The experience with rural free delivery offers an

example of how a successful extension of the Post Office's services provides insight into public enterprise in the United States.
The delivery of mail to individual houses or dwellings in cities
had been a fact of life since the Civil War, but as of the late 1880s,
farmers still had to travel to town to collect their mail.
cases,

In many

this was an arduous journey, given weather and road conditions.

In addition,

the long hours a farmer worked made trips to town the ex-

ception rather than the rule, and so mail collected until the farmer
could make the next all-purpose trip.

The importance of mail to farmers, while not to be overstated, was
not as minimal as those of us with a late 20th century perspective might

expect.

Without the immediate proximity to friends and relatives, the

mails brought important news and communication, and so the isolation of
rural life was broken by the mail service.

commerce were limited.

The prospects of outside

The only way one could order merchandise was

through the express companies, which served only certain markets.

Mail

service opened up a whole new world.
Furthermore, as farmers were becoming involved in an increasingly

nationalized (and even internationalized) economic structure, news of
faraway events became evermore meaningful.

Crop fluctuations, futures

markets, national policies concerning currency
on the farmers'

lives.

— all

had increased effect

Their need for information, and timely informa-
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tion at that, outpaced their ability to collect the mail and news
of the
day at the 4th class post offices.

And the increasing communication

among farmers— as evidenced by the Grange and the Farmers' Alliancesmay have stimulated a perceived need for better communication.

At the

very least, these relations did foster a common feeling that the farmers
needed rural delivery, and deserved service that was equal to what city
dwellers received.

John Wanamaker was the first public official to propose a rural delivery service, and the first person to do so who gained any widespread
notice.

John Stahl apparently originated the idea of rural free deliv-

ery in 1879, "But," as Wayne Fuller has written,

it was one thing to propose that the government carry the
farmer's mail to him, and another to get such a service established. Thousands of people had to be enlisted in its support before Congress would consider such a plan, and until
Postmaster General John Wanamaker began to agitate for rural
delivery in 1891, few people had ever heard of it.^

Wanamaker, then, put RFD on the political agenda, and it was a proposal

which farmers and many of their organizations quickly endorsed.

The National Grange endorsed it at its annual meeting in 1891,
and across the land local and state Alliances passed resoluThe Greenwood Grange of Marshall
tions favoring it
County, West Virginia, Poplar Grove, Whitcomb, and Star of the
West Granges of Indiana, Economy Grange of Mississippi, the
Flat Rock Grange of Ohio, the Farmers' Institute of Connelsville in Lafayette County, Pennsylvania, the Elm Tree National
Farmers' Alliance in Ohio, these and hundreds of other organizations, equally unknown but equally important, let their congressmen know that they wanted rural free delivery.-'-^
.

.

.

.

Wanamaker actually began experimenting "to test the practicability
of extending the free delivery system to farmer s

""^"''
,

by authorization of
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a joint resolution of Congress of October
1, 1890.^^

Although the tests

were apparently not conclusive as a tool for evaluation,
by 1891

Wanamaker was telling the American people that the test had
proven the feasibility of carrying the mail to rural areas and
that a rural delivery service should be started at once. 13
The support from the Grange, Farmers' Alliances, and citizens translated
into rural delivery petitions, which Congressmen entered into the Con-

gressional Record.

Although these organizations were also supporting

establishment of a postal savings bank and public ownership of the telegraph system, the petitions on behalf of RFD provided a more widespread,

grassroots expression by farmers, and these demands for RFD were startling to Congressmen.

Congressmen felt pressured to act, although there

appeared to be little chance of establishing a nationwide rural delivery
system.

14

But by February, 1893, Congress appropriated $10,000 to ex-

periment in rural delivery.

Though the amount was extremely small, es-

pecially in comparison to Wanamaker 's requested $6 million, there were
great financial pressures on Congress at the time which mitigated

against further expenditures.'^^

No comprehensive system was in place,

but by the time Wanamaker left office some appropriation had been made,
and a recognition of the demand for RFD for farmers was achieved.

The sponsor of RFD in the House of Representatives was Representative Tom Watson, Democrat of Georgia, who would be a Populist Vice-

Presidential nominee in 1896, and the Populist Presidential nominee in
1904.

Watson successfully guided the legislation through the House,

with the support of the Democratic Chairman of the Committee on Post
Offices and Post Roads, Representative John Steele Henderson of North
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Carolina.

The legislation "escaped debate in the Senate,
was signed

by the President, and became law."^^

Watson frequently alluded to his

sponsorship of RFD in later years, with every rural
mail delivery box
serving as testimony to the subsequent success of the
program.
But this $10,000 appropriation in no way secured RFD's
future for,

besides being a miniscule sum for such a large-scale
project, the new

Postmaster General appointed by Grover Cleveland, Wilson Bissell,
was
unalterably opposed to using this money for any rural delivery experiment, saying that, "To inaugurate a system of rural free delivery.

would require an appropriation of at least $20,000 ,000

.

.

.""'^

Bissell was an old friend of Cleveland's from Buffalo, and shared

with him a "conservative temperament."

How the mail could be carried

to the farmers every day he simply could not see; nor could President Cleveland. Bissell
called in one of his subordinates, August W. Machen, the man
who had been pushing the service.
.and lectured him sternly.
Rural delivery would bankrupt the nation, he said, and he
wanted to hear no more about it. Machen was to stop agitating
the question. 2^
.

Bissell retired in 1895, and Cleveland appointed William
a Democrat and ex-Congressman from West Virginia.

21

L.

Wilson,

Wilson began ex-

perimenting with a rural delivery system, for which Congress had appropriated $40,000.

The experiment began on October

1,

1896, during the

election campaign of that year, in Wilson's home county in West Virginia.

22

The election, however, proved unsatisfactory to the farmers

and the Democrats, for both common and distinct reasons, and the Repub-

licans returned to power with no permanent RFD plan in sight.

The ex-

periment had just started, and the future course was still uncharted.
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Further, how much could the farmers expect of a
McKinley administration?
By 189

7,

whether because of the support for Bryan and his loss,
or be-

cause of the general conditions surrounding the farmers'
movements, the

Populist surge was subsiding, at least on the national level.

William McKinley chose a Baltimore businessman, James A. Gary, to
be Postmaster General.

Gary resigned after little more than a year in

office, in April, 1898, in opposition to the war over Cuba.^"^

His main

achievement, in terms of RFD, was his Annual Report of 1897, which "contained a detailed and glowing account of the [rfd] experiment" begun in

West Virginia.

24

He concluded the report by writing that,

I think the reports of rural free delivery hereto annexed will
prove conclusively that this experimental service has rendered
benefits far in excess of the expenditures involved, and that,
under wise restrictions, it can be continued and extended with
great advantage to a class of our citizens who, rightly or
wrongly, deem themselves neglected in legislation the agricultural class and without serious detriment to the revenues. ^

—

—

The push for RFD was carried on by the First Assistant Postmaster
General, Perry S. Heath, and the Superintendent of Free Delivery, August

Machen.

Heath had been a close political operative of McKinley 's during

the Presidential campaign, and Machen had managed to remain in his posi-

tion despite the change in administrations.

Together they most likely

"realized that the administration would gain the political loyalty of
rural areas that were given a successful delivery service."

26

With an

appropriation of $150,000 for 1898, they were able to expand the scope
of RFD.

Heath and Machen made a significant move in June, 189 8, which put
unique pressures on Congress to force the development of a full-fledged
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rural delivery system.

To help determine the demand for routes, and

where routes were likely to be successful, and given
their limited resources, Heath and Machen announced a new Post Office
policy on June 30,
189 8.

The policy was published in the form of a circular letter,
which

was sent in response to all inquiries about rural mail
delivery, and

which read, in part:

The amount thus appropriated is obviously insufficient for
the establishment of rural free delivery in every community
where the necessity exists, and the Department has therefore
adopted a plan of locating the experimental service where it
seemed to be the most desired, and where the results promised
to be the best.
As a preliminary to the establishment of the
service, it has usually required that the citizens of the
district should forward, through their Representatives in
Congress, a petition, setting forth the nature of the country,
whether it is thickly or sparsely populated, the leading
avocations of the people, the character of the roads, whether
good or bad, and the distance which the petitioner has to
travel or send under existing circumstances to receive his
mail.
If the Member of Congress representing that district or the
United States Senator residing therein, familiar with local
conditions, should forward this petition to the Post Office
Department with a favorable indorsement, a special Agent is
then sent out to look over the ground, to map out a suitable
route or routes, to select carriers for appointment, and to
recommend the establishment of the service, if in his judgment
it can be successfully and economically carried out.^^

As Fuller noted.

These directions proved to be the turning point in the development of RFD as Machen and Heath had probably foreseen.
When word passed around among the farmers that all they had to
do to have their mail delivered to their farms was sign a petition, the rush was on, and every new route established
brought a demand for a dozen or so more. Once this began.
Congress could have as easily stopped an Oklahoma tornado as
have stemmed the demand for rural delivery. ^8

The petitions put pressure on Congressmen to file the requests with
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the Post Office Department, producing
an opportunity of wide extent for
the practice of distributive politics by
Congress.

Yet the control over

this had somehow transferred beyond Congress
to the administrative de-

partment.

The Post Office Department defined the agenda,
and Congress

was given the financial burden and the political
pressure.

The Post

Office Department had forced upon Congress an expansion
of the ongoing

experiment which resulted ultimately in a permanent RFD
program, and
then hired an extensive RFD bureaucracy to administer the
program.

The potential financial repercussions were addressed by Congress.

Senator Eugene Hale of Maine, a "self-appointed watchdog of the United
States Treasury," 30 believed that the RFD experiment would soon become

permanent, as more routes were added each year.

He led other Senators

in trying to kill rural delivery in 1899,

and only the timely intervention of the Grange and interested
Congressmen saved the service. Learning of the Senator's actions, the officers of the National Grange raised an enormous
petition of some 75,000 names in support of rural delivery and
presented it to Congress.

A House-Senate conference committee restored the money, and the development of the service was never again seriously endangered. 32

By 1902

there were eight thousand rural routes, and by 1905, thirty-two thousand.

33

Once unleashed, the farmers' demands for rural delivery service

had resounded through Congress.

Congress then acted to encourage the

Post Office to promote RFD, while at the same time (implicitly) admitting that the expenditures would outweigh receipts in providing the

service
This victory of the farmers was of a paradoxical nature.

To begin
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with, the Post Office Department (through
Heath and Machen) put the

critical pressure on Congress to promote an RFD
scheme, and it appears
as though the Post Office Department did
this by understanding the

farmers' desires and frustrations, and by translating
these into a poli-

tical success, RFD.

In providing a political victory for the
farmers,

who could point to little else as a political achievement
in national
politics, it was intended to draw this constituency into the
Republican
party, while at the same time damaging the Democrats and the
third party

movement
But this incident also reflected an important change in the poli-

tical balance.

The Post Office Department had acted politically in a

manner unthought of at the founding, in an effort to court popular
favor.

And it had done so by putting pressures on Congress which Con-

gress was unable to resist, providing public benefits with relatively

hidden costs (in the form

of postal deficits in RFD service).

At the same time as being an apparent "success" in Congressional

politics, it built an administrative presence which diluted Congres-

sional prerogative and increased the federal bureaucracy in the form of
the Post Office, both in Washington (to administer RFD) and throughout
the nation (both to administer and to carry-out the program).

Thus,

although RFD can be considered a victory of Congressional politics and
of the sensitivity of Congressmen to constituent demands, it can also be

interpreted as indicative of the emerging political order of the twentieth century.
RFD was a point at which Populism and Progressivism converged, in a
way, so that although the demands of farmers were met, it was done so
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within the developing Progressive framework.

This is indicated by

several factors.
The first was the manipulative aspect of the
Heath-Machen policy,

which not only produced an avalanche of popular demand
for RFD, but then

required an administrative entity to fulfill the service
needs.

This

translated into a growth of administration, both in terms
of discretion
(e.g.,

in establishing rural routes, and identifying rural
carriers)

influence.
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and

This occurred during the same time period as significant

growth in other vanguard areas.
Secondly, the influence of the Executive was growing relative to
that of Congress.

The McKinley victory brought Republican control of

the White House and an increasingly active Presidency.

Theodore Roose-

velt was a strong President, whatever his political leanings, and he

asserted himself in domestic regulatory and reform affairs as well as in

foreign policy. 37

Though Taft's reputation is not as a Progressive per

se, he did consolidate many

o'f

Roosevelt's actions.

And by World War

Wilson was able to motivate the national government in the pursuit of

I,

a

large-scale war effort requiring great amounts of administrative coordination.

In the meantime. Congress was stirring, and the 1910 deposing

of Speaker Cannon marked the beginning of a long decline in Congres-

sional influence vis-a-vis the Executive.
Thirdly, reform in the political system had begun to affect the

postal service significantly, as extension of the Pendleton Act to the
Post Office Department enveloped more areas.

In 1885, only approximate-

ly 15,000 postal employees were covered by civil service rules.

1896,

By

the figure rose to over 87,000, although "of the 72,371 classifi-
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able but unclassified jobs still left in
government in 1896, 66,825 were

fourth-class postmasters!""^^

Theodore Roosevelt brought about 9,000 RFD employees
into the civil
service in November, 1901, 39 admittedly after he was able
to make significant Republican appointments, and "rural mail carriers
were put under

civil service regulations in 1904,"^^ soon after RFD became
a permanent
program.

This acted to diminish patronage opportunities in the
postal

service.

RFD made fourth-class post offices redundant, and (as the

stated policy of the Post Office Department) they began to be discontinued as RFD routes proliferated.

Congressmen were in a dilemma be-

cause initiation of RFD, a popular cause, meant discontinuing the fourthclass post offices, an unpopular act among the shopkeepers who housed

many of these.

So,

"congressmen often induced the Department to estab-

lish the rural routes and close its eyes to the little post offices that

stood in the way."

41

In 1908, Roosevelt included "all fourth-class

postmasters east of the Massissippi and north of the Ohio River," under
civil service rules. 42

Taft ultimately classified the rest of the

fourth-class postmasters in 1912, though the regulations were amenable
to

(limited) political influence.

By the time Wilson took office,

then, much of the Post Office Department was subject to civil service,

bringing the postal service into the Progressive framework.

Reform in the political system during this period encompassed more
than just civil service classification.

There were issues fundamental

to the processes of democratic government which were debated and which

led to action.

The battle the farmers and their organizations had

fought against consolidated power and for democratic institutions and
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government was not subsumed by the pursuit of democratic
procedural

mechanisms within a political culture increasingly
dominated by consolidated corporate and government power.

Such issues as the referendum,

the recall, the initiative, secret balloting, and direct
election of

Senators endured from the days of the Populists (who unsuccessfully
pursued these aims) to the Progressive Era, when reforms were passed
in

state after state."

Though many of these procedural remedies desired by both Populists
and Progressives were similar or the same, the ends to be served were

decidedly different.

Populists hoped to democratize state government,

and to increase access to government by the farmer and the worker^^ at

the expense of industrial corporations and big businessmen.

The Pro-

gressives sought the same or similar reforms, "all of which were aimed
not primarily at giving the people more power as a matter of principle,

but at breaking the power of political bosses."

(The Progressives did

not aim at breaking the power of big business, but, at most, controlling
the harmful externalities of big business as well as big government.)

The contradiction goes to the center of the problem faced by groups pro-

posing that the government serve democratic ends; the form was there,
but not necessarily the substance.

As RFD entrusted power to adminis-

tration, at the expense of more directly "popular" power, so did the

success of electoral reforms shaped by Progressive politicians.
The change was not simply one from Congressional to Executive
power.

Progressives (such as Woodrow Wilson) believed that a return to

Executive fulfillment of administrative functions more closely resembled the founders' intentions than did the party politics of the latter
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part of the nineteenth century.

They understood the change to Executive

direction of policy as a move toward administrative
responsibility and
to purposeful activity.

The founders, after all, envisioned an ener-

getic and responsible Executive as being central to
the exercise of good

government
The difference lay, however, in the manner in which the Executive
was tied to the polity.

In the founding period, administrative respon-

sibility would be ensured by identifying able men to carry out the
policies of government.

Those men would be rooted in communities, tying the

national government to the various local situations in the nation. ^'^

Promotion of national purposes, whether those of commerce or of education, would* be understood in meaningful local as well as national terms.

This contrasts with the Progressives who did not root their adminis-

trative power in the localities but in the national government, which

was viewed as eliminating the politically debilitating effects of local
politics.

48

was altered.

The understanding of checks and balances on the Executive
In the founding period, the political ties to community

were much more evident.

Administrators were the products of localities,

and closely tied to those communities.

Congressmen were elected in

their districts. Senators were chosen by state legislatures, and Presi-

dents were chosen by electors who were picked by state legislatures or
conventions.

This was a system dependent upon a multitude of local

situations and the leaders who arose from this process would be responsive to those communities.
By the early 1900s, however, circumstances had changed.

Adminis-

trators were members of burgeoning bureaucracies, and not identifiable
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public figures in the localities.

Congressmen were still elected in the

districts, but Senators were directly elected, and Presidential electors

were the product of direct elections also.

This freed the Senators and

Presidents from those local constraints, and allowed an identification

with "the people"

— as

an undifferentiated whole—to provide a base of

support (and potential check)

,

rather than the reliance on local and

state support.
In a similar sense,

commerce had been freed from the constraints of

the communities in taking on a national and even international character.

Founding era commerce was based in the local merchants, farmers,

and other respected figures in the community, while the new businesses
of the twentieth century were divorced from the localities and increas-

ingly able to ignore the communities in which they operated, and the

pressures which the localities attempted to apply.
These changes represent a degradation in the understanding of politics.

The effect was not simply a change from the politics of Congress

to that of a bureaucratized Executive, but rather a change in the basis

of the nature of government.

As politics and commerce were increasingly

insulated from local conditions, a system emerged which emphasized national administration and national business, absent meaningful local

control or input.

This was a sharp departure from the founding era un-

derstanding of the relationships among government, administration, and
commerce, and paved the way for the development of a politics without

clear ties to the polity, and commercial interests less interested in

their effects on individual communities, a situation which has intensi-

fied throughout the twentieth century.
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The Increasingly broad coverage of postal
workers under civil

service classification generated a response of
organization among postal
workers.

The National Association of Letter Carriers
was organized in

1880 (August 30, 1889), and the National Federation of
Post Office

Clerks the next year (February

3,

1890).^^

They were among the earliest

public employees to unionize, responding to the new
administrative circumstances created by the Pendleton Act and civil service reform.

The

Post Office was changing from a more openly (and meaningfully)
political

organization to a professional, bureaucratic-oriented enterprise
This was furthered by the decline in the number of fourth-class post offices, and their eventual classification (in steps) during the early

twentieth century.

All this occurred in a society which was becoming increasingly centered around national entities, in business, education, government,
newsprint, literature, transportation, communication, and politics.

The

Post Office, as the first national governmental institution, represented
a department which was almost universally accepted as legitimate, and

one in which administrative powers and reforms could be accepted.

And

in a more nationally-oriented society, the extended postal service could

play a central role.

RFD brought the farmers and rural residents into

the mainstream of American postal affairs,

rural areas was breached.

and so the isolation of

Thus, the transition to a more national con-

sciousness was facilitated.
In a manner parallel to that of the failure of the farmers' coop-

eratives and the perceived need for government intervention at the national level, attempted through Macune's subtreasury

52
plan,''*

the sue-
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cess of RFD also relied on a national government
presence, and looked to

the administrative state which was emerging.

The transition to a more

active national government was reflected in regulatory
activity, civil
service reform, and the stirrings of a national structure for
the Republican party growing out of the disparate state parties,

and understood

the weakness of the farmers in maintaining their independence from
the

greater currents of national events.

As the farmers gained RFD,

there

was a concurrent weakening of Congressional control over postal matters,
as

the Post Office Department enlarged its bureaucracy and began to

practice greater discretion.

With the inception of RFD, the Post Office

Department for the first time began to establish the routes for post
roads

—a

prerogative which had been previously guarded by Congress.

Since

More money was spent, more men employed, and more paperwork
done to lay out the rural delivery system than to establish
any single extension of the postal system.

the Post Office Department ultimately created an

RFD bureaucracy that embraced eight rural divisions, with
headquarters in every section of the country and at the height
of its activity laid more than 9,000 routes in one year.^^

*Robert C. McMath, Jr. wrote that Charles Macune's sub-treasury
plan was one which, "called for the establishment of federal subtreasuries along with warehouses and elevators in which farmers could store
certain nonperishable commodities. Upon depositing his crop, a farmer
would receive negotiable treasury notes equal to 80 percent of the
crop's value." See Robert C. McMath, Jr., Populist Vanguard (New York:
More complete descriptions and
W.W. Norton & Company, 1975), p. 91.
analysis are available in the books listed in footnote //52.
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This was a significant administrative
load, which pointed towards a

transfer of activity to the Executive branch.
The Post Office of the period reflected
these trends as well as the

increasing influence of civil service, so that RFD
as a permanent service
came under civil service provisions, and the
political usefulness of the

Post Office declined.

Thus, the program which embodied the avowedly

political program of the farmers soon became insulated
from such political influence, and was the focus of administrative
control and growth.
All this fit into the increasing prof essionalization of
American
life,

including the aforementioned postal workers' associations.

Move-

ments for good, efficient government followed the organizing of private

associations in various fields, such as medicine, law, and social work.
Burton Bledstein makes the point succinctly:

In its very idealism, the culture of professionalism bred public attitudes of submission and passivity.
For instance, reformers in the late nineteenth century proposed to make American politics more attentive to the will of the individual
citizen rather than to the desire of the venal boss. But a
significant consequence of that democratic reform was to discourage the public's participation in its own political affairs. 55

Participatory movements gave way to Progressive politics (professionalized, concerned with efficiency and with an emphasis on good government)

,

and this lessened the legitimacy of such a directly political

event as the promotion of a rural delivery system by large numbers of
farmers themselves acting toward specific political ends.

Establishment of RFD as a permanent program in such a relatively
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short time indicates the possibilities
as well as the limits of the post

office as a public enterprise.

Even considering the important features

of RFD, such as 1) equality of service
to almost all residents of the

country,
or

3)

2)

extension of information and intercourse
throughout society,

facilitation of a greater market for goods and
service (especially

with the creation of parcel post service in
1913), there remains a question as to how RFD came into being considering
the predominant business

culture of the time.
RFD did not pose a great threat to anyone, and certainly
not to any

very influential and active groups.

Some merchants in rural areas did

view rural delivery as a possible threat, as farmers would no longer
have to visit town for their mail.

mainly to trying

to

But their lobbying was confined

make sure that rural routes originated in their

towns

The other people who were vulnerable to displacement by RFD were
the country postmasters, whose "little combination stores and fourthclass post offices.

.

.had been the heart of the old rural mail system

from George Washington's day to the

beginning of rural free delivery."

The post office was important because it drew trade to their stores.

The

dramatic decline in the number of post offices after the establishment
of RFD is indicative of the effect this did have on small post offices.
In 1901, there were 76,945 post offices, of which more than 70,000 were

fourth-class post offices; by 1920, there were only Al,102 post offices
in operation.

Though the fourth-class postmasters lost the overall

battle, the local problems were often solved by the Post Office Depart-

ment "overlooking" the particular post office's existence.
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The other threat was to public finances,
which Postmaster General

Bissell envisioned to be severe.

But since this threat was almost in-

visible, it was subdued by the potential for
distributive politicking,
and by early indications of financial success
(e.g., by Postmaster Gary).

There were strong proponents of RFD, especially
the farmers who had

been generally frustrated in their political efforts.

The issue of RFD

was unique, though, because it required no political organizing
and no
political vehicle (party or otherwise) to go forward:

had to forward their petitions

to

their Congressmen.

the farmers only
This was a rela-

tively simple political act, and it generated an enormous response,
putting great pressure on Congressmen to act.

They in turn pressured the

Post Office Department bureaucrats who, in the persons of Heath and
Machen, were eager to act.

Postmaster General Wanamaker, successful businessman, gave a strong
endorsement to RFD in business terms:

To the business man in town the extension of the free delivery
would be of immense value. 1 have for years advised young
merchants to get into earnest correspondence with persons whom
they would like to do business with.
It results in more correspondence, and that results in business.
I suppose the exact benefit to the merchant, due to the regularity and dispatch with which mails went out from an office in the city and
then went back into it, can not be calculated; but if this
regularity and dispatch supplant the irregularity and sloth
of the method of delivering and collecting the mails once or
twice a week the benefits would surely be incalculable. The
country is always tributary to the city; it makes the city.
The extension of the postal facilities will make the business
man more prosperous and enterprising

In another sense, RFD broke no new ground:

it did not require new

technology, and it simply extended the basic service of the post office,
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delivery of letters, newspapers, magazines, and
small parcels (up to
four pounds), to the whole nation.

In this way it did not involve an

expansion of postal activities into new areas, as
did the proposed postal telegraph and telephone, did not generally
threaten business, and

did not engender constitutional objections.

grounds, but other issues did not intrude.

It was debated on financial

(After it had been estab-

lished as a permanent program, RFD carriers began to use automobiles
on
their routes, and in 1915, Postmaster General Albert Burleson
established

automobile routes where possible.
Thus, RFD was, in policy terms, an expansion of an existing system
of free city delivery.

No newly established powers gravitated to the

Post Office Department (with the exception of identifying post roads and

choosing rural carriers)

,

no great struggle over doctrine took place,

and, essentially, the formal powers of the Post Office Department re-

mained the same.

What did change was the relationship between the Post

Office Department and Congress, giving greater discretion to the executive department, a situation which was symptomatic of the times in the

administrative departments of the national government.
Indeed, since RFD threatened almost nobody, and gave the postal

service no great advantage in generating funds,

its enactment is con-

sistent with the definition of public enterprise in the United States.
The postal service gained new service responsibilities, but did not

impinge on any profit-oriented activities desired by private interests.
In contrast to RFD, proposals for public ownership of the telegraph

and telephone systems did not succeed.

Since the original Post Office

Department ownership of the telegraph in the 1840s, there had been
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sporadic talk of a renewed government telegraph.

Representative Elihu

Washburne, Republican from Illinois,

reintroduced the idea in 1868,

but no significant action was taken.

When John Wanamaker became Post-

master General, he brought the issue to the forum again, strongly
advocating a postal telegraph, and now including a postal telephone.

Yet

his efforts were for naught, for no strong public movement expressed itself, and no part of the Post Office Department bureaucracy pushed for

such a program, as had Heath and Machen with RFD.

Furthermore, a postal telegraph did certainly threaten vested interests, and powerful interests at that.

Among the directors of the

Western Union Telegraph Company, at the time of Wanamaker 's Postmastership, were Jay Gould, Russell Sage, Alonzo Cornell, J. Pierpont Morgan,

John Hay, Collis B. Huntington, Chauncey Depew, and other notables. 6 2

Wanamaker claimed there was public demand for a postal telegraph at the
same time as acknowledging private opposition;

There is a deep and far reaching conviction among the people
that the telegraph service is by right a part of the postal
service.
To carry the postal system from pony-riders to
stage-coach, and on to railroad service, and stop all further
progress because three thousand owners of telegraph stock oppose, is not in accord with the genius of our people or the
spirit of the times. ^3

The postal telegraph proposal did have significant business opposition, and from some of the most important and powerful men of the era,
at a time of the height of their power (as a group)

.

In combination

with the absence of any broad public support (such as large numbers of
petitions)

,

there was little impetus for Congressmen to risk their power

in support of such a proposal, even if they thought it legitimate.

And
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the leaders in the Congress at that time were
certainly not sympathetic
to the control of private business

in such a manner

.

Although Wana-

maker pushed the scheme, and therefore implicated the Post
Office Department in this, there was no clear bureaucratic drive on
the issue as
there had been with RFD, and no great Presidential support.

And it

was still early, before Progressive reforms had emerged, so
that the

latitude of operation was still great for big business and for Con66

gress

There were arguments against the postal telegraph which noted a

contradiction between limited government and the extension of government
ownership to a telegraph system, thereby potentially abridging freedoms
of press and commerce,
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Wanamaker believed the constitutional argu-

ments vacuous, stating:

The courts of highest appeal have settled this question. Congress settled it, in advance of judicial action, by making the
United States the owner, and the Post Office Department the
manager, of the first line of wire constructed for commercial
and public uses.
The old government telegraph schemes were
constitutional.
.and.
.the [new] limited telegraph plan
.is constitutional.^^
.

.

.

.

Subsequently, on July 16, 1918, a joint resolution of Congress authorized the President to take control of the telegraph and telephone systems, an act Woodrow Wilson took six days later, on July 22, 1918, placing those systems under the Post Office Department.
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RFD and the Wanamaker proposals for a postal telegraph and telephone

differed in major ways.

The first was the orientation of the operation:

RFD was primarily considered a service provision to farmers and other

rural residents, revenue considerations be damned; telegraph and tele-
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phone service were debated mainly on
revenue grounds, and the potential
for government to efficiently run
these enterprises for a profit,
while

servicing the citizens' needs.

Those who were opposed to public owner-

ship of the telegraph and telephone systems
generally cited profit-

oriented revenue reasons, threats to private
business, and constitutional considerations; while Wanamaker debated
those, he also

emphasized the

service benefits which would emanate, particularly
to residents who

would not be served by the private companies.

He cited the history of

mail service, where

No one believes that the mail service would have
been so
widely extended by any private corporation that had to pay
dividends to its stockholders.

and the advantages of a public post, for

If the mails were only run to self-sustaining or profit-making
points the extent of the service would be cut off 40 per cent.
The postal system is not a scheme for profit.
The postal
service is the Government's kind hand, promoting and protecting
the correspondence of its people, and communication by telegraph as well as by mail is essential to its best development,^*^
.

.

.

Thus, RFD was established as a postal service in unique circum-

stances, and centered around considerations of service, distributive

politics, popular politics, bureaucratic finesse, and administrative
growth.

The postal telegraph was not enacted (except briefly during

World War

I)

,

and was considered on issues of revenue-production poten-

tial, freedom of press and commerce, and only secondarily in terms of
7

service.'-"-

Its failure is one of not allowing the postal service, as a

public enterprise, to act in a forthright profit-making role, at the
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expense of private business profits, thereby helping
to insure an in-

ability of the Post Office to operate as a successful
entity, both in

monetary and related terms. 72
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cit
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Wilson^^^.Tal
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edited by Festus P. S^ers (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1957). Wilson's only
reference to RFD
occurs on September 29, 1896, when he wrote:
With the exception of some unimportant visitors, I had a
quiet, lazy day at the Department, making up a few Presidential cases to send Mr. Cleveland, arranging with Mr. Machen
for beginning the experiment of Free Rural Delivery in Jefferson, and signing the usual multitudinous mail of the Depart-

ment,

(pp.
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23Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, The Cabinet Politician: The Postmasters
General 1829-1909 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), and
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28Fuller, o£. £it
29 Ibid
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,

42.

43.
Of course, Congress was in many ways sympathetic to
some type of RFD program, but the appointment of the RFD bureaucrats and
carriers by the Post Office Department did remove power from Congress.
.

,

3°Fuller, op. cit., 52-53.
31lbid.
32ibid.

^^Fuller, o£.

cit

.

,

5i

diminished Congressional prerogative and influence because
it gave much more power to the Post Office Department to appoint postal
workers such as rural carriers, and meant there were fewer opportunities
for Congressional influence to be felt in districts as local post of^"^This
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fices closed.

35^
This meant
.

that for the first time the Post Office Department
was

establishing the routes for post roads.
36

Paul R. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil
Servic e
(Evanston, Illinois:
Row, Peterson and Company, 1958).
This also included civil service classification extension.
37

Though the purpose of regulation for Roosevelt was to ensure
a
moral and fair corporate world, and not to significantly limit
corporate
prerogatives, he nonetheless represents the emergence of the Progressive
Presidency
^^Jayne E. Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the Common Life
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 312.
39

40
41

Van Riper, o£. cit

.

,

201.

Fuller, The American Mail

,

324.

Fuller, RFD, 87.

42

Since the fourth-class post office was a last refuge of patronage,
the actions of Theodore Roosevelt and Taft greatly reduced the political
use of the Post Office Department. Van Riper indicates some of the
limits of classification as weak, such as the limit of removal from office.
But this does not appear as significant.
Fuller, The American Mail 324, and Van Riper, o£. cit
202.
This, however, still "left unclassified almost 40,000 country postmasters, to say nothing of the presidential class."
(Fuller, The American
,

Mail

.

,

324)

,
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Fuller, The American Mail
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Forrest McDonald, The United States in the Twentieth Century
Volume I:
1900-1920 (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1970), p. 157.
.

45

For example, the Farmers' Alliances, Knights of Labor, and the
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46

McDonald, o£. cit

.

,

157.

47

See, for example, Mosher's characterization of administration
during the period of "Government by Gentlemen," from 1789-1829, in
Frederick C. Mosher. Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 55-61.
/ 5^

York:

See, for example, Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New
Meridian Books, 1956). Wilson wrote that, "The government of a
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country so vast and various must be strong, prompt,
wieldy, and efficient.
Its strength must consist in the certainty
and uniformity of its
purposes, in its accord with national sentiment,
in its unhesitating
action, and in its honest aims." (p. 206).
49

Cullinan, o£. cit
110-112; Fuller, The American Ma il. 326; Van
~
Riper, o£. cit
133, 156, 163-164.
.

.

,

,

Concerning the general prof essionalization of American life
seeBurton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The
Middle Class
and the Development of Higher Education in America (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976).
*

^"""While extending mainstream culture to farmers, RFD
also had a
perceived impact on preserving the farm culture, in the sense of keeping
rural children on the farm and from migrating to the towns and cities.
By making rural areas more in touch with the greater world, farm
spokesmen and proponents of RFD saw a chance to keep the farm alive. See, for
example. Proceedings of the National Grange
.

52

See, Robert C. McMath, Jr., Populist Vanguard:
A History of the
Southern Farmers' Alliance (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
and Laurence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short History of
19 75)
the Agrarian Revolt in America (New York:
Oxford University Press,
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1978).
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^^Fuller, RFD, 148.

See Chapter
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November 30, 1981, p. 85,
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However, Wanamaker, and later Gary, did claim that RFD would ultimately be financially successful.
6

Dictionary of American Biography
Edited by Dumas Malone (New
York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933). He was a Radical Republican, and
an opponent of Johnson.
.

62

An Argument In Support of the Limited Post and Telegraph by the
Postmaster General (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891),
dated September 25, 1890, p. 6.
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^Ibld .,

3.

y^^^ 1900, a time ten years hence. Fuller wrote
^^^^^'^g ^°
about^ the Senate:
There, from the State of New York sat Thomas
C. Piatt, president
even then of the United States Express Company.
There, too
from the same state was Chauncey M. Depew, one
of the largest
stockholders of the American Express Company, former
president
of the New York Central Railroad, and still, as
he sat in the
Senate, a director of that railroad.
And around these two
men, led by shrewd Nelson W. Aldrich from Rhode
Island, assembled as conservative a group of men as ever chilled the
marrow
in a reformer's bones. (Fuller, RFD, 205).
65

Though this was true of RFD also, the obstacles in terms
of both
private business and Congress were much less significant, and so
Presidential support or endorsement would be that much more important as
an
impetus for action.
66 By 1910, e.g.,
public perception had markedly changed, as had the
political field. In the case of parcel post, another proposal of Wanamaker's which had failed, the public's mood was different, which allowed

for and encouraged action.
To begin with, the great express companies had so abused the public
and its good will that they were ripe for either regulation or competition.
(See, Fuller, RFD, Chapter 9.)
This, together with general public impatience with business interests, and the onset of Progressive reforms, severely weakened the influence of their longstanding arguments
against a postal parcel post.
Secondly, the "revolution" in the House had combined with the retirement of several key Senators (and their connections with the express
companies, as cited above), to allow movement in the direction of parcel
post legislation. And since RFD was now in full force, the nationwide
aspect of parcel post delivery would be that much more attractive.
Parcel post was established in 1913. It is significant to note
that this service, free of the taint of patronage and bom at the height
of Progressive reform, became (and is) the weakest link in the Post Office Department in the 1960s and 1970s.

^^See, Leon. Trousdale, The Postal Telegraph System (Memphis,
Tenn.:
Dalton and Price, 1869), and Norvin Green, "The Government and
These were earthe Telegraph," North American Review November, 1883.
lier criticisms of the proposed postal telegraph. Norvin Green was (in
1890) one of the directors of the Western Union Telegraph Company.
Their arguments were more than a straight constitutional question,
for they were concerned with how a government might control information,
to the detriment of freedom of commerce and freedom of the press, restricting knowledge and business.
,

^^fanamaker. An Argument In Support

.

.

.,

2.
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69p^blic Resolution -No. 38 - 65th Congress. Telegraph
and Telephone Service;
Orders and Bulletins (Post Office Department,
revii^ to
May 1 1919)
,

lUo^J^ll^^Tl^^''

General's Annual Report. November 29, 1890, Serial
set

71 See

number 66 concerning the parcel post issue. Unlike the
RFD
push by farmers and their organizations, parcel post
received no great
^
push.
72

Profit-making also implies considerations of research and development, and the purchase of new equipment, which then help
to produce
long-term success. By limiting public enterprise profits, these areas
were also neglected, except in provisions suggested by the Post Office
Department and appropriated by Congress.
But, as we have seen. Congress was much more willing to do the
publicly visible, while underfunding the less visible and less glamorous.
So, research and development and equipment procedurement suffered, ultimately hurting the twentieth century performance of the Post Office during a time of unprecedented technological change.
This became most apparent in the 1960s (e.g., the breakdown of the Chicago main post office
in October, 1966, and difficulties with the parcent post system), but
this can be traced to earlier origins, and to the depoliticization of
the Post Office Department, which meant that postal affairs were of less
interest to Congressmen.
This occurred at the same time as many other
matters became part of the Congressional agenda.
Thus, postal procurements in general suffered, and the least "important" areas suffered the
most

CHAPTER
THE NEW ERAL POSTAL SERVICE:

V

CONTEMPORARY TIMES

Recent History of the Post Office
The Post Office stabilized after the turn
of the century.

Rural

Free Delivery had been made permanent, and
so the number of post offices

peaked at 76,945 in 1901.^

There were changes in the early part of the

century, such as the introduction of parcel post
in 1912, and regular

air mail service, beginning in 1918, between Washington
and New York.
But until zip codes appeared in 1962 and reorganization
effected in
1970, the Post Office changed little in terms of services offered
or

organizational structure.
The New Deal did not signal a period of postal expansion.

In fact,

the Economy Act of 19 33 resulted in a 15 percent reduction in postal

wages. ^ The focus of administration efforts was on minimizing deficits
in the Post Office Department, and streamlining the department."^

This

was intensified after World War II when a whole new range of programs,

foreign and domestic, were competing with the postal service.'^

There

was no great demand for new postal services, and postal officials con-

centrated on efficiency and economy.
This put the Post Office Department in a tenuous long-term position, for its physical plant, its transport system, its letter sorting

technology, and its administrative structure were increasingly out-ofdate.

In addition, postage rates remained the same; and so, in order
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to minimize growing deficits,

on capital investment.

officals reduced service and spent
little

By the late 1940s,

the postal system was appar-

ently ripe for reorganization, which was
the central concern of the Hoover

Commission in 1949.^

The Hoover Commission

.

The Hoover Commission began with certain questions in
mind, from

which the eventual recommendations grew.

When the Commission asked,

"What Is Wrong With the Post Office?"^ they made several
points.

summary, these points dealt with:

ganization,
and

4)

2)

1)

administrative structure and or-

ratemaking and rate structure,

budgeting.

In

3)

political appointments,

Specifically, the Commission thought the administra-

tive structure to be outdated and cumbersome as well as "obsolete and

overcentralized.

.

.

.

Although the Post Office is a business-type es-

tablishment, it lacks the freedom and flexibility essential to good

business operation."^
Rates had not risen with costs, and the Congressional ratemaking

procedure created pressures to limit any rate hikes.

This occurred at

the same time as subsidies (from class to class as well as between

services) were hidden within the rate structure.

And this had led to

years of deficits, with alarmingly large recent and projected deficits.
Meanwhile, "Political appointment of first-, second-, and thirdclass postmasters and certain other officials produces inefficiency and-

militates against the incentives of promotion."

9

In other words,

poli-

ticians managed the post offices, people who were assumed to be unskilled
in a business sense and tied to the primacy of political considerations,
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while at the same time the career postal
officials (who, it was implicitly agreed, would manage the post offices
well) were kept from advancing, and so were unmotivated.
Finally, the budgeting system was cumbersome
and inaccurate, and

made "impossible the most economical and efficient
conduct of the
service.

..10

Since the Commission assumed that the Post Office
was "of

a business nature [and] revenue-producing and
potentially self-sustain-

ing," proper budgeting would be crucial to its
successful performance

These assumptions ground the first Hoover Commission in
the mold of

administrative responsibility, rational administration, and attempts
to
organize the administrative agencies in an efficient and orderly
manner.

Within these assumptions lay an altered view of politics, and its role
in governmental administration.

The role of administration was being

expanded at the same time as Congressional politics, being by its nature
the embodiment of conflicting goals and dilemmas, was an inhibiting factor to efficient administrative performance.

The Commission stated in its first report that

the foundation of good departmental administration is authority from Congress for the Postmaster General to organize and
control his Department. Separate authorities to his subordinates should be eliminated -'-^
.

The Commission believed that a clear line of administrative authority,

headed by and lodged in the Postmaster General, was necessary.

This

would combine with the restructuring of the department to provide for a
better organized and more responsible Post Office Department, which

would then be given greater prerogatives with which to carry out its
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mandate.
The administrative restructuring would be achieved by:

1)

2)

3)

taking the politics out of the Postmaster General position
by providing that he not be a political party official, and
changing his mandate so that he would be responsible for
defining general departmental policies, rather than running
the Post Office Department's daily operations, although he
would remain a Cabinet officer selected by the President;
appointing a Director of Posts, who would be the operating
head of the department. He would be chosen by the President and confirmed by the Senate, but with no definite
term, the object being a long-term director who would bring
managerial stability to the department;
creating a board of seven advisors who would be appointed
by the President, serve part time, and represent "the different elements of the public. "13 Along with the Director
of Posts and Postmaster General, they would advise on Post
Office Department policy orientations.

These three actions were intended to change the nature of management to more closely resemble that of a proper administrative model with
clear lines of authority and a board of directors (later adopted in the

Postal Reorganization Act of 1970)

.

In addition, the Commission sug-

gested a decentralization of the Post Office Department into fifteen regions.

This would allow for more flexibility in management and adapta-

bility to regional and local conditions and needs.

This was in reaction

to the almost legendary centralization of the Post Office Department,

epitomized by the Postal Manual.
In line with the lessened political orientation of the Postmaster

General, and the depolitization of the rest of the top management (re-

moval of politics and an infusion of business/organization aptitude).
the Commission proposed that Senate confirmation of Postmasters be
ended. 1^

"The primary responsibility for personnel selection and
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management other than the Postmaster General and the Director of Posts
should rest in the service.

"-^^

Thus,

the appointment power should rest

in the Executive department, based on civil service criteria."'"^

Together

with reorganization of the top management structure, this would temper
political demands on the Post Office Department by interest groups and
Congress.

Therefore, administrative responsibility and efficiency would

dominate the department rather than more direct political expediency and

responsiveness
The department would also change its budgeting procedures and adopt
a "business form" of budget accounting and audit which would both sim-

plify its operations and provide more flexibility to the department.
This would also help i4entify costs so as to better set rates which

would continue to be set by Congress.

However, the Commission suggested

that Congress instruct the Postmaster General to make rates for certain

special services sufficient for self-support.

These included registered

mail, insured mail, money orders, post cards, postal notes, special delivery, and postage due mail.

In addition, subsidies for services (to

common carriers, such as railroads and airplanes) would be made by
direct Congressional appropriation rather than being hidden in the mail
rate structure.

(Of course,

the Post Office Department had a long his-

tory of such subsidies, from the time of the stagecoach.)

Some of the Hoover Commission recommendations were acted upon,
the most conspicuous being Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerf ield

'

attempt to decentralize the Post Office Department, beginning in 1953.

Congressional resistance was evident, and the Post Office Department
plugged along, not much changed, still woefully unprepared to meet the

18
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challenges of the second half of the twentieth century.

Its physical

plant (post offices) was aging and inappropriate
both for the new trans-

portation demands posed by trucks and truck docks and for
mechanization;
it was slow to respond to the change from railroads
to highways as the

chief arteries of travel; and it was either unwilling or unable
to

mechanize and modernize its letter sorting methods.

The blame was in-

creasingly focused on the nature of its organization, specifically its

administrative structure and political basis.

The Kappel Commission.

If the Post Office Is given a single goal of providing the
nation with a superb mail service, and given as well the
management capacity and operating freedom to achieve that
goal, the energies of workers and managers can be turned to
the creation of a postal service appropriate to a vigorous
economy, an innovative society and a purposeful nation. 1^

The 1960s were a time of conflicting agendas and action.
tion experienced four different presidents:
son, and Nixon.

The na-

Eisenhower, Kennedy, John-

There were civil rights marches, landmark domestic

legislation, foreign intrigue, intervention, the Vietnam War, and domestic turmoil.

Through this period, the Post Office muddled, at least

until the "collapse" of the main Chicago post office in October of 1966

The 13-story, 60-acre Chicago Post Office was flooded with a
monumental pile of unprocessed mail; railroad cars and trailer
trucks full of mail clogged the roads to the post office, delaying millions of cross-country letters and parcels. Ten
million pieces of mail, most of them advertising and circulars,
were simply shoved aside and neglected for weeks.

This led to the organization of a Presidential Commission (Execu-
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tive Order 11341 of April
eral Lawrence O'Brien.

8,

1967), at the urging of the Postmaster Gen-

The Commission, named the Kappel Commission

after its chairperson Frederick Kappel (who was
the retired Chairman of
the Board of the American Telegraph and Telephone
Company)

findings in June of 1968.

,

reported its

The basic suggestion was that the Post Office

Department be eliminated and replaced by a government -owned
public corporation.

The professional credentials the members of the Kappel Commission
brought with them are instructive as to the type of expertise which was
seen as being germane to evaluating the postal service.

In addition to

the Chairman, Frederick Kappel, the other members were:

George P. Baker,

Dean of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration; David E. Bell, Vice President of the Ford Foundation; Fred J.

Borch, President of General Electric; David Ginzburg, of the law firm

Ginzburg and Feldman; Ralph Lazarus, Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Federated Department Stores; George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO;
J.

Irvin Miller, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Cummins Engine

Company; W. Beverly Murphy, President of the Campbell Soup Company; and

Rudolph A. Peterson, President of the Bank of America.

21

The Commission's report immediately identified what it thought was

the main problem of the Post Office Department:

Although the Post Office is one of the nation's largest businesses, it is not run as a business but as a Cabinet agency
of the United States Government.

The crux of the matter was considered to be that while the Post Office

Department was being operated as an "ordinary Government agency.

.

.in
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what it does [it] is a business

.

Implicit in this is the belief that

a government agency, dependent upon
Congress, cannot meet business-type

challenges adequately.

The political process is not sufficiently
ra-

tional to allow for an efficient exercise of
responsibility.

The Kappel

Commission maintained that since the Post Office
Department was providing service for a fee, it should therefore operate
as a business does.

This makes two rather large assumptions:

first, that managerial

and economic efficiencies will lead to the goal of good
(or in the Com-

mission's words "superb") service, and second, that economic acumen

is

more important than political judgment, i.e., that the economic realities of a self-supporting "business" enterprise are primary, and the

social purpose of the activity of postal service is secondary.

As the

Commission later stated, the Post Office "is far more important as an
economic activity than as an instrument of public policy. "^^

The im-

plicit is later made explicit:

If the postal system had begun after the country had reached
an advanced stage of technological, social and economic development, it would in all likelihood have emerged as a private
industry suitably regulated to ensure satisfactory service
levels and fair prices. Most members of this Commission would
favor an investor-owned postal system.
We recognize that formidable barriers stand in the way of a
transfer of the existing postal system to private ownership.
The Post Office has had two hundred years as a Government
operation.
Time had nurtured the attitude that the postal
service must be a Government responsibility

This statement ignores much of what transpired in the Post Office's

history.

First of all, much of the technological, social, and economic

development that occurred was a direct consequence of Post Office activity and subsidy.

Although it may not have been inevitable for the
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postal system to develop before the automobile
or the computer, one does
not have to resort to historical determinism
to state that the postal

system is an integral part of societal development
(cross-culturally in

western civilization) which did occur because of certain
needs which
arose in civilized societies.

This historica]

role cannot be ignored or

uprooted.
Secondly, the Commission's argument assumes the regulatory method
to be the appropriate response to the operation of such service
opera-

tions.

Thus, if a postal system landed in twentieth century American

society, it would of course be an investor-owned postal system, "suit-

ably regulated."
The Kappel Commission based its recommendations for reorganization
on several aspects of Post Office Department performance.

The first was

the poor quality of service received by postal consumers, and the lack
of sensitivity to the public's service needs.

Second was the postal em-

ployment scene, including methods for hiring employees, the working conditions and chances for career advancement, the adherence to the Postal
Manual, and the lack of positive labor/management relations.

The third identified area

was the financial picture, beginning

with the growing deficit, the high cost of service, the lack of increases in productivity, including savings possible through mechanization and managerial efficiency, and the "irrationality" of the postal
rates.
In essence, the Commission concluded that

the Post Office's principal failure is one of management.
The organization of the Post Office as an ordinary Cabinet de.

.

.
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partment guarantees that the nominal managers of
the p nst-al
service do not have the authority to run the
postal service. 27
The main reasons given were the dependence on
Congress for financing,
the lack of executive prerogative in management, and
the political

nature of postal management.

These sound much like the Hoover Commis-

sion's basis for restructuring the Post Office Department,
although

whereas the Hoover Commission connected reorganization to administrative
responsibility within the Executive branch, the Kappel Commission sought
to remove the Post Office from direct governmental input.

Congressional budget authority meant that capital needs were not

being met, that managerial autonomy was severely limited, and that the
Post Office Department did not have to be consumer-oriented.

The third

item is of particular interest, for the Commission stated that, "Treasury financing [means that] there is little need to be concerned with

customer desires if all costs are paid regardless of customer satisfaction."

28

This ignores the role of Congressmen as political representa-

tives of the broad constituency of postal customers.

The political pro-

cess is the mechanism of accountability rather than the market or regu-

latory procedures.

Though cumbersome and inexact, the political process

provided for responsiveness to consumer service needs as well as to interest group demands, even if these were difficult for an administrative

department to meet.
The lack of executive management prerogatives was evident in the

rate-setting function of Congress.

The Commission noted that, "Author-

ity for pricing is a necessary attribute of a management to be held re-

sponsible for performance."

29

Secondly, post office labor relations
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were identified as undermining postal management autonomy, since
postal

worker organizations were so successful in lobbying Congress on their
own behalf at the expense of postal management control.

(Indeed, the

postal wage bill was one of only two overrides of Presidential vetoes
during the eight years of the Eisenhower administration.)
The variety of political inputs needed to be reduced from the Post-

master General down, according

to the Commission.

For example, at the

local level limits on residence as well as political affiliation were

seen as limits on good management.

Management within the Post Office Department was considered both
fragmented and unduly centralized.

The basic complaint was that local

management was afraid to initiate, yet was unable to use standardized
guidelines to fit the myriad of physical and organizational conditions
they faced.

Ultimately, the promotion of a government-owned public corporation
by the Kappel Commission was a much greater change in political emphasis

than that suggested by the Hoover panel.

What were the reasons for the

change from the one to the other?

One was the further erosion of postal service in the mid-1960s.
Although Gerald Cullinan indicated that

in many informed circles, the belief remains that the postal
crisis of 1966 would never have reached disaster proportions
if the capable Postmaster General [Lawrence O'Brien] had been
allowed to devote more energies to the postal service and less
to the promotion of non-postal administration programs on
Capitol Hill, 31

the difficulties of the Post Office Department were apparent.

It needed
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to modernize, to improve delivery
service,

to deal

with competition

(such as the United Parcel Service), and
somehow articulate reasons for,

or solutions to, the growing deficit.
In concert with this was the increasing
competition for funds in

Congress, and the lack of attention from
Congressmen who had many new

programs for which to appropriate money.

Also, this was occurring dur-

ing a period when there was a reduction in the
domination by rural con-

gressmen; rural congressmen had always been the champions
of a strong

postal service.
By the 1960s, the government corporation idea was more
accepted

than when the first Hoover Commission reported, so that the Kappel
Com-

mission could refer to a model of governmental organization which had
been tested and justified as a solution to the burgeoning demands on
government.

In addition,

the move toward business efficiencies in

government was strong, and the reorganization along principles of business organization was consistent with the introduction of more advanced

accounting and management methods in government.
In this atmosphere,

the Kappel Commission made its recommendations.

They included:
1)

Establishing a postal corporation owned by the government
to operate on a self-supporting basis.

2)

Vesting management responsibilities in a Board of Directors.

3)

Improving the quality and kinds of service offered, how
the service was provided, and work conditions.

4)

Making all appointments on a nonpolitical basis.

5)

Transferring employees to a career service within the
postal service (from the Civil Service Commission)

144

6)

Giving rate setting power to the Board of
Directors, after
hearings by Rate Commissioners, subject to a
veto by Congressional concurrent resolution.

Much of what the Kappel Commission suggested was
legislated, although Congress lost its authority over rate making
(to the Board of

Governors and a Postal Rate Commission)

.

The Postal Service was made a

government corporation, with a managerial autonomy far greater
than under the old Post Office Department.

And this is the postal service with

which we now live, the central subject of this chapter.

Its organiza-

tion, service delivery performance, organizational goal orientation,
and

future direction are the concerns to be addressed.

The Postal Reorganization Act of 19 70

.

The Postal Reorganization Act (PRA) was signed into law on August
12,

19 70,

with a newly organized United States Postal Service (USPS) ef-

fective July

1,

1971.

32

The PRA provided for an organization which

would no longer be an Executive department of government, but
ment corporation.

a govern-

The Postmaster General was not to be appointed by the

President and confirmed by the Senate, but be a creature of the new
Board of Governors of the USPS.
Specifically, the policy orientation of the postal service was to
be determined by an eleven-member Board of Governors.

Nine members,

with no more than five from one political party, were to be appointed by
the President with Senate confirmation, for nine-year, staggered terms.

These nine choose a Postmaster General, and the resulting ten choose a
Deputy Postmaster General, thus creating the eleven-member Board.
In this way, managerial authority was vested in a corporate form,
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with the Postmaster General and Deputy
Postmaster General using their
grant of power to determine postal policy on
a daily basis.

The absence

of any significant Congressional role is
noteworthy.

The PRA created a Postal Rate Commission (PRC)
to oversee postal
rate deliberations, and make recommendations subject
to review by the

Board of Governors.

The PRC was to be composed of five commissioners,

appointed to six-year, staggered terms, with no more than three
from one
political party.

There was no mechanism for Congressional review of

rate making (as had been suggested by the Kappel Commission);
the rate

making powers of the USPS and the PRC were insulated from Congressional
purview.

Criticism of this mechanism has been widspread.

The PRA mandated that postmasters be appointed on a nonpolitical

managerial basis.

It established a postal personnel service to be based

on merit selection, withdrawing personnel functions from the Civil

Service Commission.

The PRA provided for collective bargaining between

the postal unions and postal management.

The act changed the financial management of the Post Office so that
the USPS

was authorized to retain and use its revenues without going
through the usual executive and congressional budget.
In addi.^^
tion, it had the power to borrow up to $10 billion.
.

.

This mandate brought with it a gradual diminution of Congressional support,

so that the USPS was expected to be self-sustaining by 1984.

The PRA had clearly moved the postal service toward a business

orientation.

Congress was removed effectively from any ongoing involve-

ment with postal activities so that oversight occurred only during a
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perceived crisis situation.

The Postmaster General's access and
respon-

sibility to the President, or to the political
party, was abrogated.
Thus, the notion of administrative responsibility
(as opposed to ad-

ministrative efficiency) disappeared.

had been redefined.
agency

1)

The politics of the Post Office

Clearly, the USPS was heavily politicized as an

based on a corporate model,

economic efficiency and attention
direct public Input, and

4)

to

2)

responsive to the criteria of

large customers,

3)

Insulated from

vulnerable to the available forms of poli-

tical Input, such as PRC hearings, the exchange of top management
be-

tween business and the USPS, and the philosophical foundations of con-

sidering the postal system In light of a primary ethic of self-sustenance rather than one of entrenchment In Congressional politics.

Evaluation of the United States Postal Service

Several books and articles have evaluated the postal service since

reorganization, from broad, comprehensive standpoints to narrow, spe-

cialized characteristics.

The purpose here Is to describe the condition

of the postal service today, and to evaluate It In terms of the history
of the Post Office Department which has preceded It.

What about the

USPS gives us a better understanding of how American politics has shaped

public enterprise, and what behaviors does this modern public corporation exhibit which define the contemporary approach to the provision of

public sector services?

The debates In specific service areas or

management areas are part of this whole, but do not define the success
or failure of postal service as much as the critics and supporters would
like.

Reduced service in certain areas does not prove a failure, much
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the years did not necessarily mean
that

the Post Office Department was a failure.

Indeed, finance deficits may

have held the clue as to why, in many people's
eyes, the Post Office
Department was considered a success.
Of course,

the very nature of the corporate model implies
certain

measures of success if one views the form of organization
as the determinent criteria.

The fact that the USPS is

created as a government service, and

3)

1)

a public corporation, 2)

intended to meet the service

needs of the citizenry, makes for a ready distinction between it and
a

regular business corporation.

And in evaluating a public corporation,

it must be kept in mind that goals are multiple.

Although the Kappel

Commission was able to recommend a corporate form (and the PRA institu-

tionalized it), and even stated that it preferred

a

private, investor-

controlled system, its intentions did not completely define the character of the present postal system.

Even in establishing a postal corporation, Congress also made sure
that broader social goals would be part of postal considerations, such
as by guaranteeing that rural delivery service would be continued.
Tlius

it is evident that Congress understood a public postal corporation

to contain a large measure of public service goal commitment.

In years

subsequent to the passage of the PRA, Congress has proven, even in its

severely limited oversight of the USPS, its concern with services which
touch the public, through legislation dealing with the maintenance of

six-day delivery (at least through Fiscal Year 1984)

,

rural post of-

fices, and the preservation of local postmarks (if not local postmarking!)

.
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How much of this the USPS has internalized
has been questioned by

various critics.

In this vein, it is fascinating that
the most recent

edition of The History of the U.S. Postal Service
1775-1981 .^^ published
by the USPS, does not list any service goals
in its "Summary of Provi-

sions" of the PRA. 36

Of course, business considerations, public
scru-

tiny. Congressional pressure, and interest
group lobbying force postal

officials toward acknowledging the service area generally.
The material concerning the evaluation of the USPS tends
to concentrate around certain categories of measurement, similar in
many in-

stances to those criteria for reorganization put forward by the
Kappel
Commission.
1)

Thus, researchers and others discuss the USPS in terms of

managerial restructuring and autonomy, and institutional decentrali-

zation and flexibility,
freedom,

3)

2)

economic efficiency, including budgetary

personnel policy, including labor/management relations and

safety /health considerations,

4)

rate structuring and rate setting pro-

cedures, 5) research and development, including consideration of coming

technologies, such as generation III electronic transmission capabilities, and 6)

service characteristics.*

^Although the USPS contains "service" in its name, and many of the
evaluations begin with an implicit recognition of the corporation's main
role being that service, the analyses are generally lacking in more than
superficial considerations of service.
(This is not to say that service
measurement figures are not included, or that attention is not paid to
service, only that understanding of the depth of the service role(s) is
generally lacking.)
The Postal Precipice -^'^ written with a consumer
perspective in mind, is the major exception in its emphasis on service
as primary rather than an inevitably dependent variable.
,
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Managerial restructuring and autonomy, and
tlon and flexibility

i

nstitutional dP.Pn.

i

.

The first two criteria, managerial restructuring
and autonomy, and

institutional decentralization and flexibility,
reflect on issues of ad-

ministrative efficiency and the attempt for government
corporate models.

to mimic private

The Hoover and Kappel Commissions certainly viewed

these (to varying degrees)

criteria as crucial to a successful Post Of-

fice, given the modern conditions under which it
operates.

Tierney writes in Postal Reorganization

•

,

As John

.

The reorganization of the Post Office Department in 19 71 was,
above all else, an effort to increase the managerial autonomy
of the mail agency.
The architects of the reorganization believed that the mail delivery system was essentially a business operation that could be managed more efficiently and effectively if it were converted.
to a government coporation
.

.

Application of business-like management was viewed as a solvent for
the accumulated grime of governmental managerial lethargy.

A corporate

structure geared towards cost efficiency and economic self-sustenance

would better control expenditures than a line agency with the gilded
pockets of Congress at its disposal.

The Kappel Commission certainly

identified needed managerial improvements ensuring better service and

more economic efficiency.
Likewise, decentralization was viewed as crucial for postal flexi-

bility in changing times.

The ability of regional and local postmasters

to react to demands of their particular conditions was deemed essential,

as was the ability to move mail from urban bottlenecks to more suburban

locations.

(Many urban post offices were built near railroad lines,
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based on earlier transportation patterns,
and were as ill-equipped

to

receive tractor- trailer trucks as were the
increasingly crowded streets
to receive the level of automobile traffic
then occurring.)

But the assumptions made in the PRA (and the
Kappel Commission and
its background reports) may have been inaccurate
in the sense that

government corporations might not actually provide the
relief sought by
reformers.

As Tierney indicated,

the conditions under which a public

postal corporation operates are much different than those of a
private
corporation.

Although government corporations "occupy an area in which

the distinction between governmental and business activities become

hazy," and they are "Theoretically freed of the direct control of political institutions [and] expected to use efficient, businesslike proce-

dures in carrying out their chartered activities,

""^^

their mandates are

still political and governmental, and so provide the corporation with

conflicting goals and a need to prioritize among those conflicting goals.
Since the nature of the structure and goal orientation concentrates on

"businesslike" goals, and the original impetus was for a movement to
such an orientation, postal managers will tend to act in a manner empha-

sizing the businesslike.

A political postal service dominated by Con-

gress and direct political responsiveness had been rejected.
So, although it may be true that managerial autonomy has increased

through restructuring, the object of that autonomy has been concentrated
on economic and cost-related goals rather than on fulfilling political

demands of various interests.

As the National Association of Public

Administration stated recently in the Evaluation of the United States
Postal Service:
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Management has given first priority to PRA
mandates to operate
in a more efficient, cost-conscious
manner. These efforts
have occasionally run counter to the
perceived interests of
the public. Congress, postal customers,
and postal employees.
When serious conflicts have resulted, postal
management has
either retreated voluntarily or been forced
to withdraw.
The
^^""^""^
disclose any instance in which
t';?Sc''u
USPS has been publicly criticized for continuing
to render a
service which might be reduced or eliminated in
the interest
of cost reduction.
Hence, postal management's defeats have
been ^exclusively the result of advocating a more
"businesslike operation of the postal system.

In addition, the removal from the avowedly political
Congressional

world to the more autonomous world of the public corporation
only frees
the managers from the

business-like politics.

purview of the Congress to the wider world of
An evaluation concerned with modern management

techniques, managerial autonomy, and nonpolitical appointments assumes

emphasis on efficient administration removed from the greater political

conflicts of society.
But the truth is that the political world of the contemporary United

States includes the great business-like operations in society.

The in-

teraction between the state and the corporations is a defining characteristic of modern capitalist society. 41

And even in a more mundane

fashion, the traffic between government agencies and their corporate re-

lations has traditionally been heavy.

So it has been with the USPS.

The autonomy of the management structure,

then, can be understood

to be autonomy from government control and even Progressive notions of

responsibility and not from the constraints of the society within which
the service operates.

To understand this as autonomy is to limit the

focus in an artificial fashion, for although it may be true that freedom

from government controls has certain benefits,

it

also provides a
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greater dependence on the existing corporate
structure of the society.
Economic and administrative efficiency

.

This switch to the corporate model brings
with it a hierarchy of

values concerning economics, product provision,
the role of labor, and
business relationships.

Managerial autonomy does not operate in a vacu-

um of business-like flow charts, but in the real
world of corporate relations, much as the Senate does not debate (often) in
the oratorical

style of its heights but at the visceral level of its political
needs
and desires.
Thus, when the National Academy of Public Administration states
that the USPS has consistently favored business-like cost-consciousness,
this is merely a reflection of the general goal orientation of a cor-

porate structure.

However, even if management is successful in this

manner, there is no guarantee that service to the public will improve
or that overall finances will improve.

The only guarantee is that the

organization will act in a way to maximize the financial side, with

varying results.

42

The inability of local postmasters to deal with local situations

was considered an impediment to efficient operations.

"Managing for

economy was impossible at the local level because no information existed
on the costs of operating individual post offices, and there was no in-

centlve to reduce costs."

43

There were even incentives to employ more

workers, for "a postmaster's salary was set according to how many em-

ployees were at his facility. "^^

Presently, however,
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The local postmaster is less bound by
the rigid dictates of
the organization's rules and regulations.
He is encouraged
experiment and introduce new methods— in short,
to manage
finding ways to hold down costs and improve
service.

to

The emphasis is on financial considerations,
as is consistent with the

PRA intentions.

Postmasters now are more independent in terms of
mini-

mizing costs, but this then permeates their attitudes
toward general improvements.

In addition, postal service "regional centralization"
has

limited many service options.

The following attempts to delineate this

result
First of all,

I

believe USPS's term "decentralization" to be, in

some ways, a misnomer, and so prefer the characterization "regional
cen-

tralization."

For instance, mail has increasingly been routed to fewer

offices for cancelling, sorting, and shipment, to take advantage of economics of scale, mechanization, employee work shifts, and other organi-

zational efficiencies.

Thus, (most) mail from Amherst, MA to Amherst,

MA goes to Springfield, MA to be cancelled, sorted, and then delivered

back to the Amherst Post Office.

This regional centralization removes

employees from smaller local post offices, and replaces them with employees or machinery (or a combination) at these regional post offices
(Area Mail Processing centers).

Thus, options concerning employment,

sorting activities, and mail delivery and pick-up schedules are actually

more removed from the control of the local postmaster.

Costs,

be cut, but they must be cut from a reduced number of options.

then, can

Often

these reductions translate to reductions in service, or to resistance
to an increase in service when an area grows.

The USPS's computer forwarding program also fits into the regional
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centralization design.

The postal service indicates that
"As of October

1981, there were 1,124 computers at 171 sites
nationwide.

These units

processed 1.4 billion pieces of mail during
fiscal year 1981."^^

The

postal service also indicates that it has done
tests on advanced computer models, and plans to introduce these models
into fifteen large

post offices.

Kathleen Conkey believes that this could be causing

slower mail service and more missent mail.

She writes that

Before the centralized computer system, carriers each day
marked up the forwarded mail for their routes. They were
the
best people for the job because they recognized names and
addresses and noticed changes.
If a piece of mail was mistakenly placed in the wrong carrier's load, that carrier could
pass it on to the correct carrier.
Now, carriers cannot correct addresses even if they know where a piece should go.
Instead, they must send it to a computer center which for
some post offices is miles away, so the letter can be processed with a computerized address sticker. Then the letter
is trucked back to the destination post office and delivered.
This procedure is followed whether the customer has moved a
block or across the country. '^^

Locally, customers at the Florence, Massachusetts postal station

have petitioned for the return of their own zip code and their old post

office hours.

(See page 190.)

The Northampton postmaster (who runs the

Florence station as part of the Northampton post office) has rejected
the request because there would be no saving for the post office.

What appears to the public is that cost minimization is a more important
goal than convenient service for the average customer.

What this illus-

trates in the context of regional centralization is how a local post-

master's ability

to

frame postal service to local conditions really

translates into a more negative function, i.e., where to cut costs if

possible
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Perhaps more important is how flexibility
and decentralization are
implicitly defined.

These concepts hold their meaning within
the

greater context of the primacy of cost reductions
and minimization or a

more homogeneous managerial approach, and only
secondarily in terms of

meeting local conditions.

That is, the organizing philosophy is economic

efficiency and managerial autonomy, and the structuring
of local service

around that goal is the driving force for that decentralized
decisionmaking.

In an important sense, this "decentralization" is really
more

centralizing a motivating force than the previous system, because

it

is

a concept of postal service which must be applied whatever
the local

conditions
In contrast, the political postmaster was the epitome of decen-

tralization.

It was the force of

this outward pressure (towards decen-

tralization) that over the years led to the increasingly stringent and

comprehensive Postal Manual, and the Postal Inspectors.

This political

input, though, guaranteed an attention to local conditions, desires, and
the potential for growth of services in the community.

The political

element was important to the identity of the community, and the presence
of an active and service-oriented post office was both a result of and
a positive presence of the national government in the local community in
a decentralized,

i.e., meaningfully local and noncoercive manner.

Now this and other actions of the old Post Office Department were

perhaps inefficient.

Larger numbers of employees to provide service to

a constant number of postal customers would lower productivity,

given a

constant amount of mail, and be the bane of anyone attempting to control
costs
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But the greater number of postal
employees will have other residual

effects.

It

will put more money into the locality
(or the general area),

as the employee shops, pays taxes,
etc.

This will be a stimulus to

business, and will increase local, state,
and national tax revenues.

It

can also improve service, or the customer's
accessibility to service,

which will improve the image and legitimacy of
government enterprise.
This, in turn, might lessen antagonism towards
taxation, and transform
the image of government as a burden to that
of government as a service

provider.

Increased political responsiveness rooted in the
community

and attention to local needs also help enhance
interrelations and lifestyle, which many people feel have been lost in the
increasingly deper-

sonalized, mechanized, businesslike corporate world.

Many people remem-

ber with fondness the mail carriers on their routes who, at a
leisurely
pace, could pay more attention to delivery needs and also provide
social

relationships in terms of neighborliness and familiarity.

This is, in

many instances, assumed to be part of a bygone era, unrealistic in a

modern age, but it may in fact be the result of the conscious and unconscious choices made about our public services.

By consciously narrowing

the postal function to better approximate a business function of service
for fee, the nature of our community changes.

mail carrier and mail clerk, is altered.

The workplace, for the

And "decentralization" as a

managerial concept begins to better approximate homogeneity of result
post offices, physically and in service terms, begin to more and more

often resemble each other.
Again, narrow economic efficiency criteria would mitigate against

more costly service delivery.

But a broader interpretation of the

as
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postal mandate would include longer terms of
measurement, and effects

beyond the immediate postal balance sheet.
The interpretation of what goals are embodied
in a public corporation,

and what the particular organization should be
mandated to perform

as regards the public benefit, does not end in
an analysis of rather

narrow and artificial bounds as laid down by the PRA.

The fact that

broader economic considerations did not receive analysis (except
in
terms of business and consumer costs) does not delegitimize
this type
of perspective.

In fact, the history of the postal system in the United

States practically demands it.

Postal deficits have historically been one factor which assisted in
the building of societal infrastructure for private business to grow
upon; this deficit spending also stimulated the growth of new private

industries (stagecoaches, steamships, railroads, and airplanes)

.

These

developments returned benefits, many times over, both to the society and
the postal system,

49

including economic as well as other social benefits.

Among the latter might be better roads, development of frontier territories, a more educated citizenry, and a belief in government and politics as a potentially positive force in society.

The government in gen-

eral has not abandoned this role, two modern examples being the develop-

ment of the interstate highway system and the extensive subsidization
of the nuclear power industry.

Personnel policy
Thus,

.

returning to employment, we might interpret higher employment

as socially productive and positive rather than the "horror" many find
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it to be.

The Post Office Department employed
approximately 740,000

workers at the time of reorganization;
today's USPS employs approximately 670,000.

Together with increased mechanization,
regional centraliza-

tion, and presorting by mailers, productivity
has increased. 51

USPS has

thus decreased the number of workers while
at the same time increased
the volume of mail sorted, an impressive
gain for postal management 52
.

But is this really the gain it appears to be?

Many changes had to

take place, some of which were partially initiated
before reorganization, in order for this success story to occur.

change had to do with mechanization.

Probably the defining

Changing the nature of the postal

worker's work environment will, most often, change job satisfaction
levels, service provision, and wage demands.

Kathleen Conkey recently

wrote about some of the effects mechanization has had in postal service:
"Boring, boring, boring," is how a Chicago letter sorting
machine operator once described her work. She sits at a letter sorting machine (LSM) all day long typing ZIP codes onto
a keyboard, as once every second, 60 times a minute a letter
passes into view.
If monotony were the only problem with working on such
automated equipment, it might be difficult to sympathize with
postal employees who earn more than $20,000 a year at this
work. But the rapidity of the changeover to mechanization has
caused more tangible problems. When the postal corporation
began operating in 1971, it used 282 LSMs in the entire country.
But by 1981 it used 1,240.53

The results of the concentrating of mail sorting, mechanized and
stultifying, are adverse health effects, increased misdirected mail, and
the general dehumanization of the workplace

^'^
.

Dissatisfaction with the

nature of the work alters the perspective which employees bring to the
job, and to the postal service as a service industry.

As industrial and
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factory workers have reacted against the
demands of the assembly line,
so postal workers have reacted
against analogous postal operations.

This cype of work is done in large
post offices, allowing tremendous volumes of mail to be massed at larger,
more industrial type
plants.

The loss of feeling for community, or
attachment between the

customer service aspect and the inside work, can
readily be seen.

In

exchange for the deteriorating nature of work, wage
demands have increased while service interest has receded.
The mechanization of postal sorting and regional
centralization

necessary to make the sophisticated equipment cost-effective
have required alteration of pick-up and delivery schedules.

rounded up from various locations to reach

a,

Mail has to be

central point in order that

it may then be sorted and dispensed again for delivery.

offices generally not sorting mail any longer, the trip
spot is further.

With local post
to

the sorting

One result is that mailings later in the day or in the

evening must then wait 12-24 hours to be picked up at the collection
boxes.

The mechanization has made sorting more cost-effective (although

even this is questionable), but it has changed consumer expectations,

employee working conditions, attitudes and satisfaction, and local
postal presence, thereby having effects on many aspects of community
life and on the societal view of public sector performance.

When the Kappel Commission promoted

a postal

corporation based on

business organization principles because they believed the post office
to be an essentially commercial enterprise,
to

they betrayed an antipathy

the public role of the postal service and to government services.

By

ignoring the broad societal and community implications, such as loss of
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confidence in public service provision
and turning away fro. the public
sphere as the arena of conflict
resolution in the society, the ethic
of

reorganization degrades the public sector
and so promotes private avenues of procuring service satisfaction.
(This would be consistent with
the Commission view that the major
part of the postal mission could be

served by private enterprise.)

The business ethic brought to a public

service, held to different expectations
and measures by a citizenry

viewing the public organization as the
embodiment of democratic process,
thus tears at the very fabric of public
life.

Mechanization is only

symptomatic of this view, for many would agree that
labor-saving machinery will beget efficiency which will in turn
free revenues for better

service provision.

However, the broad implications of the human dis-

placement involved is something not addressed by the present
USPS.

Reorganization brought with it a change in labor/management relations.

Collective bargaining was included in the PRA, so that postal

management could deal directly with postal workers and their unions,
thus taking Congressional politics out of the process and concurrently

increasing managerial autonomy.

John Tierney contends that the collec-

tive bargaining process has been destructive of post office solidarity,
so that the postal workers are now "union members first and postal

workers second. "^^

The nature of the political conflict has changed,

with Congress removed from the picture, but this has generally caused
divisiveness in the postal service.

Whatever the defects of the pre-organization method of setting
postal wages, the system had its virtues. The presence of
third-party decision makers (Congress, the President, and the
Bureau of the Budget) tempered relations between management
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and the rank-and-file employees. Now,
however, the unions and
management face each other across the
bargaining table without
the luxury of intermediaries on whom
responsibility devolves
Whereas before the reorganization both
parties saw themselves
as constituent parts of the same
service agency, they now see
themselves more as independent adversaries 57
.

Political creatures thrive on the ability
to diffuse situations of

built-in conflict.

Congressmen especially are masters of the political

compromise, so much so that they are attacked for
lacking principles.
It seems evident that they, as representatives
of the public and pro-

viders of the nation's services, would be well-suited
to compromise the
demands of postal workers against those of postal
administrators.
a Postmaster General,

And

appointed by the President, also has an abiding

interest in a satisfactory resolution of labor problems.

Further still,

the Postmaster General had by tradition been the head of
the victorious
party, master politician at the height of triumph.

Between his skills

and those of the Congressional committee chairs, corporate-style manage-

ment must pale in comparison.

It is no wonder that the amount of con-

flict has increased under reorganization, despite large pay increases.

The adversary relationship is also a reflection of the managerial

authority now lodged in the postal service.

This authority leads to the

emphasis on cost control, at the possible expense of worker job satisfaction and worker safety.

Thus,

issues of worker boredom at LSMs or

dangerous working conditions at Bulk Mail Centers

(a

creation of the

reorganized postal service) are indicative of the idea or rationale of

managerial prerogative checked now only by collective bargaining rather
than by Congressional oversight and political pressure.

When talking about the general "Effects of Management, by Legis-
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lature," the Kappel Commission reported
that

""^^^^
rnanagerial decisions for
lit l^K^lT.^^^
the
Post Office--it sets rates and wages,
approves postal facilities and decides many other postal
matters.
When key
business decisions are made in this way,
they do not necessarily bring about what is best for the
postal system and its
customers.
This process.
.is simply not a substitute for
sound decision-making in a business context.
The mission of the Post Office is simpler and
narrower than that of
most other Federal activities.
It is by far more imp ort.n^ as
an economic activity than as an instrument
of public poli^
IMy emphasis.]
For this reason, and even leaving aside management considerations, we cannot help raise the
question as
citizens whether the Congressional and Executive
energy devoted
to the details of postal affairs
represents the most productive
use of the talents of our national leadership 58
.

.

However, the experience since reorganization has pointed
up an interesting comparative perspective on labor relations in a
public corporation
as opposed to the politicized relationships of Congressional
and Execu-

tive involvement in labor relations.
To begin with, the adversary relationship has apparently produced

more contentious labor relations, as described by Tierney.

average postal wages rose from $8,030 in 1969

to

In addition,

$22,849,^^ partly be-

cause of the unique economic conditions of the 1970s and because of the

political agreements made with the unions for support of the PRA (i.e.,
for large wage concessions).

Despite this, many postal workers believe

that their working conditions have deteriorated, whether they are those

of the clerk who sits before a LSM or the carrier whose workload has

been rationalized.

And many members of the public remember the old

Post Office Department with fondness, whether the memories are warranted
or not.
to ask

Although the picture is not clear, there is at least some basis

whether the reorganization has actually improved the labor situa-
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tlon for either postal management
or postal workers.
Rate structuring and rate se tting
procedurps.

Almost everyone has criticism for the
USPS in terms of its rate

structuring and rate setting procedures.

The relative rates between

classes are viewed as inappropriate with
the first class mail users

bearing a greater burden than costs justify. 61

The PRA set up a Postal

Rate Commission (PRC) to monitor the rate
setting process.

Its role is

to hold hearings on proposed rate changes
made by the USPS and to make

recommended decisions to the USPS on the changes.*

The decision then

goes back to the Board of Governors of the USPS,
who may approve the

decision, allow it under protest, or reject the decision.

If the governors allow the decision under protest
or reject
it, it goes back to the PRC for a further recommended
decision. When the governors get the second PRC decision, they
can, with an unanimous vote, actually modify the
decision
after meeting certain minor criteria. 62

This is exactly what happened in the most recent rate change case, when

the USPS Board of Governors raised the first class postage rate to twenty cents despite the PRC's decisions that eighteen cents was more appro-

priate

.

There are several weaknesses in the process, which was aimed at

taking the plethora of interest groups out of the postal rate change
process by removing it from Congressional control.

First,

the PRC has

*In the literature it always seems to be termed rate "increases"
rather than changes, although, in fact, the PRC has at times recommended
reductions, such as in third class mail rates.
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no independent ability to
conduct investigations or
audits,

thereby maklag it reliant on the USPS for
its information used in
the hearings and
decisions. And although the Kappel
Connnission suggested that
Congress
have sixty days to veto any rate
changes by concurrent resolution^a
(^he

House of Representatives pushed for
the same condition), the PRA
deleted
this check on the rate changing
power
of the USPS.

The hearing process has become more
technical and involved in detailed legal and economic considerations,
in contrast to the legislative

methods in place prior to the PRA.

Thus, although the hearings bring

together the USPS officials, mail user
groups, and an Officer of the

Commission (OOC, to represent the broad public
of mail users), the hearings are by their very nature conducive

to

ests, at the expense of the general public.

the large organized inter-

These interest groups also

promoted their causes in Congress, prior to the PRA,
but at that time
the decisionmakers were representatives, subject
to the whims of their

constituents, and access

was more evident.

to

Congressmen by a larger variety of interests

By being put in an administrative atmosphere, ra-

tionalized and professionalized, they have also become removed from
the

public forum of Congressional politics.

The hearing process of the PRC

in rate cases is held

under strict administrative procedures. To participate is an
expensive process requiring expert knowledge of rate methodologies, court procedure and law. As many as 125 businesses and
associations participate and a core group have regularly appeared since the first case.
Under the circumstances it
is not surprising that individuals only rarely participate 64
.

.

.

.

And the OOC, "As an employee of the PRC.

.

.is in a difficult positi on
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to criticize Conunission decisions.

As part of the PRC, he is also
sub-

ject to all its limitations and
weaknesses "^^
.

John Tiemey has noted the extensive
change in rate making since
the implementation of the PRA:

Before the reorganization, the [rate]
hearings were handled in
an informal, hail-fellow atmosphere in
which political maneuvering was the rule. ... The new process
with its formal
depoliticized, legalistic, adversary hearings,
is designed to
inject more rigor and prof essionalization
into
setting
postal
rates. "

This means that, "Economists and cost analysts are
now especially pro-

minent in the revised proceedings
has been most enhanced. "^^

,"

but also that, "the lawyer's role,

Together with dramatically increased costs

in the rate hearings, information has gained a crucial
role, resulting

in a position of increased importance for the USPS in the
rate setting

process
But the procedures remain highly political, only the arena of poll
tics and groups participating have changed.

The autonomy of management

has increased, although the regulatory procedures frame a rather weak

control over the USPS in the process.

Thus, a public corporate entity,

unbound from the political controls of President, party, or Congress,
evidently enjoys greater control over rate setting than did the Post Of
fice Department.

This is in contrast to earlier reformers, who envi-

sioned Executive control and responsibility central to performance and
accoun tability
In this context, nine criteria must be considered (by the PRC) in

the rate case process, these to guarantee the role of the postal system
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as a public servant.

They are:

1)

that rates and classifications
are fair and equitable,

2)

the value of service actually
provided each type or class
of maxl service to both the sender
and the recipient

'

3)

the requirement that each class
of mail bear the direct and
xndirect costs attributable to it,
plus a portion of all
other costs reasonably assignable to
it,

4)

the effect of rate increases on
the general public, business mail users, and private enterprises
engaged in delivering mail matter other than letters,

5)

the available alternative means of
sending and receiving
letters and other mail matter at reasonable
costs,

6)

the degree to which a mailer has
prepared a mailing before
It enters the postal system, and its
effects on reducing
Postal Service costs,

7)

simple structure for rates and classifications, and
simidentifiable relationships between rates charged the
various classes for service,
a

ple,

8)

the educational, cultural, scientific, and
informational
value to the recipient.

9)

other factors the Commission deems appropriate. 69

The guidelines provide for a wide latitude in interpretation,
so that

while in writing the law Congress attempted to inject certain rather
political considerations into the rate making process, they removed the
most appropriate political forum. Congress.

It is interesting that in

much the same way that Congress's absence has caused increased confrontation and rancor in labor/management relations, its absence in rate

making has caused almost universal displeasure, certainly

to a much

greater extent than in pre-PRA days.
Congress was notoriously successful in keeping rates down, even to
the point of perhaps hurting the Post Office Department's capacity for
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research and development and capital
improvement 70
.

(However, revenues

were not so determinant in appropriations
in Post Office Department days,
since the budget derived from the general
treasury.)

Nonetheless, for

all classes of mail, Congress provided
low rates for mailers.

First

class rates were two cents at the turn
of the century, and only six
cents by the time the PRA passed.

(Rates were raised from six to eight

cents on May 16, 1971, partially as a result
of large wage increases

given to the labor unions in exchange for their
support for reorganization.)

The fact that the rate structure was so open
to pressure allowed

for a public free-for-all, even if weighted in
favor of organized inter-

ests, and a public perception of political compromises.

The political

skill of politicians is in reducing conflict, and in trying
to either

accommodate all parties or make the losers understand the reasons
for
their loss.

And the losers always had the recourse to other legislative

attempts and strategies, and ultimately the ballot box.
This has largely disappeared with the new rate mechanisms.

Highly

professionalized, the process excluded most people, and so allows the

organized interests— and the postal service itself— to make public policy
largely untouched by greater political consequences.

Progressive-type

reform (in professionalism and administrative efficiency) mated with notions of managerial autonomy and a private corporate model has bourne a

rate process out of public control, but with all-inclusive public effects.

That is, despite the loss of visible political control, the pub-

lic still bears the effects of rate changes, producing a damaging rela-

tionship with the government, for despite all else the USPS is

a

corporation and is still considered the embodiment of the public

public

— the
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govemment-for most people.

This feeds on the feeling
of political

helplessness, for the increasingly
frequent rate hikes occur, unimpeded
by voting (i.e.. Congressional
oversight, and a tie to one's ballot),
in
an increasingly privatized manner,
or outside the public scrutiny.
A
rate hearing in Congress would provoke
the best of political rhetoricpublic, visible, noteworthy, targeted
for constituents-thereby "informing" the public about public policy
decisions concerning the most public

of agencies, the Post Office.

Now, even if the news media present sum-

maries of PRC meetings, nothing newsworthy would
occur except the final
statement about the rate decision.

The public discussion, rich with

political maneuvering as well as political substance,
is lost.

And from

that loss stems different types of decisions, which
have ultimately, un-

der the USPS, led to frequent rate hikes and intense displeasure.

The Kappel Commission believed that the argument as to

Whether every class pays its "proper" rate is a long-standing
controversy which cannot be resolved in the absence of functional cost data which the current cost system [a Cost Ascertainment System] does not generate.
Postal management
.needs a modern cost accounting system, one that shows, by
each postal function, how costs vary with each class of service, how each class contributes to peakload and the size of
the remaining pool of institutional costs. ^1
.

.

.

.

.

Criteria number three (page 166) mandated by the PRA directed the USPS
to change the cost ascertainment system.

But it did not specify the

methods for gauging costs, and left that decision to the USPS.^^

xhe

ways in which the USPS has attributed costs and prices have generated
significant amounts of criticism.
their methods or the results.

Almost no one seems satisfied with

Varied interests all find fault with the
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relative costs for the different
classes of mail. 73

Cross-subsidization between classes, a
criticized practice of the
Post Office Department, was
supposed to be ended by the PRA,
with the
mandate of the above criteria. But
since everyone involved, including
the PRC, has criticized USPS costing
and pricing methods (and it would
be expected that relative changes
would bring about great amounts of
controversy), a political scientist might
assume costing and pricing not
to be a

technical economic problem but an inherently
and blatantly poli-

tical one, not resolvable by methodological
tinkering.

It is the mis-

understanding that removing Congress and the
executive would solve political problems which leads to groping for more
accurate measurements,

more fair or honest processors, and less interest
(in terms of political
pressure) in the whole matter.

The rate setting process is probably

never susceptible to stable, accurate pricing, fulfilling
the dream of
a decade-long postage rate based on such principles,

since the institu-

tion of any such rate along with the subsequent unforeseen
events and

changes in society will alter the figures, and so (mechanically) demand

new price structures.

It was only^in the highly politicized atmosphere

of Congressional appropriations, rate setting, and influence that the

three-cent stamp lasted for twenty-five years.
In a postal business that is supposed to make prices reflect costs

in the different classes of mail and operate with little or no outside

financial assistance, the impetus will be to compromise between the re-

alities of pricing according to cost and the ability of each class
absorb the "true" cost (as closely as can be ascertained).

to

For example,

fourth class mail may in fact be underpriced if strict economic criteria
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and measurement are applied, yet other
forces operate to mitigate the
rise in prices.
If it is conceded that parcel
post is underpriced (re-

lative to the cost structure), then
should not parcel post rates be
raised? Alan R. Sorkin argues, e.g.,
that

Although cost-based rates would probably
cost the postal system to lose some mail volume in
classes such as parcel post
such an approach would also tend to
reduce losses.
The reason
for this is that much of the business is
being retained only
because rates are set below the average cost
of providing the
service.
t.

The problem with this reasoning is that USPS
losses would be in parcel

markets with the most readily available competition,
and not in the
markets which are most costly to service (such as rural
areas, singleparcel customers, and items private carriers will not carry)

.

Full-

cost rates would tend to drive off the more profitable
business to pri-

vate firms, which in turn would require even higher rates on the
remaining, low-profit mail.

The problem is not solved by Sorkin

less there is no parcel business at all.

's

advice, un-

So there are reasons why the

USPS must moderate rates, despite cost analyses, because USPS is not

truly analogous to a private corporation, which can leave service areas
it does not consider profitable.

In terms of comparing the USPS in parcel post to United Parcel

Service (UPS), Kathleen Conkey writes that:

''Prices for all classes of mail have risen, dramatically, since reorganization.
See, for example, Table 4-2 in Alan R. Sorkin, The Eco nomics of the Postal System (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980), p.

57.
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A comparison of UPS-USPS parcel rates
reveals that the Postal
Service actually holds the rate advantage
in the vast ma^o^Uy
of weight and distance zones.
However, UPS holds a definite
advantage on parcels weighing 12 pounds
and under, and
the
advantage in those particular weights
are a convenient umb;el^^^^^ ?^^'^^
UPS
11 pounds and
for n^P^^
USPS IS 6 pounds.
[Senior Assistant Postmaster General]
Jellison claims that the United Parcel
Service intervenes in
Fostal Rate Commission hearings to
convince the PRC to put
more costs on parcel rates, "Then their
rates are set by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and they're
able to use more of
P^,^c^;{8 strategy by planning their prices
for the different
u
breaks

Third-class mail (commonly referred to as bulk-mail
or junk-mail)
is generally attacked as being underpriced
and a major cause of high

first class rates.

Defenders are many among bulk mailers, few among

those who write about the Postal Service.

Yet there are arguments which

justify an "underpriced" third class rate, one of them being
their (general) lack of time sensitivity.^^

Thus, much third class mail can be

sorted at non-peak times, when underutilized personnel and equipment
can

perform this secondary work.^^
Another justification of lower third class rates has

to

do with the

nature of the organizations which raise money by third class non-profit
rates.

Congressional cutbacks in subsidies last year threw

many non-profit organizations into turmoil. This sudden loss
of expected funds hurt not only the non-profit groups that depend on the [revenue forgone] subsidy but the many Americans
who depend on those groups.
.when non-profit third-class
rates jumped from 3.8 cents to 5.9 cents in less than a month,
the postage bills sent many charity groups scrambling to stay
on the tightrope [over the safety net].^^
.

Since many of these non-profit organizations rely heavily on con-

tributions in response to their mailing efforts, cutting back will mean
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reduced contributions, less money for
their causes, and less for
the mdividuals who benefit from their research
or service (e.g., from the activities of the American Lung Association
or the Salvation Army).
At-

tributing a "fairer" share of the burden
to some of these non-profit
mailers may be detrimental to those already
suffering from a general

societal misappropriation of resources.
Some critics view subsidization of these
"interest groups" as in-

equitable within a liberal society, where each
user should pay the
proper costs of the service they receive.

What this ignores, given the

context of a pluralist society in which groups
compete for

a

piece of

the pie, is that the less powerful or influential
groups may be properly

subsidized in the pubMc interest, by the public sector, because
they
are often shut out of alternative means of fund-raising.

This is not

the promotion of one group over another, but only provision of
access to
all groups, many of which are unable to participate in the more costly

environment of the private sector.
Second class mail has historically been accorded subsidies in the
mails, beginning with Benjamin Franklin's free delivery of newspapers.
The educational, social, and political benefits have been considered as

crucial components in a liberal democratic culture, worth underwriting
as costs to society in order to promote a free exchange of ideas.
is done through the postal system,

This

in the least costly and noncoercive

way possible.
Critics contend that by subsidizing second class mail, we are sup-

porting publishers and their readers who should be openly competing in
the market place of communication.
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If we subsidize certain classes
of mail because of their educational, cultural, scientific, and
informational value to the
recipient, why do we not subsidize all
educational, cultural
scientific, and informational transmissions 80
.

In reply,

there are significant differences between
printed material and

broadcasting which are rather evident, such
as control over editorial
content,

the permanence of the transmission, and
the role of the public

in providing the transmission.

Most importantly, the fact that there

can be a public role in promoting all publications
for a vibrant, educa-

tional, cultural, and social existence, is almost alien
to those who

would "directly subsidize publications, not the costs of
mailing them,
and.

.

.subsidize only those that are small, unprofitable, and below
ef-

ficient scale. "81

For critics concerned with government overinvolvement

and its coercive power,

this is manifestly a much more unlikely, coer-

cive, and irrelevant prescription, given the nature of postal service.

The intent, again, is not support of particular specialized interests,
but of the mail class of interests, which stimulates entry into the

market, survivability, and the genuine governmental role in promoting

values of education, of culture, of ethics, of politics, and of commerce
in an undifferentiated manner.

petitor's products

— i.e.,

When Benjamin Franklin allowed his com-

newspapers

— into

the mails as freely as his,

i

Indicated the type of commitment the postal system has made ever since
to

promote certain social values.

The issue may be that cross-subsidi-

zation is not the proper tool for achieving this, although given the

present form of organization it is the primary tool.
First class mail is the focal point for much of the discussion con-

cerning the skewed rate structure.

Almost every commentator agrees that
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too great a part of the costs
are apportioned to first class,
and so

first class rates are priced too
high.

This is also the judgment of
the

Postal Rate Conmiission, which twice
rejected USPS claims that they

needed a twenty-cent first class stamp.

This has been an issue since

before reorganization, and was addressed
by the Kappel Commission 82
.

The reforms in the PRA have not
solved the problem.

Although all classes

of mall have had increased rates,
first class rates have gone up the

most.

One reason for this is the procedure used
by the USPS to determine
costs and so set the basis for pricing.

Explicitly used in earlier rate

cases, and still implicitly used, 83 the inverse
elasticity rule leads to

apportioning a greater amount of institutional
(unapportioned) costs to
the class of mail with the greatest inelasticity.

Because of the postal

monopoly on first class mail rooted in the private express
statutes,
first class mail has been accorded an inordinate amount of
institutional
costs.

The pressures of competition, and other criteria (subsidies,

strong pressure groups, etc.), have moderated the rates in other classes.

Observers prod the USPS to more properly apportion costs, which would
result in lower first class rates.

One problem connected with so controlling first class rates is the

mission of the USPS: self-sustenance.

To move toward this goal,

the

USPS has had to increasingly apportion deficit-costs (which were borne

by Congress) to the different classes of mail.

Each class has felt the

increases in varying intensities, and users have complained.

But,

as

the USPS argued earlier and now implicitly posits, the elasticity of

first class mail has allowed for a greater apportionment to that class
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without necessarily harming postal service
business or receipts, which
is not true in other classes.
A goal of economic efficiency moves
postal
management into a strategy of focusing
greater increases on first class
mail
The PRC, in its first recommended decision
for an eighteen cent
stamp (on February 19, 1981), conceded that
"demand for first class mail
was becoming more elastic because of electronic
al ternatives "^^

Ulti-

mately the USPS overrode the PRC, and kept the
twenty-cent stamp.

The

.

long-term implications may prove the increasingly elastic
nature of
first class mail, but the short-term demands of economic
results evid-

ently pushed the postal service in the continuing saga of
a high first
class rate.

Res earch and development

.

There are other reasons for the rate structure being as it is, such
as the privacy of the sealed envelope, the timeliness in which it is

(supposed to be) delivered, and the pick-up stations maintained.

But

those who study it carefully, whether in the 1960s or 1980s, criticize
the postal management for overcharging first class mailers.

Observers agree that research and development of new equipment and
service was neglected in the Post Office Department and that it is still

inadequately funded and promoted in the USPS.
one's mind is electronic communications.

The area on most every-

The National Association of

Public Administration study sets out three types of systems presently in
use:

1)

Generation

I:

Hard-copy mail or messages are translated
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into electronic form for transmission,
and then retranslated to hard copy for delivery to
the recipient.
Telegrams are characteristic of this type
of system.
2)

Generation II:
Information already in electronic form,
generally from computer information systems,
is electronically translated to a delivery service,
where it is converted into hard copy for delivery to the
recipient
USPS's
Electronic Computer Originated Mail (E-COM)
is an example
of this type of service.

3)

Generation III: Information from one electronic
source is
directly transmitted to a recipient's electronic
terminal. 85

The possibilities for future developments are
boundless, ranging

from USPS estimates that their workload will continue to
increase to
some analysts predicting drops in Postal Service business,
leading to

higher prices and eventually the system's collapse. ^6
The Postal Service has become involved in Generation II services,

such as INTELPOST and E-COM, despite vocal opposition and FCC claims
of

regulatory jurisdiction. 87

it has principally relied on serving large

volume customers, although the original Electronic Mail Service System
(EMSS) was to have had the capability

to deliver first and third class letter mail to its destination mail box within one to four hours, for priority mail,
or overnight for non-priority, anywhere in the United States,

But because of uncertainties over the USPS role in the field of elec-

tronic communications, work on EMSS stopped, and only the spin-off,
E-COM, was retained. 89
It seems that for short- to mid-term success,

the USPS must aggres-

sively pursue Generation II electronic mail service, including services
for individual mailers as well as large-volume mailers.

Even in going
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this far,

the opposition is

(and will be) quite fierce,

for oppo:
)pponents

fear that USPS will use these
[Generation II] services as a
stepping stone toward a more extensive
use of electronic com"''"^ generation III systems. Representa
tives of the telecommunications
"veroTth'
industry fear that the USPS
will be pushed
this direction by a rapid and
substantial
^^^^^-^1-^
to Electronic Communications

m

sJI"L"5o°'

The issues abound in this new area,
since it is evidently the wave
of the future.

Electronic communications will increasingly
permeate

American society and the definition of the
postal service's role is not
yet clear, although it is being actively
framed in a back door manner.

The Postal Service itself is eschewing involvement
in Generation III
communications, even if this is eventually detrimental
to its existence 91
This is especially important because of the more
traditional issues
of the postal service as a public service which inhabit the
coming elec-

tronic world.

The postal system has proven to be remarkably successful

in insuring privacy of the mails,

in providing universal mail service,

free flow of publications through the mail, and international postal ex-

change.

The electronic future, if not under as keen a service referee

as the postal service, might present some quite serious threats.

As the private control of the telegraph was feared for its value in

terms of speculation, "the new electronic communications offer a field

of speculation to profit-seekers

— the

field of communication barter. "^^

Possible barriers to access to information would be lack of universal
service capabilities, educational handicaps, and insufficient financial

resources
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But probably the most important
what instituucns an indLI""

kp..

^^

t:iXsZr.\riT.T.:ll'
P-vlde aLess

rtaff^TcL:n?:NT^^
then,

•

^^^ysities, libraries, news
services and publishers

wn-n

How,

^o-r

^o^^their

can dissidents (from the large
and acceptable institutions
of

society) gain access to information?

Non-profit organizations might

.

lose their privileged status
(albeit, an often attacked one)
on special
rates.
The privacy of the mails would be
threatened, and freedom of the

press might be further endangered by
everconcentrated corporate power
(in electronic communications).

'

The very privacy of the total of
one's

life might be threatened by computer
knowledge,

through two-way interac-

tive systems, of what you read, where
you shop, what you eat, when you

shower,

etc.

Finally, what are the implications for democracy
in a nation
where shopping, banking, reading a book or
newspaper, or even
working can be done from the home?94

As was the case with the telegraph (see Chapter
III), the USPS is

letting its role be defined by others in not aggressively
pushing into

new technologies.

This appears to be a reflection of two major elements

of the USPS and the postal system's institutional history
(as the Post

Office Department and USPS)

:

1)

the belief of the USPS in the corporate

model which narrowly defines the public role of postal service in this
burgeoning field, although theoretically allowing for more aggressive
entry into electronic communications; and

2)

the historical circumstances

wherein the postal system has had the limited role of helping

to develop

new technologies, but only until the private sector was able to fund the
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necessary development.

Thus, although Mr. Morse
developed the electro-

magnetic telegraph under the auspices
of the Post Office Department,
the
public realm hesitated, and private
enterprise still operates the telegraph lines.

In 1959,

Speed Mail was put into development,
only to be

killed in January, 1961, when

J.

Edward Day became Postmaster General.

Speed Mail would be prepared on a special
post office form and
sealed.
A machine would open the letter, scan it,
transmit it
to the receiving post office where
it would be reproduced,
folded, sealed, and delivered. ^5

It is not just research and development
which the postal service

lacks

(or has lacked), but also the ability to act
upon the developments

it makes.

Repeatedly, the Post Office is restricted in its role,
which

later undermines its service capabilities.

Whether electronic communi-

cations will be the ultimate threat to USPS survival will be seen
in the

next few years.
There has been a gap between the promises of service delivery im-

provement made by the promoters of reorganization and that actually delivered.

The Postal Reorganization Act itself states that:

The United State Postal Service shall be operated as a basic
and fundamental service to the people by the Government of the
United States, authorized by the Constitution, created by Act
of Congress, and supported by the people.
The Postal Service
shall have as its basic function the obligation to provide
postal services to bind the Nation together through the personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of
the people.
It shall provide prompt, reliable, and efficient
services to patrons in all areas and shall render services to
all communities.
The costs of establishing and maintaining
the Postal Service shall not be apportioned to impair the
overall value of such service to the people. 96

Critics point out not just the lack of improvement in postal service but
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the deterioration which has occurred.

What is the best example of something
in this country that
doesn t work as well as it once did?
It's a tough choice, but
tor lots of people the answer is the
Post Office. With the
arrival last month of the 20-cent stamp,
first-class postal
rates have increased more than 150
percent in the last 10
years— better than double the decade's inflation
rate-and
poor service is increasingly annoying to
millions. 97
From the Kappel Commission's recommendations,
which were based on

bringing a "superb service"

the American people,

to

to PRA promises of a

reliable and efficient service, to the widespread
dissatisfaction with
the service the USPS provides:

why is there such disparity?

Alter wrote that, "After all, despite its name,
its priority:

money is."^^

to "unrealistic expectations.

Jonathan

'service' is no longer

John Tierney attributes perceived failure
.

.inflated by the rhetoric of enthusias-

tic reformers who needed to convince others of the reorganization's
vir-

The National Academy of Public Administration apparently be-

tues.

lieved that perceptions are dependent upon your contact with the USPS
(as an individual mailer, a business, a postal worker,

USPS management,

etc.), and that both service delivery and perception of such can be im-

proved.

Kathleen Conkey wrote that:

When people want to denigrate government, the Postal Service
is often their example, not only because it is familiar, but
because service deterioration has been steady and visible -'-^^
.

The Postal Service defends its service delivery, at least to the point
of stating that, "The Roper Report.

rate postal service highly."!^-'-

.

.finds that consumers continue to

Analysts have been skeptical, since
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there xs some question if a
five-fold choice of opinion with
good as the central category
(and most frequent choice?
a
position usually designated by a
neutral terl nT.expression
such as "neither good nor bad "
a^^nr^!
^^^o^'^s an adequate and objec109
tive t&<^r
cive
Mf T.,Kitest of
public opinion. 102

^

What are the service characteristics
of the USPS?
is delivery performance.

This is what much criticism
centers around:

the reliability and speed of the
mails.
to some distant spot,

Firstly, there

If you mail a letter or package

how soon will it be delivered-or
will it be de-

livered?
The USPS instituted a new measurement
device, called the Origin-

Destination Information System (ODIS)
first class mail service.
in its overnight,

,

to better evaluate its stamped,

The standard for delivery success is 95%
with-

two-day, and three-day delivery areas.

The overnight

boundaries are locally determined, two-day delivery
is expected within
a

radius of 600 miles, and three-day delivery is
expected everywhere

else in the United States.

Standard

1973

1977

1981

Overnight
Two- day
Three- day

92%*
80%
81%

95%
90%
91%

95%
86%
87%

The figures above are representative of the earlier rise and then

deterioration of the service delivery performance in the years since
ODIS was first instituted.

Thus, even within USPS's own goal structure,

^Percentages are the portion of mail which met the delivery standards.
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the Postal service is failing
in its delivery
perfor^nce.

This is

^-

welcome news to consumers,
aggrevated by the fact that the
measuring devices of overnight, two-day,
and three-day service do
not .ean that a
letter has to actually be delivered
in those spans for it
to meet the
standard. Why? Because the USPS
does not include Sundays
or holidays
as days in which the letter
is in the n>ail, and because
the time mea-

surement is only from the point a
letter is face cancelled (at a
sorting
post office) to the time it reaches
the last delivery unit.^O^
The reasons for the poor performance
of the USPS include the amount
of misdirected mail, due to operator
error on the LSMs (without a recall
key), machinery error, computer
forwarding delays, massing of mail and

regional centralization, and changes in
airline schedules.

Promis.es of

improvement stem from the installation of
optical character recognition

equipmentl05

^ar code readers, which will increase
productivity and

give more accurate sorting.

(With 58 billion letters sent per year,
a

1% error rate mearis 600 million missent letters.)

Regardless, the de-

livery system is falling short of the goals established
by the Postal
service itself, and the public is aware

of this performance.

The centralization of mail delivery is also perceived
as a deteri-

oration of service.

Beginning in 1978, the USPS issued new regulations

which mandated use of curbside boxes or central locked boxes for residents in new housing.

Interestingly enough, businesses (because of

their mail volume, presumably) still have the option of to-the-door delivery.

"'"^^

savings.

The new regulations were designed primarily for economic
(Cluster boxes or centrally located boxes cost about half of

what front door delivery costs, with curbside delivery somewhere in be-

182

tween.)

The Postal Service is
enthusiastically promoting this
trend:
'°

°f centralized delivery
the
''''
^'^^ regulations t;
luSSri
authorize
t'^'' installation,
the purchase,
and maintenance of
neighborhood delivery and collection
boxes and parce! lockers
The most cost efficient of
all delivery methods! cen'raUzed
delivery, serves apartments and
groups of curbslde boxes as
well as neighborhood delivery
and collection boxes. Of the
68.5 million deliveries served by city
carriers, approximately
23 3 percent are now centralized, while
49.5 pe;cent
are door
^
deliveries and 18.9 percent are
curbline.108

Jo.f.rr

Collections at collection boxes have
been curtailed also.

"The

number of collections, especially
evenings, Sundays, and holidays, has
declined; so has the number of collection
boxes, from 355,000 in 1973 to
275,000 in 1980. "109

Routes for mail carriers have been more
rationalized, i.e., tightened up, so that the number of mail carriers
has declined while the num-

ber of delivery points has increased.

This means that the carriers have

less time to spend at each address, especially
with increasing delivery

centralization; consequently, there is less of a social
presence by mail
carriers in the neighborhood.

Since mail carriers may be understood to

serve more than a simple mail carrying role, this is
a social service
loss to the community.

A letter carrier, for example, may be an infor-

mal authority presence, cognizant of the neighborhood and its residents,
and of any abnormal conditions, and serve as a substitute for the more
coercive police presence in a neighborhood.

This is lost as the carrier

loses contact with the people in the community, and as he rushes through
his mail route.

Post office hours have been curtailed, so that post offices are no
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longer open the whole day
on Saturday, but only
^til noon. Staffing
has been cut, as well as
hours.
This ™ay be an entirely
defensible „ay
to run the Post Office,
but It brings with It
problems because of expectations for certain levels
of public service.
Six-day mall delivery has been
threatened several times,
although
customers are presently protected
through Fiscal Year 1984 from
cuts to
five-day dellvery.llO As recently
as April of 1980, Postmaster
General
Bolger warned that cuts In
subsidies would necessitate service
cutbacks,
among these, possibly, curtailing
six-day service."! And the
National
Academy of Public Administration's
study concludes that
In spite of the political
problems Involved, the
savings from reduced H e llverles are too or... ^„ potential
r-'m,^ r„T
,.P
ly discardeX-USPS .ho„1H
p erlodi-^^lT;rg;;^ .,
iHii^S£iL^chedule i n
ot current lnUMr,l. operat onaT
and budgetary conditions .-'-'-'^

L

U^r

'

—

~"k
~

"

No doubt the Postal Service will
review the potential savings, and again

push for service delivery reductions.
in delivery frequency over decades,

This is in line with a decrease
.^^^

^^^^

^^^^^

The closing of small post offices has
continued, though at a rate

moderated by Congress.

The small post offices, vulnerable to the
ra-

tionalization process, were targeted in a 1975 GAO
report, which suggested that great savings and no service loss would
attend the closing
of 12,000 small post offices.

despite Congressional

Postmaster General Benjamin Bailar,

resistance, closed two hundred post offices with-

in a three-month span, and reviewed closing many more.^^^

Congress re-

acted by stopping the closings through the Postal Reorganization
Act of
1976.
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The 1976 amendments were a rlpar- -^^a
u
rural America, aad PosLl^^sLL
«g to^flght the corporate .acMnary'irg:re?:r^h:':!"'

ofX^Lt sirslit!"

At the same time as thpc;p
GP-r-<rT^« ^
j
tnese service
trends
occurred generally, the
USPS has paid increasingly
close attention to business
needs.
Programs
for cost-reduction for
pre-sorted mail, suggested to be
in excess of actual pre-sort costs at times,
have grown since their first
introduction

under the USPS.

Programs such as INTELPOST, E-COM,
optical scanning

readers, and ZIP Code +

4

are aimed specifically at the
large volume

mailer and include discounts.

The Postal Service claims this
attention

is dictated by the fact that
businesses are the main users of the
mail,
,t:hat

money is easier to save here (e.g.,
through presorting), and that

in second-class,

third-class, and fourth-class mail there
is competition

which threatens the postal system's market.
So the USPS has been more visibly
attentive to business while serv-

ice delivery expectations have changed.

This experience reflects on the

government, for the USPS as a governmental enterprise
is considered a

part of the government.
though,

There has been no explicit acknowledgement,

that the Postal Service is or should be a service-f
or-f ee or-

ganization.

Such an explicit statement, legitimated through the
poli-

tical process in some form, might diffuse concern
over changes in postal

services

Conclusions
The

modem

USPS is a much different organization than the old Post

Office Department.

It provides a different type of postal service des-
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pite the fact that it still
delivers
ivers lettPrc=
letters, parcels, newspapers,
magazines, fruit trees, and
various other products.

Evaluated by the terms of the
Kappel Commission intentions
and the
PRA, the USPS has been
a limited success.
As a positive public enterprise, incorporating social,
cultural, educational, and
political values
as well as organizational
and economic ones, it is
a break with more
traditional understandings about
a political institution.
The Kappel Commission was
interested fundamentally in
producing a
mail system as close to the
private corporate model as possible.
Indeed, -most members" favored a
privately controlled postal system.

The

goals of increased managerial autonomy,
a clear line of responsibility,

depoliticization, and budgetary and rate
making control were intended to
let the postal service act in a much
more privatized manner.
In very

many ways, the success of the Kappel
Commission has led to certain failures of the postal system.

There are several reasons for this.

The historical role of the Post Office has
been to provide services
to the public in terms of delivery the
mail as efficiently and quickly

as possible.

Mail delivery (and various associated services)
was the

primary goal; and the political connections to the
general public,
through Congress, insured a certain amount of
responsiveness.

This was

most vividly apparent in the success of Rural Free
Delivery.
The Post Office Department was also a limited service,
able to sub-

sidize new industries but not to operate those industries
itself.

This

meant that, in general, it was an important factor in the development
of
the infrastructure necessary for the commercial and industrial
growth of
the country.

Without challenging business, it promoted business develop-
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ment.

Thus, although there have been
sporadic calls for limiting its

mandate, particularly the private
express statutes pertaining
to first
class mail, these have been
isolated and unsuccessful.
The problems the Post Office
Dpeartment accumulated in the
twentieth
century did not mean that it was
moribund, and the transition to
a public
corporation was not necessarily the
best or only answer for these
difficulties.
More attention to the Post Office
Department's capital needs

and to modernization, by Congress and
the Executive, and some reorganization and budgeting changes could have
been instituted, perhaps being
a less expensive and less dramatic
move.

Identification of these needs

at the point in time after Chicago's
post office "seizure" might have

been an acceptable response to bring about
Congressional legislation.

After all, the problem was visible, identified
(through President Johnson's appointment of a Presidential Commission
to study the Post Office

Department), and ripe for legislative recommendations.

But the Kappel

Commission was a panel representing business interests and
primed to interpret the needs of the postal system from such a perspective.

And the

period was one in which business methods were increasingly being
applied
to government agencies

(e.g., PPBS)

,

and when the success of government

corporations, at all levels of the federal structure, was being acclaimed.

Whatever the ifs

(a

distraction common to sports fans), the Kappel

Commission's recommendations were largely instituted by way of the PRA.
The present USPS is its child; in Kappelian terms it is successful.

The USPS has reached almost unimagined heights in managerial autonomy,

including the 1981 Board of Governors' overruling of the PRC
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reconnnended rate decision, and
the subsequent introduction
of the twenty
cent sta:^. Management has
been able to set its own
agenda, and act on

that agenda,

to a much greater degree
than the old Post Office
Depart-

ment ever could.

Emphasis on business-oriented
customers, benefit-cost

analysis, and limited Taylorism and
automation in the workplace all have
been part of the management agenda.
Responsibility has also been more
centralized in the Postmaster General
and the Board of Governors, without distracting separate authorities
as in the Post Office Department.
But this has had the consequence of
making the USPS aloof from the

broad public interest in mail delivery.

It has given the USPS a much

closer identification with business
management, and generated a poor

public image of responsiveness.

It has caused the social, educational,

and cultural goals cited by Congress to
decrease in importance relative
to the economic, marketing, and organizational
goals favored by manage-

ment.

It has,

in some important ways, undermined the Postal
Service's

public character.
This has been helped along by the depoliticization
of the postal

establishment.

By removing the influence of Congress and the
executive

almost completely, the USPS is able to operate in its own
quasi-govern-

mental world, largely unscathed by public input except when it runs
across opposition from regulatory bodies such as the PRC or the FCC,
or
in rare cases a perturbed Congress.

This is in contrast to a Congres-

sionally controlled Post Office Department or

ment designed

to be run by the

to a Post

Office Depart-

Executive with significant authority but

also tied to notions of administrative responsibility.

The limitations

are not insignificant ones, but they remain tangential to daily opera-
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tlcns.

However, politics is not
ll:,lted to the

„ea of government action; by insulating daclsionn^king
in a public corporation
£ro. Congress,
power is really being transEoliticizad.
in this case to the
..nage.ent
structure and the interest groups
they derive fro. and interact
with.
In the case of the USPS, this
translates to the nation's
businesses and
heavy mailers.

Reorganizing the Post Office Department
"removed it from politics only xn the sense that it
became much more difficult for
the congressional committees to
control.
(Before the reorganization the House committee was
particularly influential.)
The first board of governors of the
Postal Service came from
the nation s business leadership,
and the executive came from
industry as well.-!-!/

"Politics" did not disappear, but a change
did occur in the iocus of

operation and the actors involved.

The loss of public accountability

through the loss of Congressional influence
may have been the largest

negative of the reorganization.

Relevant to this is the inability to

realize local and national public needs through
politics and the post
office.
lems.

Government problems as a whole are now divorced from USPS
probThus,

"The total number of Postal Service workers was reduced

[after reorganization] while new public service jobs were
being financed
by Congress. "11^

Similarly, rates have risen with unprecedented speed under the
USPS.

By removing the political element and direct Congressional con-

trol over rates,

the PRA made rate setting a professionalized adminis-

trative chore.
The Postal Service has achieved some success with its new budgetary

authority, creating a $612 million surplus for Fiscal Year 1982.119

189

"hetha. this is the short-te™
.esult of the twenty cent
sta^ or the
beginning of a longer te™
trend is oncleat, though
unless the USPS

«re

aggressively pursues new technologies
while at the sa^e ti™e
addresses
its i^age and service
problems with the general
public, the deficits „ay
yet be record in this decade.
Indeed, so.e analysts conceive
as a
realistic possibility the collapse
of the postal system within
fifteen
years if electronic communication
evolves as expected. Yet this
is certainly a tentative conclusion.

Societal goals can be related to
the present USPS in two areas,
postal centralization and carrier mail
delivery. Though not completely
separable, they allow for an understanding
of both what is and what
could be.

Postal centralization has been brought
about for efficiency and

economy reasons.

Better service within the centralization
schemes of

the postal service means moderated rate
hikes and more efficiency be-

cause of mechanization, closing of small
post offices as well as limited
hours at many of those remaining, the massing
of mail for certain sort-

ing times, less employees, and a change in how
mail is collected,
routed, and delivered.

But this has other social effects beside the

change in these specific activities.
The manner by which mail is distributed has further
implications
for the local community as well as the region.

Under Post Office De-

partment rules, postmasters had to live in the area served by the
post
office;

the PRA abolished this rule.

Presently, sorting is likely done

at a distant post office, and employees there have no familiarity
with
the original locality.

The local post office cuts down hours, and be-
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co.es, increastagl,. .n
economic

by the USPS ^aagement.

liaMUty. subject

to economic scrutiny

The Florence post offtce
story, referred to

previously, is a good case in
point.
•01062?

Florence merchants seek

o™

zip code," relates the
story

of local merchants and others
who „ant their old zip code
back, and the
old hours at their substation
reinstated.
One reason for the change is
that there is a Main Street.
Florence, and a Main Street,
Northampton,

with many buildings having conunon
addresses as well as a common zip
code
of 01060. Merchants and businessmen
in both Northampton and Florence
complain of frequently receiving
missent mail, although Northampton
Postmaster Alfred T. Healy maintains that
"We are getting very few complaints
on mail in Northampton. "121 The article
reports that:
At one time Florence had the zip code
01062, but it was later
revoked as the postal service began
streamlining Its operations.

And the Florence Business and Civic Association
wants the
Florence post office open from 8 a.m. to 5
p.m., as it was before Its hours were cut back last year
[to 8:30-1 and 2-

4 30 j
:

.

I'^l

They have gathered a petition of more than five
hundred signatures.

Postmaster Healy was quoted as saying that, "By giving
Florence
zip code,

it would do nothing for our office.

a

No savings for us."123

Further, Healy indicated that the business volume is not
sufficient in

Florence to justify keeping the postal station open all day.
The story indicates the gist of postal service policy in centrali-

zation and cost efficiency at the expense of local customer service.

What is in it for his post office?
books.

Nothing, evidently, but unbalanced

There is no place for significant public input, whether to rati-
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fy the arrangement or to
adjust it to .eet public
determined needs.

Something as seemingly mundane
as the type of delivery
service
present in a community can have
an effect on its social
character,

^

re-

lating to neighborliness, safety,
and appeal of the neighborhood.
For
instance, the difference between
having a carrier walk a route
and

either drive or deliver to cluster
boxes can be significant.
A familiar face in the neighborhood
changes relationships in the
community, and gives people a chance
for social intercourse, whether
they are elderly people confined
at home or children playing in the
yard,

to whom the mail carrier presents
an outreach to the larger

lic) world and a positive social
image.

(pub-

The friendly postal carrier is

a character of legend, and not too
closely related to the more modern

breed, glued to the car seat or walking
briskly through the rounds.

Further than neighborliness, though, the postal
carrier provides a

noncoercive, informal authority presence who is
aware of the normal conditions in the neighborhood and who notices abnormal
conditions .^^^
This is in contrast to the policeman who drives
the beat in the car with

his rifle or gun.
It is true, modern communities are in many ways not
closely related
to the neighborly communities of the past.

reflection of this or a cause?

But is the postal system a

Is there not social value in reaching

for positive elements of social existence?

The appeal of a friendly,

informal and yet safe neighborhood, with a governmental employee at ease,

concerned about the community, and a positive representative of government surely contrasts with our current image of the Postal Service.
In sum,

the USPS has recently achieved a short-term (FY 1983)

finan-
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cial success, but with
significant change in the
understanding of a public service's political
responsiveness.
This is a failure of the
corporate .odel of public enterprise
as measured
one sense, but should
not be considered a failure
of the possibility for
positive public enterprise.
It is, in a sense, an
abdication of political will
by Congress, although one can understand
how the constraints on
Congress' role
may have lead to the ullUngness
to release the Post Office
to a eore

m

rationalised corporate form.

One colunmist, in asking who
Is to blame

for a postal service which
concentrates on balanced books at the
expense
of service, wrote:

TTae politicians in Congress,
but not for the predictable reasons.
The real reason that they're to
blame is that they
don trespect their own profession
enough.
That's right the
politicians took politics out of the Post
Office, and we're
ail suffering because of it.
The Post Office worked best before
World War II, when it
was entirely [not entirely] political.
In those days
the
local postmaster was appointed by the local
congressman.
That
was patronage, all right, but a kind of
patronage that we
could learn a lot from today.
If the congressman appointed
his drunk brother-in-law, he had to face
the wrath of his constituents.
So the appointments were usually good. 125
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CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSIONS

-nt

The history of the United
States Post Office shows
how the fulfillof a public service
function, and perceptions
concerning the suc-

cess in that role, has
been shaped by the American
political process.
The Post Office allows for
a unique comparison of
how differing organizational structures relate to
the public service function,
because it
has been both a department
of gover^ent (as the Post
Office Department)
and a government corporation
(as the Postal Service).
The history of
postal policy has been characterized
by four themes which are
conceptually distinct but overlapping
in practice:
1) the Post Office as a national institution, 2) the Post
Office as a service-provider,
3) the

Post Office as a subsidizer of
commercial development, and 4) the
Post

Office as an institutional example
of the change in the nature of the

understanding concerning the relationship
between administration and
politics.

This chapter will develop these themes.

The first characteristic of the postal
service is that of a wholly

national entity, whose comprehensiveness had
never been seriously attacked.

From the first conception of a postal system,
this implication

has been apparent, beginning with the
Revolutionary Era's Committees of

Correspondence and continuing to the present time.

Even those who pres-

ently attack retention of the private express
statutes by the United
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States Postal Service (USP<?^
lUbPS) ^nn
still ^
envision postal service
as a comprehensive service to all
citizens.
(One ma, ,nestion,
however, whether
the economic underpinnings
of their arg^ent might
not undermine the
comprehensive role, and finally
the universal service
feature cf the
postal system. By allowing
the marketplace to function
freely in the
area of postal service, the
Post office would be put in
the position of
having to provide service to
the least economically
viable patrons while
private business could "skim"
the most profitable portions
cf the postal
business. This would undermine
the universal feature of
postal service
as wall as lead to further
attacks on the nature of
governmental operation of public services.)
In a country which prides
itself on its federalism and the
division

of responsibilities and functions
among the various levels of government,

the postal service appears to be
a major exception to that sharing

of powers.

States do not retain their own postal
systems as they do

their own militias.

They do not provide a portion of the
operating

costs of the national postal system as
they have and do for developing

and maintaining the interstate highway
system.

So,

as almost any exam-

ple illustrates, from regulatory activity
over electric rates to distri-

buting food stamp benefits, the postal function
is a rare instance of a
purely national power and service.

Yet in an important sense, this national power had not
meant, at
least until recently as a result of the Postal Reorganization
Act (PRA)
that the postal power operated at the expense of local government,
a

general condition expected by Antif ederalists concerning national/state
relations.

In fact,

the Post Office Department was uniquely responsive
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to the needs .nd
desi.es

.He ci.i.e.., .H.o.gK

necessary connection .o Congress and to
the local postmasters
„Ho provided a local presence and tie to the
community
.

AS the country grew,
post offices sprouted in
reaction to demands
for mail service. The
parallel development of roads,
railroads, steamships, etc., was a boon
to the developing
nation. As f...ers demanded
Rural Free Delivery (RFD)
Congress and the Post Office
responded.
Though the system was not
perfectly responsive, and certainly
did operate within the constraints
of the peculiarly American
political culture,
the Post Office was generally
a success story.
And its service charac-'
teristics continually improved,
well into the twentieth century.
,

In a real sense,

the postal service was a
facilitator both of local

development and the ability of diverse
communities and states

to be ap-

prised of national politics and to
influence those politics to their
own
advantage.
Prerogatives were enhanced rather than
limited.
No one

questioned the benevolence of the national
postal power in

a

rapidly

growing society, except its expansion into
new service areas such as the
telegraph or banking functions.

But even these were not seen

as:

threats

of national government dominance over
local political units, but rather
as threats to private development.

Accordingly, postal service was

limited in certain meaningful ways.
The national Post Office has been a representative
of postive national government activity since the founding
of the nation.

^

No one

suggests giving this power to the states for the history
and nature of
the postal mandate mitigates against this.

The perceived successes and

failures of the postal service are considered against the
standard of a
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national government's ability
iicy to act
art

m
ir.

a

positive, beneficial manner.

But a corollary must be
added because, since
reorganization in
the
1971,
nature of the mandate has
changed. Although the USPS
is still
understood to be a part of the
national government in its
guise as a
"government corporation," its
very structure and service
orientation,
and so its essential nature,
has changed.^ The USPS remains
a national
service, but it is no longer
a department of government
and no longer a
direct national government
function.
It is often referred to as
"quasipublic," which is as close as many
can come to an accurate
characterization.

(When a success, it is often
characterized as a private corpora-

tion, but when it is a failure,

status and a governmental role.

the USPS often "reverts" to
governmental

Thus,

it makes money as a corporation,

and it provides poor service as an
example of government inefficiency.)
The national service orientation is
retained by universal service and

subsidization of certain classes of mail,
but the nature of that service
has been changed because of the
transformation concerning the political

basis of its mandate, from one of Congressional
politics or Executive

responsibility to that of a public corporation.
The second characteristic of the Post Office
is that of a service-

provider rather than

a

revenue-producer throughout most of its history.

This has been debated over time and severely
moderated by the PRA in
1971, so that now the USPS is in a netherworld of being both
or neither.

The entire history of the U.S. Post Office demonstrates
the subordinate
role of economic considerations as compared to the operation
of a private

organization.

Although early in its history proponents viewed revenue-production
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as a possibility (and ever
since,
to so Shape the Post Office),

^ny

political figures have attempted

Congress has rather willingly
expanded

service and incurred deficits,
despite the rhetoric.

This is evident

beginning with the earliest
period, when Congress mandated
that any
leftover funds were to be allocated
to new post offices and new
postal
facilities.

And this continued until
reorganization.

With the Postal Reorganization Act,
the USPS still was not n^ndated
to make money (i.e., profits),
but
rather to reach "self-sustenance,"

thus putting the Postal Service
in a corporate mold without
availing it
of similar benefits of profit
generation.
The critical step of rever-

sing the long-held mandate of service
primacy over fiscal responsibility

was accomplished.
The reasons for this had to do with the
ever increasing Post Office
deficit,

the perceived deterioration of service,

the saturation of the

nation with traditional postal services,
the fiscal problems of the nation generally,

the growth of competing national programs
(in terms of

allocating funds), the desire for administrative
responsibility, the

growth in legitimacy and political expediency of the
government corporation,

and the rising influence of the business-corporate
ethic in the

provision of government services.

All this allowed for a narrower mea-

sure of the goals and benefits of postal service provision.

Thus,

the

perceived needs of the national government and inclinations of those

legislating policies coincided to transform the purpose and political
meaning of the Post Office without, in some ways, realizing the transformation thereby generated.

A corporate model would, while paying at-

tention to service and legislated mandates to provide such service, em-
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phasize certain considerations
while
niie at th»
the =same time cater
to the major
customers of postal services
rvices, the large u
businesses and corporations
in
American society. And
this would appear to he
natural in a society increasinsly shaped hy the
power and political
influence of business/
•

In a tangible way,

though,

to the public corporation
form.

the USPS is caught in
a realm peculiar

Although it espouses
self-sustenance it

is restricted in how it
may operate, e.g., into
what areas of new tech-

nology it can expand (Just
as the Post Office
Department had always been
limited)
When the USPS chose to enter
the electronic co^unciations
.

field,

important elements of the society
rose to block its entry and
limit government enterprise in
significant ways. Delays in
entering
such areas have usually been
sufficient to allow private sector
development of the field which then serves
to delegltlmate a public
(postal)
"takeover" of private industry.
This relates to the third
characteristic, that of a limited
postal
service which serves most essentially
to promote commercial development

and not to displace it.

In this sense,

the Postal Service has always

bought services which would promote
private development of new Industries but has always met with unyielding
resistance to its own efforts
to enter those fields.

This is the case with E-COM where the
USPS uses

RCA to electronically transmit messages
which the USPS then delivers as

hard copy.

While highlighting the unchanging nature of the
support for commercial development which the Post Office has
played (and does play),

attention should be drawn to a change which may be
occurring under the
USPS.

This change has to do with the lessened degree of
oversight of

2Q7

postal activities in the
reorganized
S i±^ea Post
fost Off.v
Office, and so the ability
of
the USPS to expan. its
activities into ateas
„hich pteviousl, would have
been defined as illegitimate
by the prevailing
political cult:ure
This tentative step is
tolerated because of a
narrowly-defined corporate argument which construes
entry into a portion of a
market as conducive to its economic
mic intere^fc.
At.
a
interests. An
advance
in the sense of purs
pursuing
possible new roles it IS
i
ai
o
also a regressive step
away from a public
accountab ility
1

<^

This suggests a critical
weakness of the public corporation
model.

Although it is freer to initiate
new activities because it is
more detached from public control, this
freedom represents a lack of
identification with public ne.ds and desires,
except in a marketplace-responsiv.
sense.

The process means that the public
corporation model may lead to
a loss of public purposefulness
when compared to activity based
on direct government attachment.

Historically, for the Postal Service,
gov-

ernmental involvement has meant a broad
public service orientation
coupled with a purposeful support of
commercial development and a limited mandate in terms of development
as a public industry.
The reor-

ganization in some ways loosens the constraints
on the latter feature,
but in other ways it ties the USPS into
the dominant corporate model, so
that any novel developments occur within
that rather limited conceptual

framework
Furthermore, this indicates a change in the creation
of public
policy.

In earlier times,

the Post Office was a tool of active public

policy, controlled by Congress and Congressional
politics.

Congress

funded the Post Office Department, and it put constraints
upon the Post
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Office which were consistent
with the political
poxicical vf.w
view concerning the role
of government and its
institutions
cucions. Whil^
While ^K
this meant that the Post
Office was limited to a role
of helping to promote
co^^ercial development
(and not becoming a
manufacturing industry itself),
this was largely
consistent with the direction
of mainstream American
public policy. The
loosening of these constraints
by the lack of Congressional
oversight
and active involvement in
Post Office policy does
potentially allow
greater leeway by the Postal
Service, but it also removes the
Post Office from the context of
Congressional and public policymaking.
This inhibits the possibility
of changing public conceptions concerning the nature of public
enterprise. As a result, attempts to
promote other positive public goals are
sidelined.
This not only affects

current service but also, perhaps more
importantly, the conception and

implementation of new postal service mandates
in a rapidly changing era.
Not only do broad considerations of
employment get removed from governmental consideration, but other questions
of what new public purposes
can be met by an established public entity
are obscured.

Therefore, the

notion that the Post Office might serve certain
social functions, e.g.,

visiting elderly people to help them fill out forms,
check their needs
for medical and food supplies, or even provide
company for them, similar
to what rural postmen do in Sweden, would not
only be limited by our

cultural predilections (as in previous times) but now by the
limited

notion of public service which the USPS carries with it.

The "freedom"

of a public corporation thus plays a significant role in restricting
the

possibility of public purposef ulness in the Post Office.
Thus,

the postal system operates in a changed political context
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Which, aUHou,H aUcwins

.

,.e«e. a„.„.

p.s.al o.sani.a.ion
initiative, .ces so subject
to syste.ic constraints
pethaps „..e sisnif leant than the
freedom it now
w enjoys.
eniovs
AnH this
^h
And
prerogative coupled
With purposelessness
.elates to the centtai
p.ohle„ of an, positive
sovem^ental pro^tion of public
goals.
Government has so farmed
out its
essential functions and made
disparate its national,
centralizing potential, that a new public
philosophy based on public
purposef ulness „ould
have a tremendouslv
ly dilticult
diffirn^^ job
h^k of translating
that goal into institutional activity.
4-

->

.

The fourth characteristic is
the change in the Post
Office from a
government agency rooted In
Congressional prerogative and
responsible
and effective administrations to
a public corporation based
on principles of corporate organization
and related administrative
techniques.
The result is a postal service
which has a changed orientation,
albeit
in a changed society.

The early period of the Post Office
shows a public service controlled by Congressional politics and
prerogatives.

The Post Office was

administered by the executive with the goal
of -good" administration,
coupled with the impetus for postal decisionmaking
and drawing of broad

public policy in Congress.

Congress had an integral part in appointing

postmasters and identifying post roads.

Congress controlled rate making

a nd determined (in most instances) where
the line lay between "legiti-

ma te" public enterprise and the realm of private
enterprise, such as in

the case of the telegraph system.

The rapid physical growth of the United States in the nineteenth

century was conducive to distributive Congressional policymaking.

The
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push toward the frontiers
„ith concurrent demands
for postal service put
pressure on Congressmen to
deliver postal services,
and Congress oMigIngly did so.
At the sa^e ti.e, the
Post Office beca.e a policy
vehicle for patronage.
The Post Office was
"politicized- markedly with the
advent of
the Jacksonians.
As a significant part
of the national government
and
a presence in every state
and locality, the Post Office
was a readily

available and useful tool for
patronage needs and demands.
Changes in the American political
world at the turn of the century
were reflected in the Post Office.
Several events contributed to the
change from the earlier Post Office
heavily influenced by Congress to
the twentieth century Post Office
which was increasingly dominated by
the Post Office Department.

The Pendleton Act of 1883 regarding
civil

service reform, the "closing" of the
frontiers, party realignment in
1896,

Rural Free Delivery, increasing prof
essionalization in society,

and the development of a big business economy
all played
change.

a

part in that

The result was a Post Office which was
less tied to the exigen-

cies of Congressional policymaking (and
former ideas of administrative

effectiveness) and one more immediately responsive
to the developing

bureaucratic emphasis in government.
a

(In a certain way,

this made for

postal service which was more removed from Congress yet
at the same

time even more sensitive to its actions concerning the
Post Office, for
less attention in policy terms could also mean less
attention in finan-

cial terms.)

The establishment and growth of RFD signalled such a change in the
Post Office Department.

The Post Office became more heavily bureau-
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cratized as the century
i-y wore on.
on

Tho
^
rhe shortcomings
of the Post Off:ice

became more evident and calls
for reorganization developed,
bringiing
With them recommendations
for rationalized administration.
The result
was ultimately a USPS which
was "depoliticized, " being
not only removed
from Congressional policymaking
and politicking but also from
the taint
of any meaningful political
input by the executive branch.
Thus, the

political Post Office Department
whose reputation is perhaps without
equal as an example of patronage
and politics in government has
been
gradually transformed into a public
corporation which is largely removed
from national government politics
and which is managed on the model
of a
private business corporation.

The example of the Post Office makes
clear that within the American

political culture a public corporation is limited
in its activities.
This brings with it advantages and drawbacks.

The USPS is attentive to

service demands, but within a context of market surveys
and associated

measures rather than through an actively political process
of determining service needs.

It cannot threaten to displace private enterprise,

but only help in its development.

It is removed from the main political

arena, Congress, and so is viewed as isolated from the vagaries
of poli-

tical infighting, party spoils, and undue public influence.

In fact, a

modern corporate form is considered desirable because it is insulated
from public control.

And given the size and nature of modern bureau-

cratic enterprises, whether public or private, the ability to act in such
a politically "disdainful" manner is evident.^

While this is descriptive of the contemporary USPS, it is in many
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respects at odds with the
larger history o, the
Post office.
The
legendary political influence
in the Post Office
Department meant that
the attention to public
de„.nds, to party affairs,
and to the "hasic
realities" of political
intercourse were the staple
diet of the Post Office.
B,e Post Office Department
had to internalize the
vagaries of
electoral politics, of local
demands, of Presidential
leadership, and of
e nonrationalized
administration, rather than be
aloof from public intervention and a political context.
Although the Post Office Department
did not enjoy managerial
autonomy or operation by strict
economic efficiency, it certainly was
encouraged to focus on public
satisfaction and
the political capital which
service success generated.

Public corporations are an effort
to retreat from this historical

model of public service and achieve
public service goals in more marketoriented ways. They purposefully resemble
business operations, with the
important qualifiers that their goal
structure is not so clear (because

of the inclusion of public, statutory
goals which conflict with their

organizational goals) and that they do answer
some public desires (if
only in terms of catering their public
images).

Iliis

changes the nature

of their public service role.

Public corporations are institutions designed to
deliver services
based on a recognition of public needs and desires.

These publicly

recognized goals have been legislated, so that an institutional
structure represents those basic societal attempts to address
certain issues.

The foundation of these modern institutions,

then, is laid in explicitly

political action focusing on issues of political substance.
But in the process of establishment,

they have been removed from
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much further oolitirai
-.•r,^!
poiicical influence.

PoUUcal sol.uon.

Their
ueir nrio-ir,^i
original mandate derives
from a
^^^^^^^

-chants..

.He

.e^nUion

an,

^^^^^^^^^

„ve„ene c„„a..

a p.HUc pu.posefulness is undermined
by cne
y the lack of any well-structured
understanding of publicly
determined or identified
goals.

This Change in postal
service reflects a lack
of political acumen
and sensitivity because
public corporations cannot
operate in a political
vacuum, since their mandates
and so political impetus
derive from the
political structures and actors
with which they interact.
Narrow but
important service orientations
are presently
presentlv hP-inc
being given to largely unaccountable agencies and
authorities. „hUe the .ost
acceptable parts
Of the political process shun
the "political- fulfillment
of avowedly
•

political needs through aggressive
mandates.

Political actors Instead

attempt to fulfill the needs of
society in the form of public
corporations, such as the USPS, so
that the needs are addressed
on one level
(symbolically) while they may be
Inadequately fulfilled on a service
or
political level, aus, although the
political system has identified a

problem area and acted, the "solution"
provided through

a public

corpor-

ation may be Inadequate or Irrelevant,
given that the problem area may
require different types of political
solutions to the dilemmas which

occur
This is not a case of simply identifying
problems in implementation

and rectifying administrative feedback
processes.

The nature of a pub-

lic corporation like the USPS is to insulate
politicians from the dyna-

mics of the political world,
structure.

7

as well as to rationalize its bureaucratic

The politicians apparently prefer to not deal with
the dilem-
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mas which may not be solvable; they would rather "solve"
problems, win
votes, and secure stability.

What this means for the postal service is that how it is structured
and expectations of how it performs will parallel dominant political

moods.

Public corporations are not intended to provide access for poli-

tical dialogue and change, and people often feel powerless, disenfranchised, and unable to effect political change through traditional poli-

tical channels

From time to time, critics do charge that public authorities
are autocratic, beyond the reach of the people, or unresponsive to public officials, but these criticisms focus on the
very characteristics that advocates of government corporations
regard as virtues. Public authorities provide a relatively
independent base of operations for entrepeneurs in the public
sector, providing managers with administrative power that is
greater than that usually found within the regular hierarchies
and bureaus of government.
The corporate form of public
authorities permits jobs to be done and projects completed
without the clamorous debates, recurring compromises, and delaying checks and counterchecks that characterize the rest of
American government.^

These very strengths of administrative autonomy, efficiency, and

political aloofness mean that political frustrations may build, since
they are not debated, compromised, checked, and so dealt with or fulfilled.

The purposes of a political system are undermined, in that the

issues which are important to individuals and groups in the society are
addressed, if at all, in a cavalier fashion.
The expectations of what a public enterprise can do or should do
are restrained:

Ideologies of laissez-faire, localism, autonomy, and limited
politics converge to limit the forms and ambitions of public
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enterprise, to preserve the power of groups with narrow
and
specialized aims, and to relieve the enterprises themselves
of obligations to respond to broader interests.^

The public,

therefore, receives little in the way of participation in or

benefits from a public corporation; public corporations carry the labels
of being inefficient and unresponsive.

government service provision.

They "prove" the shortcomings of

The fact that public corporations are by

their very structure and purpose not intended to provide political sen-

sitivity as the primary focus is not generally recognized.

Despite being a wholly national entity throughout its existence,
the goals and environment in which the Postal Service operates have

changed.

The Post Office Department was essentially a political vehicle

of Congress and the Executive while the USPS is a public corporation

geared towards self-sustenance.

The Post Office has always been a pro-

moter of commercial development, but the nature of that commerce has
changed so that in the modern era not only does the USPS promote the

business of large corporations but it also pursues its goals within an

environment increasingly determined by, and conceived by scholars as,
the corporate state.

And the USPS is structured on a corporate model as

This is a significant difference from the world of eighteenth and

well.

nineteenth century America.
Viewing the Post Office as a public service measured by service
criteria and political responsiveness rather than managerial or corporate criteria leads to certain conclusions about postal service in United

States.

To begin with,

the bulk of postal history has included a service
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measurement "internally" within the postal system, through the
role of
politics and thus the Post Office's relationship with Congress and
the
public.

Beginning with Rural Free Delivery and working through the

twentieth century, the Post Office was considered increasingly by the
criteria of administrative and managerial efficiency.
The political and service responsiveness of postal service to the

general public has declined, though specific interests have received

more attention to their needs than was the case in the past.
is in line with the Post Office's mandate,

Since this

it is not unexpected.

How-

ever, this result ties into public feelings about the effectiveness and

legitimacy of government.

It is in this context that the case study of

postal service points out the reasons for the failure of the delivery of
adequate public services and the possibility that this trend can be reversed by conscious policy choices and political action.

This is a

first step in conceptualizing the nature of the problem and so a begin-

ning in building foundations for deliberation and change.
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NOTES

This is not to say that the Post Office Department itself was responsive, for in many cases it resisted expansion of service and growth
because of economic and/or organizational reasons, but that with Congress
also involved the postal system was a responsive institution.
2

Positive in the sense of active, and through most of our history
it has also been a relatively positive experience, despite complaints
from Mason, Washington, and Jefferson, and all through the nation's existence

.

-^See

Chapter V.

^Martin Camoy and Derek Shearer, Economic Democracy; The Challenge of the 198Qs (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980), p. 21;
Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets:
The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1977).
^Effective or "good" administration was an important goal of the
founders, presenting a contrast to the government of the Articles°'of
Confederation.
This idea of effective or "good" administration would be
related to the ideas of statesmanship (Herbert J. Storing, "American
Statesmanship: Old and New," in Robert A. Goldwin, ed.. Bureaucrats
Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads ? (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), leadership qualities (James W. Ceaser,
Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton: Princeton
and the search for able personnel at the levels
University Press .1979)
of policymaking and "service" (Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A
Study in Administrative History 1789-1801 (New York: The Free Press,
19A8).
The understanding of "good" administration in the founding era,
then, incorporated the qualities of administrators as being moral,
civic-minded, and public spirited, while also checked in their activThis contrasts with later
ities by the political process and Congress.
ideas about administration, which center more around efficiency, rationalization, and scientific management (Frederick Moser, Democracy and
Oxford University Press, 1968)).
the Public Service (New York:
,

,

,

^Bureaucratic politics is a part of the whole mind set which dicRalph Hummel, when writing about burtates a style of decisionmaking.
eaucracy and its influence on politics, strikes a relevant note:
Not poliIn bureaucracy, administration replaces politics.
tics as the decision-making center of society bureaucracy increasingly makes the central decisions that govern public and
private life but politics as the participatory activity of
citizens cooperating and fighting with one another to work out

—

—

solutions to public problems.
Politics of this sort is replaced by purportedly "apolitiThe only thing
cal" decision-making of the managerial few.
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apolitical about such decision-making is
that the public is
excluded from the process. The rest
of this bureaucratic
apolitics is as political as traditional
politics used to be
the sense that through it are determined
the ways in which
we live our lives. Apolitics, in short,
is hidden decisionmaking which decides the fate of the public
but excludes the
public from the process.
Bu reaucratic Experience (New York:
St. Martin's
rress, ^'Q7T'^^'
ly//;, p. 165.

m

^Ibid

.

Vnmarie Hauck Walsh, The Public's Business: The Politics
and
Practices of Government Corp"^tions (Camhridpp, Mp..ch..c.o^^^
.

Press, 1980), pp. 3-4.
^Ibid., 6.

^

j^j^
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